

**POLITICAL SYSTEM  
OF  
PAKISTAN  
AND  
PUBLIC POLICY**

**ESSAYS IN  
INTERPRETATION**

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
POLITICAL SYSTEM  
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# POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN AND PUBLIC POLICY

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INTERPRETATION

SAEED SHAFQAT



PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHERS

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**FOR**

**DR. (MISS) K. F. YUSUF**



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I began working on the articles included in this book in the early 1980's although most of them have been published after 1985. In the process, I have rewritten and improvised some of these. In this exercise a number of my colleagues and students at the Quaid-i-Azam University (where I have been associated with the Department of Pakistan Studies from 1973-1988) have had an influence on my thinking. First and foremost, I am indebted to my friend Dr. Sikandar Hayat, Associate Professor of History; discussions and exchange of views with him helped me clarify some of my thoughts and ideas. I am grateful to him for taking out time to read most of these articles and making comments and suggestions. His comments have helped me a great deal in developing my arguments and theoretical framework. Dr. Aslam Syed and Dr. Sabiha Syed have helped me in many ways while I was conducting research. I have also benefitted from exchange of views with Professor Fateh Mohammad Malik, Dr. Mohammad Waseem, Dr. Riffat Hussain, at the Quaid-i-Azam University. I am also grateful to Dr. Tayyab Shabbir, at the University of Pennsylvania (U.S.A.), who read and made some very useful comments on one of these articles.

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20th October, 1989,  
Civil Services Academy, Lahore.



## INTRODUCTION

This book is a compilation of articles. Each article has a specific theme. Each focusses on an analysis of either a particular issue or set of issues and the policy responses that emerged or developed in resolving these. It is in this context that policy choices formulated and implemented by various regimes are analyzed and evaluated. It is a matter of serious concern that the political process in the country does not pay adequate attention to the formulation of public policy. It needs to be recognized that there is an integral relationship between the public policy and the political system. Thus, in these articles the effort is to identify some of the issues, to explicate public policy responses, and to analyze the relationship that these have with the political system of Pakistan. Public policy has a definite bearing on the political system. In turn, the political system influences its formulation, development, and implementation.

The first article "Pakistan Studies: Is it a discipline"?, Evaluating a education policy choice **is a further expansion** development of an article presented at the workshop on Pakistan Studies, organized by the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, held on June 26-27, 1989. The paper explains how Pakistan Studies was introduced as a discipline. Tracing the evolution, development and inadequacies of the discipline, it provides a conceptual framework of Pakistan Studies. The major argument is that Pakistan Studies should not be confused with the study of history of Pakistan movement or the ideology of Pakistan, although it covers both. It is suggested that studies on Pakistan should have an inter-disciplinary perspective, by utilizing insights from all the relevant disciplines.

The second article, "Political System of Pakistan 1947-1989: A Brief Analysis", is an exercise in model-building. It provides conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of crisis and change in the development of Pakistan's political system. This is an update or an earlier article, "Political System of Pakistan 1947-1977: A Brief Analysis", Published in *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. X, No. 1 & 2, Jan-July, December 1984. The article provides a brief overview and analysis of the dynamics of structural change and patterns of the ruling coalitions. It identifies four mechanisms of the making of ruling coalitions and the dynamics of structural change, i.e. selective co-option, containment, collateralization, and changes in international environment and performance of economic policies. Each regime change is followed by not only change in the public policy making but also in the ruling coalition, which in turn, effect the nature and direction of the political system.

The third article, "Politics of Islamization: The Ideological Debate on Pakistan's Political System", published in *Asian Profile*, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 1987, revolves around one central issue i.e., what should be the role of Islam in the political system of Pakistan? It analyzes the ideological debate by focussing on the three types of participants; the traditionalists, the neo-traditionalists and the modernists. It identifies the degree to which various regimes in Pakistan have exercised Islamization as a public policy choice and how it has affected the political system.

The fourth article, "Bureaucracy, Military and Party Politics, 1947-1958", (which has not been published previously and is from my forthcoming book) develops a typology of studies made on the early phase of Pakistani politics, 1947-58. It takes a point of departure from most of the earlier studies by suggesting that Pakistan's politics during this period can be better understood and analyzed by focuss-



ing on the role of bureaucratic-military elites rather than by concentrating on political parties and party system. It delineates and analyzes how bureaucracy and military was able to pre-empt political parties from the political process, thereby obfuscating the development of party system during this period.

The fifth article, "Public Policy, Financial Industrial Groups and Development of Economic Institutions in Pakistan: The Experience of the Sixties", published in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. xxvi, No. 2, July-December, 1988, focusses on the role of public policy making during the era of President Mohammad Ayub Khan. It is argued that under Ayub a policy choice was made to develop economic institutions. These institutions have continued to persist and explain the process of economic development or lack of it. These economic institutions did have an impact on the political process and facilitated the transformation of trader-merchants classes into financial-industrial groups. However, the interesting aspect was that during 1960s Ayub Khan initiated certain economic institutions that developed into important instruments of public policy.

The sixth article, "Public Policy and Reform in Pakistan" 1971-77: An Analysis of Zulifkar Ali Bhutto's Socio-Economic Policies" published in *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XI, No. 3, Spring 1988., develops insights as to how public policy was formulated under Bhutto. It treats Bhutto as a reformist leader, identifies and analyzes his socio-economic reformist policies, and argues as to how they were formulated and why these policies could not be implemented in their totality?

The seventh article, "Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: An Appraisal of Bhutto Period", published in the *Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on*

*Asian Studies*, 1987., focusses in detail on the patterns of civil-military relations. It analyzes what kind of policy choices were exercised by Bhutto regime in 1970s to re-define its relationship with the military? What impact it had on the nature of civil-military relations? Bhutto's excessive zeal in subordinating the military to political elites was an important factor that alienated the Bhutto regime from the military and expedited military's intervention into politics.

In this book, the basic effort has been to build a relationship between public policy and the political system of Pakistan.

## Pakistan Studies Evaluating an Education Policy Choice

Since 1978 Pakistan Studies has been a compulsory subject at the high school and college level. While Quaid-i-Azam University has the distinction of being the first institution in the country that started the Master's programme in Pakistan Studies in 1973, currently various Pakistan Studies centers in different universities of the country are engaged in this task. Some are offering diploma/degree and some are offering M.A. and M.Phil degrees, still others are offering joint Pakistan Studies/history diplomas. This has caused considerable confusion about the status of Pakistan Studies as a discipline. Since 1986 Allama Iqbal Open University has also introduced a programme of Master's degree in Pakistan Studies. This mushrooming of Pakistan Studies has aroused considerable interest in the programme and also raised questions about the credibility of the discipline. There is a common misperception that Pakistan Studies is a substitute for Pakistan history or at best its equivalent. Sometimes it is equated with the ideology of Pakistan. (This misperception is reinforced particularly if one takes a cursory look at the text books being used at high school and college level for teaching Pakistan Studies.) It is a misnomer to equate Pakistan Studies with



the discipline of History or substitute it for ideology of Pakistan. It must be underscored that both history and ideology are integral components of Pakistan Studies but not its equivalents. Then what is Pakistan Studies? How is it different or similar to other conventional disciplines? Here my effort will be to provide a conceptual basis of Pakistan Studies as a discipline and also briefly comment on how Pakistan Studies is being taught at various levels in the country.

The confusion regarding the nature, direction and orientation of Pakistan Studies in terms of a study programme and a discipline in search of some methodology is visible in a recently published Report of the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Islamabad (N.I.P.S. Report). The Report finds area study approach towards Pakistan Studies as inadequate, propagandist and designed to serve the interests of sponsoring agencies.<sup>1</sup> Identifying the inadequacies of area studies, the authors point out "inter-disciplinary feuds" and argue that inter-disciplinary integration leading to a new "discipline is a rarity". Deducing from the same misplaced logic, "in case of Pakistan Studies", the authors emphatically assert that, "a true integration resulting in the emergence of a new discipline is still a remote possibility"<sup>2</sup>. Thereby they reject area study approach and propose to Islamize Pakistan Studies. This adds to the confusion rather than clarity on the functioning and evolution of the discipline. The authors propose a 'methodology' for Pakistan Studies based on what they call "Quranic view of man". According to the authors,

the Quranic view neither over-emphasises the complete autonomy of man, nor does it sacrifice the dignity of man. It strikes a healthy balance whereby man is seen as autonomous in decisions/choices but then he will have to bear the consequences of those choices. The other level of justification may be called existential levels i.e. there exist in Pakistan certain conditions which strongly

point to the feasibility of this methodology<sup>3</sup>.

Through this 'Quranic view' methodology, the authors seem to be suggesting that the study of Pakistan, be based on the moral principles of Islam. Thus they propose Sharia as the guiding principle for teaching and research on Pakistan Studies. The authors assert,

If we need to fix moral responsibility for certain actions, it may be more useful to identify the decision makers and their motives in terms of moral dimensions rather than supposed socio-psychological and economic determinants of their actions. This would involve research into individual and collective deviations from the Sharia, and further research to determine whether such deviations were intentional or they were product of misjudgement.<sup>4</sup>

Through what method does one determine and clarify "moral responsibility", "motives of decision makers", and "deviations from the Sharia" is not clear.

Quranic view, would probably be more beneficial for Islamic Studies, if one is to think in terms of improving its methodology. However one finds serious constraints with regard to its applicability on Pakistan Studies.

This clearly reveals that the authors are over stretching the role of Sharia in formulating a case for Pakistan Studies. At the same time they find it difficult to draw a distinction or develop relationship between Sharia laws and social science theories and methodology. Its not merely a question of showing preference for 'positivist' or a 'interpretative'<sup>5</sup> dimensions of social theory as the authors would like us to believe, but a question of developing relationship between social science theory, concepts, methods and better comprehension about studies on Pakistan. The Report's preoccupa-



tion appears to be in Islamizing Pakistan Studies programme rather than developing it into an autonomous discipline. The role of Islam and the Sharia in Pakistan Studies is understandable, some very interesting and insightful work is already available in this direction<sup>6</sup>. However, the need is to synthesize the knowledge, theory and methods from various social science disciplines, so that one may better appreciate and understand the problems of contemporary Pakistan. It is only by developing such a perspective that one can possibly conceive of developing policy choices and alternatives for the decision makers.

The authors seem to misunderstand and misinterpret the spirit of 'area studies'. The area study approach or inter-disciplinary perspective does not seek or advocate "integration" of various disciplines. By making use of more than one discipline, it focusses on the various facets of a particular area. The inter-disciplinary approach aims at building synthesis and developing consensus among various disciplines rather than integration. Here the effort will be to explain how 'area studies' and Pakistan studies programmes have evolved and grown.

In the post-World War - II phase, area study programmes were initiated in American, European and Soviet Universities. The basic purpose was to synthesize area and discipline knowledge and to have a better and deeper understanding of the newly emerging societies. Simultaneously an implicit objective was to provide authentic and reliable information to the decision makers, so that while developing policy options towards the newly emerging countries, their decision makers (i.e. U.S., Soviet, European etc.) could protect, project and advocate their national interests. In the U.S. Universities area programmes acquired a prestigious position, as in

1958, American Government passed the *National Defence Education Act (N.D.E.A.)*. Through NDEA from 1958-73 Federal funding for area and language programme was about 14 million dollars annually<sup>7</sup>. Besides, American Corporations and Foundations also made heavy investments in the area programme. Massive investments by American Universities in the Area Programmes did influence the academic world in Britain and Europe. In 1959, the British University Grants Committee had to reorient its policies and priorities by focussing on Area Study Programme. Presently, in Europe, quite a few Universities have Area Programmes. Unfortunately, very little is known about Soviet studies on Pakistan. Although it is generally recognized that considerable scholarly work on Pakistan does exist in Russian language. However, much of it needs to be translated. It is interesting to note that in about 35 American Universities South Asia Programmes are being run, but Pakistan does not figure out prominently in more than seven to eight universities. Thus by and large in the American and Western Universities Pakistan has remained understudied and ignored. This necessitates that howsoever late, we must have Pakistan Studies Programme.

India was also quick to grasp the significance of area programmes. In the early sixties, at the Rajasthan University Jaipur, South Asia Center was established. It has made substantial studies of problems confronting India, and has been performing an important feed back task for the Indian government, for policy studies on Pakistan. A Pakistan Study Center has also been in operation at Hyderabad University. Realizing the benefit and significance of area programme in 1969 at the Jawahar Lal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi a fullfledged Pakistan Studies Programme was also initiated. At J.N. U. Pakistan Study Center offers: M. Phil and Ph. D. degrees. Presently, they have about nine students in their M. Phil programme and three to four students are enrolled in the Ph. D. programme.<sup>8</sup>

The Pakistan Studies programme should serve as a laboratory on the issues and problems confronting Pakistan. A systematic scientific and objective analysis is desired, not a rhetorical advocacy of a particular point of view. The effort should be to explore and identify the source of tension and to suggest alternatives to keep the fabric of the nation and state unified. Presently, there exists some ambiguity about the nature, working, and scope of Pakistan studies programmes. Three reasons can be pointed out:

- (a) The Pakistan Studies Programme was enunciated without any clear objectives and guiding principles, (i. e. a conceptual framework was not there).
- (b) University education in our country has not been responsive to public policy issues.
- (c) We did not have adequately qualified staff, trained in the techniques of multi-disciplinary study of an area.

In terms of a discipline Pakistan Studies calls for a merger of social science disciplines with a nucleus on Pakistan. Founded at Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan Studies was conceived and designed to grow along the lines of an area study programme.

The primary advantage of an area study programme is that it aims to provide a comprehensive knowledge on a particular area — a picture of the area in its entirety. No single discipline can perform this task satisfactorily. It is only through a cross-disciplinary approach and an area perspective that one can analyze the bits and parts of a polity and tie one to another.



Unfortunately in our educational system teaching and educational training is still predominantly single discipline oriented. A rigid compartmentalization of disciplines which characterizes the Pakistan research environment is a severe constraint. Cross-disciplinary communication and exchange of ideas among the educationists is limited if not poor. Although conferences and seminars do take place in each discipline, (such as history, sociology, economics, political science etc.) scholars in general, hardly take any interest in disciplines other than their own. There is a general lack of awareness about inter-disciplinary perspectives. That makes it all the more difficult to appreciate the spirit and content of an area study programme. The studies of an "Area" may include at least the following aspects:-

- (1) Power Relations i.e. interaction within various groups and also intra-power units.

To understand the political system of an area it is essential to identify the sources of power and explain the dynamics of struggle for power. This is facilitated when we address ourselves to such questions: who commands power, which groups are the dominant groups and why? what is the relationship of these groups with each other? How is power distributed and exchanged among the groups of various regions of the country.

- (2) Memories of unique collective history:

Collective consciousness of a people can be instrumental in shaping the destiny of a nation. The history of the Pakistan Movement must be analyzed on the basis of Nationalist sentiment. An interpretive history rather than the descriptive history should be the guiding principle. We need to concen-

*romanticist view*  
CP 3

trate upon the social, economic and political aspects of History and its development, particularly with reference to the regions that constitute Pakistan.

- (3) Economic relations among its various social groups and regional/geographic components:

An understanding of economic resources, their distribution among groups and regions is vital for the study of society. Disparities in economic resources can cause social cleavages in the nation and may rupture the very fabric of the state. Issues confronting Pakistan's economy may be analyzed in relationship to social groups and regional units. Economic development policies must aim to remove regional disparities.

- (4) Physical configuration and contiguity:

Geographical forces can be a determining factor in the evolution, growth and development of a state. Geographically contiguous area tends to be cohesive, however, regional variation requires a serious study. An understanding of geographical factor can facilitate our understanding of frontiers, boundaries and territorial disputes within a state, and in relation to its neighbours.

- (5) Culture as manifestation of interaction of languages, religious thought, ideals and values of the society:

✓ Culture of Pakistan with Islam as its essential component is understandable. Yet, there appears to be little effort at locating and treating the influences of Islam on our society. A basic orientation in that direction has been given by thinkers like Jamalud-

din Afghani and Allama Mohammad Iqbal. This can also be facilitated by taking into account the works of such thinkers and sufi saints of Pakistan like Shah Lateef of Bhit, Rehman baba, Bullay Shah, and others who spread their message in indigenous languages. The study of regional languages and culture alongwith the national language needs to be encouraged.

**(6) Social Groups and societal values:**

Pakistan is a heterogenous society. A variety of social groups exist in Pakistan. How these groups interact, inter-relate and facilitate the development of societal values, needs to be appreciated. What bearing social groups, ethnicity and religion is having on our societal values and national goals needs to be analyzed.

**(7) Strategic considerations:**

The significance of an area changes with the changing political realities. In the contemporary world of today the geo-political significance of Pakistan's location cannot be over-emphasized, however systematic studies identifying and explaining the strategic importance of Pakistan have yet to be made.

A dispassionate, analytical, objective and empirical study of inter-relationship of such aspects is fundamental to the Pakistan Studies programmes. Its about time that survey research and opinion polls are encouraged as research techniques. This will give us an insight into the intricate aspects of Pakistani state, society and economy and help us to acquire a comprehensive knowledge of it. Indeed over the



past few decades the study and research in social sciences has undergone a rapid transformation, cross-fertilization between disciplines has made it difficult to draw a line where the boundary of one ends and the other begins. The direction is clearly from mastery in a single discipline to a synthesis of various disciplines in studying a particular area.

The cross disciplinary and area studies approach in social sciences is particularly important for countries like ours which, in fact, are old societies undergoing changes of multi-dimensional nature under the impact of modernisation processes. The scholar observing these developing societies is confronted with two fundamental questions; one, the relationship of these tradition bound areas to an age of science and technology and two, how the developing societies are acquiring modern technology and also struggling to retain their cultural identity? Tradition, modernity and technological infusion is producing strains and contradictory processes in these societies. A complex and multi-directional transformation of societal values and group behaviour is taking place. To say the least, a single discipline expert will find it difficult to comprehend the processes of social, economic and political changes in a developing society like ours. This consideration necessitate's that Pakistan Studies as a discipline must evolve, grow and expand on an area study programme pattern, synthesizing area and discipline knowledge. Pakistan Studies programme should be developed into a laboratory where cross fertilization of various social science disciplines takes place. Where it is not the discipline but Pakistan that serves as a prism for various disciplines. Students obtaining M. A. Degree in Pakistan Studies, could specialize in a conventional discipline, (history, sociology etc.) by doing a required number of courses in a discipline of their choice. It was in this spirit that Master's programme at Quaid-i-Azam University was initiated. The course programme exposed students to such diverse but integrated aspects of studies: the historical

origins of our nation: the political system of Pakistan: the interaction and role of regional languages in identifying cultural similarities in evolving national culture, the relationship between economic development and technological advancement and its impact on our economy; understanding of folk-urban continuum; life style; customs and behaviour of our people; the role and significance of Islam in regulating our social behaviour, values and thought processes; the dynamics of geo-strategic considerations in the broad framework of South Asia.

Since it is a new and non-conventional programme of study in its content and spirit, it is also confronted with the problem of recognition as a discipline. Recognition has not been forthcoming from among the other social science disciplines in the country nor from the governmental agencies. In fact, the emergence, growth and development of Pakistan Studies has brought to surface a quite but fundamental struggle between conventional disciplines, particularly history, and Pakistan Studies which is likely to affect the self-identification of aspiring scholars. One way to make this struggle healthy and competitive would be if the hard core social scientists in the country i.e. Economists, Sociologists, Anthropologists, and Political Scientists take active interest in Pakistan Studies as a discipline and a programme. It is regrettable that, so far the attitude of hard core social scientists towards Pakistan Studies has been that of benign neglect or at best that of an ambivalence. These social scientists need to recognize that Pakistan Studies has come to stay as a programme and a discipline and that they can make an important contribution in determining the future direction and scope of the discipline. Pakistan Studies needs and must benefit from the theories, methods and rigorous analysis of social sciences. Pakistan studies as an area programme can bridge the gap



between the generalities of theory building and particularities of individual case studies — the debate that keeps social sciences divided into two groups.

Students obtaining Master's degree in Pakistan Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University have proved their mettle under extremely difficult conditions. They have suffered from the problem of identity, self doubt, even inferiority complex because Pakistan Studies is a non-conventional discipline and has not been given due recognition which is given to other disciplines. And yet, in spite of all, they have done extremely well with whatever recognition they got. According to estimates based on departmental record, controller of examination's office and my informal contacts with the sizeable number of former students, between 1973-83, about 160 students with a male-female ratio of almost 50:50 have obtained Master's degree in Pakistan Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University. Out of these about 35 have made it into the Civil Services of Pakistan, another 30-35 are working as School/College teachers of Pakistan Studies. Still another 30-35 have joined Banks, Ministry of Education, Army Education Corps. About 55-60 could not be identified. Only about 7-10% female students are gainfully employed in Civil Services and educational institutions. The fate of the rest is not known. (For post 1983 progress of students see the N.I.P.S. report).

Now with the mushrooming of Pakistan Studies programme at various universities of the country, it is imperative that conceptual parameters are defined and disciplinary recognition is attained. If the degree in Pakistan Studies has to become a marketable commodity it must be distinctively different from the traditional disciplines and should at least be competitive if not superior to the traditional disciplines. This would imply reinforcing the "area-study" spirit and content of Pakistan Studies programme.

To achieve this objective, besides teaching, the research and policy orientation content of Pakistan Studies programme needs to be strengthened. Research implies not only initiating M. Phil and Ph. D. programmes but choosing challenging topics and issues that confront Pakistan as a nation-state. It entails developing new perspectives and re-interpretation of old problems. Research implies funding, infrastructural facilities, and above all intellectual innovation. If Pakistan studies can provide lead in intellectually stimulating research, funding and support for the programme would follow. Besides, encouraging research on specific issues. Pakistan Studies must be the nerve centre for encouraging research on Islamic ideals and Muslim society. Researchers may seek to bridge the gap between Islamic ideals and Muslim reality in Pakistani society.

Secondly, policy analysis must be made an essential component of Pakistan Studies programme. Pakistan Studies can serve as a nucleus and feeding ground for policy and issue oriented research. This would help promote an understanding between the decision makers of the country and the academic community. It is worthwhile to note that one reason (besides many others) why adversarial relationship prevail between the country's policy makers and the academic community is that policy makers find little research that has relevance for them or for efficient execution of a decision.

Pakistan Studies as a programme and a center of research must concentrate on concrete realities and objective conditions of Pakistan. For the purposes of research it is imperative that we "keep our feet in Pakistan; our eyes on the world". It implies that we intensify research on Pakistan's national imperatives, issues and policy arenas that we want to explore and for that we must probe into the concrete realities.



Secondly, it means that we must learn from the experiences of other states in the world - anything foreign (in term of research tools i.e. theories, concepts, methods etc.) that is good should be absorbed as our nourishment, to serve our needs.

Pakistan studies is not merely a plea for inter-disciplinary area studies synthesis but a case for a new discipline, which while borrowing from the knowledge of social sciences has the potential to construct concepts, build theories and models that at micro level are specific to the objective, conditions and concrete realities of Pakistan's society, polity and economy, and are general enough to facilitate our understanding of developing countries at the macro-level.

Finally, Pakistan Studies as a programme and discipline must not be history-centric—as Pakistan lies in future and not in the past. This is not to suggest that past and history are irrelevant to understand the concrete realities of contemporary Pakistan. The problem with history in Pakistan is that it is obsessed with documentation and description of events or personalities. No attention is paid to explain or analyze the social forces that generated a particular event or brought the crises and change in the socio-economic and political conditions of Muslims society. The study of history is too important and need not be treated as the exclusive domain of the professional historian. History must be studied to analyze and understand the present. However, we must not be overburdened with history. It is the contemporary Pakistan which is faced with complex problems and challenges. The problems we face today will become more complex and multi-dimensional in the next decade. Now is the need to understand historical objectivity and prepare Pakistani society for the twenty first century. How we respond today will, in fact, determine the future of Pakistan. Pakistan Studies programme as outlined above will not only afford



researchers an opportunity to conduct research on contemporary Pakistan but will also act as a window on its future of Pakistan.

### Teaching of Pakistan Studies from Matric to B.A.:

There is a need to reevaluate the working and operation of Pakistan Studies at various levels. From secondary school to B.A. level there appears to be considerable overlap and repetition in Pakistan Studies curriculum (See table). Consequently, the students not only find the programme repetitive and uninteresting, but in recent years appear to have developed an aversion for the programme<sup>9</sup> They take it as an unnecessary burden being repeated over and over. Pakistan Studies as a compulsory subject is treated as a discipline that has no relevance with the degrees they seek in Science and Humanities. A study of the course content at various levels reveals that it is not interdisciplinary perspective, modern and scientific education that is being encouraged. Eversince the subject was made compulsory, the effort has been to 'Islamize' the books on Pakistan. Pervez Hoodbhoy, commenting on the content of various books of Pakistan Studies has observed:

"Islamization is the central concern of all Modern Pakistan Studies textbooks . . . . Modern textbooks heavily stress the formal and ritualistic aspects of Islam, as against those which emphasise social justice. Science and secular knowledge are held in deep suspicion"<sup>10</sup>.

## CURRICULUM CONTENT OF PAKISTAN STUDIES AT VARIOUS LEVELS

SECONDARY LEVEL	INTERMEDIATE	B. A.
Foundation of Pakistan: Ideological Basis of Pakistan, Causes of Downfall of Muslim in India.	Advent of South Asia and its role in the making of Pakistan.	Ideology of Pakistan from 1857, Khilafat Movement, Pakistan Movement Objectives Resolution and efforts towards Islamization.
Religious assertion and Pakistan Movement.	Impact of Islam on local culture: Religious revival, Muslim League, Pakistan Resolution.	Geography and Agricultural, Industrial resources.
Constitution and Government in Pakistan.	Objectives Resolution and Islamization. Geography natural resources, administrative division.	Pakistan and the Muslim World.
Geography and Natural Resources.	Cultural heritage and role of languages.	
Pakistan Muslim Countries and relations with the world.	Economic development. Pakistan, Islamic countries, U.N., Non-alignment and RCD etc.	

Similarly in another interesting study, Aftab Kazi<sup>11</sup> while making an analysis of the course content of Pakistan Studies books at high school and college level has incisively pointed out that Islamic ideology and history of North and Central India continue to dominate Pakistan Studies curriculum. He has aptly observed that history of the regions that constitute Pakistan, and the role they played in Pakistan movement has been completely ignored. Identifying the weaknesses of the curriculum content Kazi recommends a complete reevaluation and re-examination of the Pakistan Studies textbooks from Matric to B.A. He has suggested that an integrated history of regions that constitute Pakistan, with reference to their social, cultural, economic and political affinities is imperative for national integration and needs to be incorporated in Pakistan Studies curriculum.

In a concise and excellent paper, Hafeez has critically examined the various errors of facts, false assertions and poor expressions, while reviewing the Pakistan Studies text books prescribed at the intermediate level.<sup>12</sup> He has noted that the language and expression used for defining "ideology of Pakistan", "Islamic State", "Pakistani Culture" etc, is confusing, vague and biased. He has suggested that books at this level should carry a brief introductory note on Pakistan Studies, and that the language and style of the texts should be clear, comprehensive and simple.

It appears that for the past one decade or so Pakistan Studies has been used as an instrument to advance 'Pakistan Ideology' from a 'particular' point of view. The effort seems to be on only emphasising on the Islamic character and 'basis' of Pakistan movement. It is understandable though, yet the thrust has to be in familiarizing the new generation with facts about Pakistan movement and exposing them to that, explaining what went wrong and how. Commenting



on this aspect of studies about Pakistan, 'Dawn' has recently editorialized as follows:

We also tend to be biased and selective in compiling facts and in assessing the work of material relating to the emergence of Pakistan and its subsequent wanderings through the passage way of time and event . . . The point to stress is that the construction of the history of a nation is a continuous process and in this there is no choosing between pleasant facts and the unsavoury truths, between moments of glory and those of utter defection. Both form an integral part of the total reality of life of a nation. Unless there is full acceptance of both a spirit of historical objectivity for a new nation at any rate there is always the danger of falling into illusions or errors of judgement. Opening the possibility of some of the mistakes and failings of past being repeated. The pith and substance of all this is regardless of their connotations and impact in a given context. Armed with this spirit, we must begin to collect and preserve all the documents and source material about Pakistan<sup>1 3</sup>.

Its about time that we seriously review the curriculum content of Pakistan Studies from Matric to B.A. level, remove factual errors, see history in proper context and make the syllabi objective and rational. Simultaneously there is need to review whether Pakistan Studies should be continued as a compulsory subject or be made optional. It appears that by making Pakistan Studies as a compulsory subject, its the stereo-type image that has been reinforced (i.e. Pakistan movement, Pakistan ideology, History of Pakistan etc.). This has undermined the autonomous growth of the discipline. Nothing innovative or interesting is associated with Pakistan Studies. As an optional subject only those students will opt for it who are curious or are serious about Pakistan

Studies as a discipline. This will add to the credibility of the subject which has come under question since it has been made compulsory.

## NOTES

1. *Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar and Sarfaraz Hussain Ansari, Pakistan Studies: A Report on the State of the Discipline in Pakistan: Islamabad, National Institute of Pakistan Studies. 1988. p. 2.*
2. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
5. *Ibid.*,
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 28-29.
6. For an excellent discussion on Shariah laws with reference to Pakistan see Abdul Ghafur Muslim, "Application of Shariah laws: An investigation into the problems and principles in the field of Islamization". *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* Vol. vi, No. 2, July - December 1985. pp. 19-36.
7. For detailed discussion and description on funding and programmes see, Lucian W. Pye. "The confrontation between Discipline and Area Studies" in Lucian Pye, *Political Science and Area Studies: Rivals or Partners. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. pp. 3-22.*
8. *Information based on an interview with an Indian Scholar visiting Pakistan in 1986.*
9. *Observation based on my informal conversations with the Probationers at Civil Services Academy, on the subject.*
10. *Parvez Amir Ali Hoodbhoy and Abdul Hameed Nayyar, "Reviewing the History of Pakistan " in Asghar Khan (ed), The Pakistan Experience: State and Religion, Lahore; Vanguard, 1985. p. 174.*
11. *Aftab Kazi, "Ethnic nationalities, Education, and Problems of National Integration in Pakistan". Asian Profile Vol. 16, No. 2, April 1988. pp. 147-162.*

12. Abdul Hafeez. "*Intermediate ki Kitab Ka Review*". Paper presented at the workshop on *Pakistan Studies as a Discipline*, organized by NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN STUDIES' Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, June 26, 27, 1989.
13. *Dawn*, Karachi, 18 May, 1989.





## Political System of Pakistan 1947-1989: A Brief Analysis

This paper shall address itself at two levels: (i) theoretical and (ii) empirical. At the theoretical level "systems paradigm", shall be used which states that in political systems, "there are components that are related with some durability over time. Durability implies that the components are organized or structured predicting changes in the state of the system in the components, and the relationship becomes the task of analysis. Connections are sought among components across both physical and organizational (structural) space and across time".<sup>1</sup> In this context "durability" of "structures", "connections" and "relationships" among the various components of Pakistan's political system shall be sought to develop systems logic of development and change.

At the empirical level Flanagan's model of crisis and structural change, which is designed in the broad framework of system's paradigm, shall be operationalized to explain the dynamics of Pakistan's political system (1947-89). The model suggests that changes in the international environment and performance of government generate systemic crisis which lead to structural change.<sup>2</sup> The model identifies four phases of crisis and change: (i) the antecedent system; (ii) environmental performance changes; (iii) coalition formation and

crisis resolution; and (iv) developmental linkage and the resultant system (see Diagram 1). Systemic crisis and structural change implies, according to Flanagan, "a fundamental change in regime that alters the institutional balance among the power contenders". These "power contenders" are not mere "personalities" but are rooted in certain institutions or structures. "Thus the attack on the incumbent that accompanies a systemic crisis is not simply an attack on personalities that can be settled through a routine turn over process. The issues go to the heart of the institutionalized criteria for allocating authority and rewards and cannot be resolved in favour of the challengers without some fundamental changes in the political structure, that is in the structure and process of recruitment and decision making"<sup>3</sup>.


This pattern of systemic crisis and structural change appears to be the dominant characteristic of Pakistan's political system. What are the dynamics of systemic crisis? How these are resolved? How ruling coalitions are formed? And what kind of structural changes are introduced? These questions shall be analyzed to explain the dynamics of Pakistan's political system.

The structural components of Pakistan's political system can be identified as military, bureaucracy, industrial-merchant classes, political elites, and religious elites. These are relatively "structured" components. Out of these military, bureaucracy and industrial-merchant classes are structural components with greater "durability". Hence these components have propensity to dominate the other components and the system, and a tendency to impede the growth of other relatively weak components. Whereas weak components remain weak or decay, these components acquire greater strength over a period of time. In some respects these three components i.e. military, bureaucracy, and merchant-industrial classes are the parameters of Pakistan's political



system. In the ruling coalition making process, they emerge as the critical components. It is the interaction and changing relationships among these structural components that gives birth to relatively unorganized structural components, (the dynamics being change in international environment and economic policies), like middle farmers, new industrial-commercial classes, middle class intelligentsia and the urban labour. These new components effect the coalition making process. Both military and political elites reveal a tendency to broaden and reinforce their coalition. However political elites appear to be the losers in this coalition making process. While inducting these new components they fall back on bureaucracy or military or play one with the other. Consequently the basis of coalition remains fragile, alternate institutional development does not occur. Thus the military bureaucracy, the industrial-merchant groups and classes continue to acquire durability in the absence of alternate structures. By focussing on the changing relationships of these components and induction of new components and their changing relationships the ruling coalition patterns of the political system can be predicted with some credibility.

During the period of 1947-89, seven ruling coalition patterns can be identified. (See Diagram 2). In its dynamics these patterns are cyclical and have a tendency to recur on an average of five year cycle. Each is preceded by a systemic crisis, occurring under changes in the environmental performance changes in international and governmental performance). Each successive systemic crisis not only changed the composition of the ruling coalition, but also led to structural changes. Each coalition made an effort to alter the existing institutional balance in its favour. In this process of alternately altering structural balance, reinforcement of the ruling coalition, rather than developing a consensus on the nature of the system was sought. In the absence of structural balance, the system continues to have a latent tendency towards



systemic crisis.

### **Ruling Coalition and Dynamics of Structural Change 1947-58:**

Pakistan achieved independence in 1947 and inherited the British institutions of government. In the Colonial pattern of government bureaucracy and military with sparing use of judiciary were the dominant institutions. Consequently at the time of independence these institutions had greater durability as compared to other institutions. Though political elites who led the nationalist movement had high mobilization capacity they inherited weak or almost non-existent political institutions. So they suffered from low governance capability. Their immediate problem was to create an institutional balance. The Founders of course showed preference for adopting the Westminster parliamentary democracy model.

The early phase of Pakistan's politics, 1947-58, reflected the transitory nature of transformation from Colonialism to Independence. Political elites who had social origins in the landed aristocracy and legal professions acquired the reigns of the government. In the absence of political institutions they fell on bureaucracy. It must be understood in relative terms. The bureaucracy although small in size had more experience and tradition of government as compared to the political parties or political elites. This marked the beginning of a two component interaction and domination of the political system. Political elites instead of developing political parties revealed tendency to formulate a ruling coalition with the help of bureaucracy. This can be readily attributed to two factors. I) In the final stages of Pakistan's movement (1940-47) Muslim merchant classes (who later became merchant-industrial classes) from Bombay and Gujrat, (now part of India) provided initial finance for the Pakistan movement and also migrated to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> Because of their histo-



rical association with the political elites, they emerged as an important coalitional component. Political elites found it imperative to protect the interests of these classes. The first industrial policy announced in January 1948, encouraged the growth of private capitalist industry.<sup>5</sup> It placed only Defence production, Hydro-electricity-Power and Irrigation and Communications under public sector. II) In the wake of independence and partition of India, about 6-8 million Muslims migrated to Pakistan. Though these migrants were dispersed both in the urban and rural areas, substantial majority settled in the urban centres, which effected the demographic composition of the cities. The rehabilitation and settlement of these migrants was a primary concern for the government, which forced reliance on bureaucracy. These two factors vitalized the position of the bureaucracy and broadened the parameters of this ruling coalition to the merchant-industrial classes.

During 1950-53 changes in the international environment and changes in the performance of the government induced changes in the components of ruling coalition. United States adopted a strategy of containing Communism in Asia and made overtures towards Asian states with similar objectives. Pakistan conscious of security threat from India, and the Pakistan military eager to modernize itself, responded affirmatively towards U.S. overtures. In 1951, U.S.-Pakistan mutual security treaty brought military to lime-light as a significant component in the political system of Pakistan. U.S. involvement in Korean war during the same period facilitated export of cotton and jute. The government found it convenient to initiate economic and industrial policies. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) were initiated, and private enterprise was encouraged to develop textile and other related consumer industries.<sup>6</sup> The Korean boom marked the beginning of

industrial growth in Pakistan.

These developments also increased the interaction between bureaucracy and merchant-industrial classes, and brought to surface military as an important aspirant for ruling coalition. Political elites involved in their in-fights and confronted with a challenge from the religious elites revealed weakness to hold the coalition together. The religious elites challenged the legitimacy of the ruling coalition. They contended that in an Islamic Polity westernized elites could not be allowed to govern. They demanded the enforcement of Islamic laws.

One of their major demand was to declare Ahmedia's (Ahmedia's are a religious sect in Pakistan who did not believe in the finality of Prophethood) a minority.<sup>7</sup> The resulting crisis of governmental performance forced the political elites to enforce Martial Law in certain cities of Pakistan. Religious elites showed tremendous capacity to mobilize masses on religious issues, leading to polarization, generation of systemic crisis and formulation of a new ruling coalition. This agitation gave military its first visibility in the political processes of the country. Growing internal crisis and changing international environment marked the ascendancy of military in the political system of Pakistan. A series of treaties (May 1954 U.S. -Pakistan Mutual Aid, September 1954 membership of SEATO, September 1955, membership of CENTO) reinforced the position of military.<sup>8</sup> These changes in the international environment and changes in the governmental performance introduced military as a component with some durability in the political system of Pakistan. From a position of oblivion in 1947, by mid fifties it acquired a position of pre-eminence. As bureaucracy, merchant-industrial classes collaboration expanded, the relevance of political elites to the system became minimal.

The decay of political elites was expected. Systemic



crisis were imminent despite initial growth Pakistan was moving towards increased ethnic conflict between Punjabi and Bengali political elites. In West Pakistan Muslim League's strategy of mass mobilization (particularly during the year 1958) intensified conflict between the political elites who dominated the ruling coalition and those who sought to gain power. Political elites appeared incapable of resolving their differences on socio-political issues confronting the country. The adversarial relations among the dominant and the contending political elites deepened the cleavage in the elite structure. In October 1958 the military encouraged by the favourable international environment and poor performance by the political elites intervened to resolve the crisis. mil

In 1958 the military acted to resolve the systemic crisis, evolved a new ruling coalition and "resynchronized" the system. This change of regime meant defining new rules, and shifting emphasis on the relationship of various structural components. The military ventured to alter the balance of power, both at the ruling coalition and structural level. As has been pointed out by mid fifties military was encroaching upon the system, in the post 1958 phase it tended to dominate the system.

The military operated at two levels. In the global context, it explicitly identified Pakistan with United States in the Asian International sub-System. It also revealed eagerness to encourage capitalist pattern of economic development systematically, compared to the previous regime. At the internal level it ventured to evolve a new ruling coalition, and adopted a reformist position to legitimize its rule. At least four mechanisms can be identified through which change of relationships was induced among the components to formulate a new ruling coalition and generate structural changes. Three mechanisms are explained through internal dynamics whereas the fourth is explained through external dynamics.

These mechanism became a standard procedure of coalition formation and structural alternation in the political system of Pakistan and have been used by successive regimes to formulate a ruling coalition. These mechanisms were: (i) Selective Co-option; (ii) Collateralization; (iii) Containment (iv) Economic Policies and Changes in International Environment.

### (1) Selective Co-option:

To evolve a favourable institutional power base, the Martial Law regime slashed the role of political elites. In 1959 the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) was enforced. This affected about 6,000 politicians of various size and shades. Nearly 40% of the big landlords were affected. The ordinance debarred these politicians from holding any elective office till December 1966.<sup>9</sup> By this slash those political elites who resisted military domination were eliminated. With this slash the regime took measures to co-opt relatively conservative big landlords and middle farmers. This selective co-option policy brought eclipse of political elites who had participated in the Pakistan movement. Instead the new coalition inducted those conservative political elites who were consistent in showing loyalty towards the government. Since the British times these political elites were socialized in subordination to the administrative rulers. Whereas the military co-opted the conservative political elites for the ruling coalition, it also attempted to project a reformist image. In 1959 land reforms were announced. These reforms introduced the notion of land ceiling fixation in the agrarian structure of Pakistan. Ownership of ceiling was fixed at 500 acres for irrigated lands and 1,000 for the non-irrigated lands.<sup>10</sup> These reforms were more of a rule legitimizing mechanism rather than a genuine reform effort. Besides to induct the military in the agrarian structure, a scheme of granting land to the officers of the military was initiated. Through these measures the Martial Law regime not only



legitimized its rule but also altered the structural balance favourably.

## (2) Collateralization:

The Martial Law regime socialized the bureaucracy to descend from coequal to collateral relationship. The Screening Committees were set up by the regime, and thirty one officers from the prestigious Civil Service, Foreign Service and Police Service were removed on the charges of corruption and inefficiency. As many as 1,662 Civil Servants belonging to central and provincial services were removed.<sup>11</sup> With these 'corrective' measures the regime re-defined the coalition relationship with bureaucracy and also reinforced its reformist image. This re-defined relationship between these two components of the ruling coalition established their dominance in the political system of Pakistan. The two acted in greater unison and complemented each other's reinforcement.

## (3) Containment:

The Martial Law regime aimed at containing the religious elites and also de-politicising the masses. The religious elites had been making efforts to penetrate the ruling coalition and legitimize their role in the political system. However the military considered these elites peripheral to the coalition and having a negative input function in the system. Besides the religious elites did not have a stable support base. So in the new coalition recruitment pattern they were the losers. They did agitate and protest, but were successfully contained as military and bureaucracy acted in greater unison as compared to pre-1958 phase. However religious elites remained a potentially explosive component with high mass mobilization capacity to generate systemic crisis in the political system.

Besides the regime depoliticised the masses by banning

political parties and political activities. It was argued that political parties had brought the country on the brink of disintegration, hence the military intervention to rejuvenate the system. In this perspective all political activity was considered anti-state and had to be contained.

#### (4) Economic Policies and Changes in International Environment:

The Martial Law regime devised an industrial and commercial policy to formulate coalition with the new industrial commercial classes. It undermined the influence of established industrial-merchant classes and recruited new members in this class. In a reformist posture it encouraged capitalist road to economic development. It de-emphasized deficit budgeting and brought a relative budgetary equilibrium. It could afford to do so because by identifying itself with the United States in Asian international sub-system it was able to procure foreign aid. Assured of capital inflow, the regime increased credit facility to the private sector. During 1959-62 the aggregate increase in commercial credit exceeded by over 60% as compared to the total expansion of commercial credit during 1949-59. The regime introduced another commercial policy to change the structure of merchant-industrial classes. It was called Bonus Voucher Scheme (BVS). The scheme allowed exporters to receive vouchers priced at a certain proportion of the value of goods and commodities they sold abroad. These vouchers could be sold at a premium in the market. The BVS were bought by the importers to obtain foreign exchange, so that they could import goods and commodities on the "bonus list". Apparently the BVS scheme was to promote export, "in actual practice it became a highly efficient tool for distributing economic benefits from one class of people to another".<sup>12</sup> Thus by introducing control mechanisms in the supply side of economics the regime inducted new industrial-commercial classes in the ruling



coalition, and redefined the basis of relationship with established merchant-industrial classes.

As has been discussed above, during 1958-62, the Martial Law regime by pursuing a strategy of selective co-option, collateralization, containment and policies of economic development resolved the systemic crisis and formulated a new ruling coalition. Through these measures it legitimized and consolidated its position, altered the institutional power base, and introduced structural changes by changing the resource allocation and distribution pattern in the political system. In the process it changed the component relationships, laid the foundations of a relatively broad based coalition, in which military dominated bureaucracy collateralized, political elites, established merchant-industrial classes, middle farmers and new commercial-industrial classes accepted sub-ordinate role. This reflected a significant coalitional and structural change compared to 1951-58 period, during which political elites or individual politicians had dominated the political system, in collaboration with a relatively small segment of bureaucracy and merchant-industrial class.

The ruling coalition confident of its durability and relative success of its policies of economic development, by mid sixties conceded limited political participation. However the basic thrust of the regime was economic development. The Second five year plan (1960-65) emphasized expansion of private sector. Public sector was confined to basic industries. The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) projected similar emphasis. During 1962-69 coordinated economic planning generated tremendous economic growth and industrial development, but also increased income inequality.<sup>13</sup> This economic growth brought structural changes, the social costs of which were not properly perceived by the ruling coalition. Policies of economic development accelerated the rate of urbanization and industrialization, which in turn in-

creased the rate of social mobilization. But the rate of political institutional development remained low. This generated crisis of participation.<sup>14</sup>

Thus by mid sixties changes in the performance of government and changes in the international environment made systemic crisis imminent. In 1965 Presidential elections were held, on the basis of 1959 Basic Democracies Act. 80,000 Basic Democrats were to elect the President. Political elites, religious elites and other disaffected groups formed a loose opposition coalition (called Combined Opposition Party).<sup>15</sup> This coalition floated Miss Fatima Jinnah (the sister of the Founder of Pakistan) as their candidate against the incumbant President General Mohammad Ayub Khan. The General did win the election, but this restrictive political participation mobilized the masses, and shook the ruling coalition. The regime's economic policies came under severe criticism, greater political participation was demanded. Besides the middle classes, intelligensia and urban labour got mobilized against the quasi-authoritarian nature of the regime. Secondly, the change in external environment was caused by war with India in September 1965. The masses were further mobilized as a consequence of this development. The systemic crisis became imminent, the ruling coalition began to disintegrate under the mounting pressure of agitations and demonstrations. The crisis became difficult to resolve, once in December 1966 the EBDO period came to an end. By late sixties, the students, intelligentsia, middle classes, political elites and other disaffected groups were in open revolt against the regime. The return to systemic crisis in 1969 reinforced the assumption that economic development without political participation could lead to political instability. In March 1969 General Ayub Khan abdicated power to the military. Martial Law was imposed once again. Whereas in 1958 military intervention was seen as restoring political order the 1969 Martial Law was perceived as an act of "vested interests



to forestall a revolution".<sup>16</sup>

### **Ruling Coalition and Dynamics of Structural Change 1969-71:**

The second Martial Law regime (1969-71) headed by General Yahya Khan found it very difficult to resolve the systemic crisis. It was born under crisis and collapsed under crisis. Military's credibility was very low, and its capacity to retain the broad-based ruling coalition was very weak. The Martial Law regime had a very narrow and weak coalitional base. Confronted with systemic crisis, and a populist demand to hold general elections, the regime decided to hold first general elections in the history of Pakistan on the basis of adult franchise. This decision completely changed the relationship between coalitional and structural components. To ensure continuity of its rule the regime pursued a policy of selective co-optation towards the religious elites. Thus during 1970 election the nature and role of Islam in the political system was encouraged as an ideological component. This generated considerable controversy and kept the masses politicized, highly mobilized and polarized. Weak governmental performance, and change in the external environment, i.e. December 1971 war with India brought the collapse of the regime. Kileman has succinctly observed, "this second interlude of military government proved disastrous. His (General Yahya Khan) two years in power coincided with further national disintegration, a waning of popular enthusiasm for military, and a more pervasive application of Martial Law regulations".<sup>17</sup> During this period systemic crisis persisted political participation expanded, whereas the coalitional capabilities deteriorated, and relationships among various structural components became dissynchronised. The very fabric of the state collapsed.

The systemic crisis of 71 ruptured the political system

of Pakistan. The fundamental question confronting the new regime was how to rejuvenate the system? The relationships among the coalitional and structural components were disintegrated. Thus in the post 1971 Pakistan a regime was confronted not only with replacing another regime or formulating a new ruling coalition, but to reconstitute the entire political system.<sup>18</sup> The only structures with some durability were military and bureaucracy. But as has been indicated, the systemic crisis considerably undermined their legitimacy. Political elites and political institutions had been the weaker components of the system. The regime that inherited power in disintegrated Pakistan was confronted with the task of almost recreating a political system. Robert Laporte described the intellectual atmosphere of the country in these words: "Many Pakistanis especially those moving into positions of responsibility in government and business, are not sure of the idea of Pakistan and its future as were their fathers and older brothers; disillusionment, uncertainty, cynicism and pessimism, all appropriately describe the intellectual climate of the country in early 1972".<sup>19</sup>

### **Ruling Coalition and Dynamics of Structural Change 1971-77:**

It was under such an environment that Z.A. Bhutto (1971-77) had to formulate a ruling coalition and rejuvenate the structural components of Pakistan's political system. Bhutto headed Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) which was an umbrella organization, representing interests of feudals, middle class, intelligentsia, students, and labour. It had sympathizers in the military and bureaucracy.<sup>20</sup> However political elites who dominated the decision making had social origins in the feudal and urban middle class.

The civilian regime under Bhutto operated at two levels. In the global context, it diluted Pakistan's identification with



the United States in the Asian International Sub-system and showed solidarity with the Muslim countries and the Third World. Quite contrary to Ayub regime, it revealed eagerness to encourage socialist pattern of economic development. At the internal level, it ventured to evolve a new coalition (comprising of a segment of feudals, urban-middle classes and industrial labor) and adopted a reformist position to legitimize its rule. also

The coalitional mechanism adopted by the PPP leadership to resolve the systemic crisis and to introduce structural changes were similar to that of Ayub regime in form but different in substance and in influencing the coalitional structures. 24 32

#### Selective Co-option:

Like the previous regimes, the new regime also adopted similar coalitional mechanisms. It adopted a policy of selective co-option to recruit political elites and a reformist programme to legitimize its rule. The regime's primary objective was to establish the supremacy of political elites and rehabilitate the political structures of the political system. To legitimize its rule and keep its broad support bases together, the regime announced land reforms, fixing ceiling of 300 acres on non-irrigated land and 150 acres on the irrigated lands.<sup>21</sup> These reforms had an immediate psychological impact. It gave rural masses a new confidence. However a segment of landed aristocracy (particularly in the relatively backward provinces, Baluchistan and NWFP) resisted these reforms and it also led to tenant-landlord clashes in some of the rural areas.

The major breakthrough in crisis and a relatively stable foundations of coalition making were laid in 1973, when Bhutto succeeded in formulating a constitution, which had

a broad consensus of all the major political elites in the system. All the major political parties of the country participated in the constitution making process with PPP-NAP-JUI providing the lead. Out of 133 members of the National Assembly 125 casted their vote in favour. The constitution was adopted on April 10, 1973 and was put into effect on 14th August 1973. Bhutto's approach towards constitution making was considerably influenced by his concern to collateralize the military and bureaucracy. He desired to ensure personal and civilian supremacy over these two durable components of the country's political system.

Bhutto's strategy was to confine the role of military to defence and security measures. The 1973 constitution declared that under the direction of the federal government the military was required to 'defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so'.<sup>22</sup> These are the normal functions of the military but by including such a clause Bhutto showed that he was determined to set limits on the political role of military.

#### **Collateralization:**

Like the Martial Law regime (1958-69) the civilian regime also adopted corrective mechanisms to collateralize the relationship with military and bureaucracy. The Generals were purged, the command structure of the military was reorganized and to ensure that the military remained subordinate to the political elites a clause was incorporated in the Constitution, which treated overthrow of a civilian government an act of treason. Besides a para-military force, Federal Security Force (FSF) was also created and placed under the direct command of the prime minister.<sup>23</sup> Thus in the coalitional and structural relationships the military was to have sub-ordinate rather than super-ordinate relationship.



The military in the wake of 1971 crisis accepted this role, at least temporarily. To contain the role of bureaucracy, about thirteen hundred officers were purged in a reformist spree. Administratives Reforms were introduced to alter the structural balance with the bureaucracy. Reforms abolished the constitutional safeguards and privilege granted to services. Legislation was passed which authorised the government to retire from service senior civil servants without assigning any reason. A scheme of lateral entry was introduced to recruit laylists into the bureaucracy. These measures reduced the power of bureaucracy but increased uncertainty in the service and latent hostility towards the political elites and the regime.

Through control over promotion and removal military and bureaucracy were collateralized, their power base was contained, but still these were the most durable structures. So to perform the functions of governance the political elites had to rely on these structures, which consequently enhanced their (military-bureaucracy) durability. Besides political structures could not be created overnight. Hence the ruling coalition, despite its broad base remained fragile and structural imbalance existed.

#### Containment:

The civilian regime made efforts to co-opt the religious elites into the ruling coalition. However this coalitional relationship was relatively short-lived, since in terms of economic and social policies the two had different perceptions. This elite cleavage further reinforced the durability of military and bureaucracy. Besides changes in the international environment, particularly the 'resurgence' of Islam in early seventies in the Middle East led to Islamic revivalism and enhanced the position of religious elites. Thus the potential for crisis existed.

### **Economic Policies and Changes in the International Environment:**

During 1971-77, economic policies of the ruling coalition and changes in the international environment largely changed the complexion of relationships among the structural components. Changes in the international environment conditioned the economic policies of the regime.

One of the major constraints was the foreign debt situation of the country. The regime made a major compromise with International Monetary Fund (IMF). To obtain debt relief, it agreed to devalue rupee by 13% and lift import restrictions from about 300 commodities.<sup>24</sup> This caused inflation, and accelerated monetization. The second major concern for the regime was to convince the international community particularly America's and Europe that Pakistan has a "responsible and responsive leadership".<sup>25</sup> Thirdly, the reality of changed geo-political environment demanded that the regime may seek some legitimacy in the Asian international sub-system, which propelled it to seek identification with the Muslim Middle East. Fourthly, the regime had to combat the burden of defeat in a war, and recognize the reality of Bangladesh, and normalize relations with India.

It was in the context of this changed international environment that Bhutto ventured to introduce his reformist economic policies. The regime aimed at economic growth but by its "socialist" rhetoric discouraged capitalist entrepreneurship. It emphasized public sector in its development strategy. The regime undercut the power base of industrial-merchant classes by nationalizing large scale industries; shipping, cement, vegetable oil companies etc. It also nationalized banks and insurance companies.<sup>25</sup> This nationalization



policy had multiple effects on coalitional and structural components. The capitalist-industrial classes became shy of investment and flight of capital from the country increased. Besides these classes developed a tendency of latent hostility towards the regime. Through nationalization of banks investment priorities, creation and disbursement of credit was controlled. Credit facilities were used to co-opt new social classes and reinforce the ruling coalition. Banking system was extended into rural areas, middle class farmers and peasants were provided credit facilities. The penetration of the banks in the rural areas disrupted the traditional agrarian structure, and aggravated the tenant-landlord relationships. Besides it also reinforced the middle peasants. The agrarian structure was further disrupted by encouraging 'labour export' to the Middle East. As large number of artisans who performed services in the rural structure moved to Middle East and the rural structure began to loosen up. During 1972-77 there were about 33,000 Pakistani workers in Saudi-Arabia, (varying in terms of occupation from doctors and engineers to masons and carpenters), about 12,000 in Libya, Dubai and 5,000 in Abu Dhabi, Jordan, Bahrain and Iran.<sup>27</sup> According to unofficial estimates Middle Eastern countries had a labour force of almost one million Pakistanis. The remittances from these workers increased from 508.8 million rupees in 1971-72 to 5500 million rupees in 1976-77.<sup>28</sup> By the end of the decade the figure rose to 17 billion rupees.<sup>29</sup> The remittances though a major source of foreign exchange for the government led to expansion of monetization in the economy. In the rural areas monetization and influx of foreign gadgets brought back by the labour force disrupted the traditional patron-client relationship and intensified the social tensions in the rural structure. In the rural structure this transformation was obviously resented by the landed aristocracy, who despite coalition with regime remained skeptical about its intentions. Thus economic changes led to loosening up of rural structure, and the situation in this sector became



potentially explosive.

Nationalization of industries reinforced rather than curtailed the role and power of bureaucracy as was intended by the regime. Besides with unenthusiastic merchant-industrial classes, the industrial growth and production stagnated. During 1973-74 to 1977-78, whereas investment in large scale public sector rose from 332.3 million rupees to 5,463 million rupees, the investment in the large scale private sector during the same period rose merely from 697.3 million rupees to 1,118 million rupees.<sup>3</sup> The investment in private sector was proportionately much lower compared to previous regime (1958-69). Industrial-merchant classes were intensely inimical to the regime. Through nationalization the regime attempted to alter the institutional power balances, reduce social inequality and improve the conditions of relatively disadvantaged groups. But it could not generate capital or industrial production and indeed went on to earn the hostility of industrial-merchant classes.

It must be noted that sensitive to changes in the international environment, the regime did not nationalize the foreign capital, infact it encouraged foreign investments. In 1976 the parliament passed a bill ensuring non-nationalization of foreign investment. This further disturbed the indigenous industrial-merchant classes.

Unable to generate industrial production and economic growth, the regime heavily relied upon foreign aid and loans. In 1974 Iran provided a loan of 250 million dollars and Saudi-Arabia provided a loan of 100 million dollars. The Muslim countries also emerged as the major buyers. Out of Pakistan's total exports, about one quarter went to the Muslim countries. Dependence on the Muslims countries increased.<sup>3</sup> The regime in Pakistan identified itself with Muslim countries in the international system.

In January 1977, as Bhutto announced elections the merchant-industrial groups, a segment of the landed aristocracy, the trade-merchant classes and religious elites who were affected by the regime's socio-economic policies, formed a broad coalition which was publically manifested through Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). From the outset the PNA showed a determination to use elections not so much as a legitimate means towards competitive politics and peaceful succession of power, but as an opportunity to dislodge Bhutto from power. Shocked at the election results the PNA proceeded to launch a protest movement against the "election fraud" of the PPP. In the wake of allegation of rigging and its denial by the PPP regime, the PNA intensified politics of protest and confrontation. The latent systemic crisis re-emerged the ruling coalition crumbled and Pakistan's political system came back full circle.<sup>33</sup>

#### **Ruling Coalition and Dynamics of Structural Change 1977-85:**

The military under General Zia - ul - Haq, Chief of the Army Staff, did not intervene when the political confrontation between the ruling PPP and the PNA opposition had reached its peak during March-May 1977. Strangely enough, it intervened at a time when political negotiations between the two had created a hope for political settlement. Just two days before the 5th July 1977 coup, an accord between the PPP and PNA had been reached. Bhutto had virtually conceded to all the principal demands of the opposition, most importantly of holding a fresh election.<sup>34</sup>

On assuming power the military moved very cautiously to reconstruct a new ruling coalition. In his opening speech, after the take over Zia, basically extended two reasons for military intervention, First, the country was on the threshold of a civil war. Secondly, Islam had not been effectively put



into practice in Pakistani society.<sup>35</sup> This, he insisted, necessitated military take over. Since, according to the 1973 constitution, military overthrow of a constitutional government was an "act of treason", the regime was careful enough to talk about Islamization to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. However, one of the first steps of Zia regime was to hold the constitution in "abeyance" and take political leaders of the government and opposition in "protective custody". But to gain public confidence, Zia promised to hold elections within 90 days.

The regime unfolded its strategy gradually and cautiously. Noman Omar has divided, Zia regime's strategy into three phases.<sup>36</sup> In the first phase, i.e., 1977-79, the regime's primary aim was to ensure elimination of Bhutto and to outmanoeuvre political parties. In the second phase, 1979-83, it intensified coercion and ensured regime consolidation. In the third phase, 1983-85, under increased political pressure from the opposition parties coalition—Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) the regime allowed limited political participation. This phase of limited political participation paved the way for a guided democracy in 1985-88.

Like the previous civilian regime, the military under General Zia-ul-Haq operated at two levels. In the global context, the regime identified itself closely with the United States, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. By implication it pursued a hostile policy towards Soviet Union. Among the Muslim countries, it showed solidarity with conservative monarchies and regimes in the Arab world. In particular, it developed close ties with Saudi and Jordanian monarchs. In contrast to Bhutto regime, it revealed enthusiasm for capitalist road to development and encouraged de-nationalization of some of the industries taken by the previous regime. At the internal level the regime,



ventured to evolve a new coalition, comprising of religious elites, particularly from Jamaat-i-Islami, feudals and Pirs, who were opposed to the PPP, industrial groups, judiciary and trader-merchants in the urban areas, (see diagram II). The regime, as indicated earlier adopted Islamization as a policy choice to legitimize its role in Pakistani politics.

The Islamization thrust of the regime stabilized the position of religious elites, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami and in general the traditional Ulama who controlled the mosques and Madrasshas. According to Akmal, indeed the regime made consistent efforts to promote ideology propounded by the Jamaat-i-Islami. In the process, the regime not only allied itself with the Jamaat, but also made consistent efforts to protect, project and advance the interests of the political forces that represent the Jamaat in governmental institutions.<sup>37</sup>

Quite consistent with the identified cyclical patterns the regime under General Zia-ul-Haq also moved to alter the institutional balance in its favour, demolishing the structures, political consciousness and social liberalism that was encouraged by the previous regime. The ruling coalition that developed under Zia was different from previous coalitions at least in three respects. First, it revealed tremendous skill in combining political coercion with Islamization — i.e., Martial Law Regulations were effectively supplemented through laws supporting Islamic punishments. Secondly, the coalition showed considerable skill in excluding and suppressing the opposition groups (from the previous regime) and consolidating the members of its coalition. Third, compared to the previous military governments, the regime extensively involved the military officers in the administration of the country. During July 1977-1979, an estimated 400 officers between the ranks of Major and Lt. General were involved (an insignificant number from Navy) in Martial

law duties, Summary Military Courts and Special Military Courts.<sup>38</sup> Thereby the military acquired a hegemonic position in the political system and played a pivotal role in constructing and consolidating the new coalition.

The coalitional mechanism adopted by the Zia regime to resolve the systemic crisis and to introduce changes in the coalitional structure were similar to those of the previous regimes. However, in *substance, orientation, and ideological goals*, they were diametrically opposed to the coalitional pattern established under Bhutto.

### Selective Co-option:

Given the PNA-PPP conflict and polarization General Zia-ul-Haq, after assuming power, did not waste time in mobilizing religious groups as potential allies for constructing a new ruling coalition. To entice the support of religious groups the regime slowly and systematically developed Islamization as a policy choice. Within six weeks after the take over the Zia regime activated the Islamic Ideology Council to convert Pakistan into a "theocratic state".<sup>39</sup> Islamization was used as an instrument to regulate social behaviour as well as to institute changes in the legal-political framework of the country. As a policy choice, Islamization aimed at enforcing Islamic punishments (i.e. following Arabic Penal Code, amputation of wrists and ankles for theft, stoning to death for adultery, and lashes for drinking alcohol) shaping country's economy on Islamic principles, and inculcating Islamic values in the society and the educational system. The changes that the regime initiated and instituted were both symbolic (i.e. calling of prayer on the T.V., introducing prayer breaks during office hours, strict observance of fast during the month of Ramazan, public lashing for criminals etc.) and substantive. In substantive terms the Shariah faculty (1978) was created at Quaid-i-Azam University, and then subse-



quently was raised to the level of fullfledged Islamic University with its own campus located, quite conveniently, at the Shah Faisal Mosque. In 1978, Shariah Benches were introduced to enforce laws according to Islamic jurisprudence.<sup>41</sup> On 10th February 1978, Zakat and Usher Ordinance was announced as a part of the drive to Islamize the economy. The new Education Policy emphasised religious education, encouraged the development of mosque schools and gave recognition to religious degree offered by various Madrassahs.<sup>42</sup> This provided an opportunity to enhance the status of the Maulvis at the societal level and also in the Armed forces. To top it all in 1984 Nizam-e-Salat campaign was launched. The regime appointed 100,000 prayer wardens for village and urban localities". During the same year Ordinance No. 20 was introduced which made calling of 'Azan', at their place of worship as 'Masjid', or calling themselves 'Muslims' as a punishable offence for the Ahmedis.<sup>43</sup> In 1985, the Ninth Amendment was passed by the Senate and the Shariat Bill was introduced.

These Islamization measures helped the religious elites immensely. On the one hand, they were co-opted to the ruling coalition. On the other, it stabilized their position in the political system. As Jones has correctly observed:

"The Zia regime's embrace of Islamic legal changes goes beyond tokenism, it gives the Islamic political parties (notably, the Jamaat-i-Islami) direct influence in the government they have not had before".<sup>44</sup>

Thus, under Zia regime the religious elite not only gained legitimacy, but also emerged as an important component of the ruling coalition.

The second group that the regime co-opted were the industrial-merchant classes and the new industrial and commer-



cial classes. The regime encouraged privatization, and also denationalized some of the industries. The public sector which had grown in the previous regime was allowed to stagnate and decline, the private sector was provided with incentives of tax holidays, duty free imports of capital equipment and availability of credit at low interest rates. However, inspite of these incentives industrial-merchant classes remained reluctant to invest in the manufacturing sector, fearing return of the PPP to power.<sup>45</sup>

The third group that the regime carefully and selectively co-opted were a particular faction of the political elites. The regime was skillful in cultivating that faction of political elites who were opposed to the PPP or could be weaned away from it. For example from Sind, the regime was able to elicit the support of Pir Pagaro, one of the biggest landlord and a Pir from Sind. In the NWFP Khan Wali Khan of the National Awami Party was neutralized,. Indeed, he was encouraged to speak against "Bhuttoism", demanding political accountability of the previous regime first and elections later on.<sup>46</sup> In Punjab Ch. Zahur Elahi emerged as a strong ally of the new regime.

#### Collateralization:

|| The military regime adopted a three pronged strategy. First, it sought extensive penetration of the military in administration, industrial public sector and other para-economic institutions. It was no more a question of merely protecting the institutional interests of the military. It also meant an opportunity to advance personal careers and seek attractive jobs in the civilian sector. Secondly, the bureaucracy was encouraged to play the role of a junior partner. Third, rule making devices were sought to influence the working of an independent judiciary.

Compared to the previous military regimes, the involvement of military in administering the country was quite extensive. In July 1977, Corps commanders were appointed Zonal Martial Law Administrators, some of them were also made governor's of various provinces.<sup>47</sup> It was only in 1980 that the office of Governor was separated from that of the corps commander. A number of serving Generals were appointed to the posts of "Permanent Secretaries". According to one estimate, in 1980, as many as one fourth of the 35-40 top bureaucratic positions were held by the military officers.<sup>48</sup> A number of military officers were also appointed as additional secretaries and joint secretaries in various ministries. Prior to General Zia's regime, serving military officers in such large numbers had never been appointed on top bureaucratic positions. Besides in corporations such as PIA, WAPDA, PASSCO, NTRC the military officers continued to hold top positions. National Logistics Cell (NLC), which was created in 1976, under military command grew into a giant transport company, giving tough competition to private truckers and the Pakistan Railways. Fauji Foundation, which is considered the single largest employer of the retired Army personnel grew into a big economic conglomerate. As it made investments in industries, services, hospitals etc. In short, under Zia regime, the military extensively expanded its role in the civilian sectors.

Bureaucracy, which had become scared and restive because of 1973 Administrative Reforms, found Zia's regime reassuring for its institutional needs. The bureaucracy willingly accepted the role of a junior partner in the new coalition. To look into the grievances and ameliorate the service conditions of the Civil Services of Pakistan, the regime instituted in February, 1978 a Civil Services Reform Commission under the Chairmanship of Justice Anwar-ul-Haq, Chief Justice of Pakistan.<sup>49</sup> The Commission recommended, inter-alia constitutional guarantees to the services, doing



away with the lateral entry system, enhancing the powers of the Deputy Commissioner, proposed merger of Tribal Agencies Group (TAG) with District Management Group (DMG) and a separate status for it. The Commission also recommended the creation of the office of the Ombudsman and regularization of the local bodies elections. These recommendations were accepted, although certain other recommendations of the commission were ignored by the regime. From 1980 onwards the regime ensured that 10% the vacancies at 17 and 18 Grade in the Civil Services would be filled by the military officers.<sup>50</sup> Through such devices the regime successfully collateralized bureaucracy into a stable component of the ruling coalition.

Between 1977-1980, gradually and systematically, Zia regime collateralized the judiciary. Chief Justices of the High Courts were appointed governor's in the provinces. After Bhutto's execution in April 1979, the judiciary began to reassert as increasing number of political detenus sought justice through the courts. Besides, to protect civilian interests the courts also began to question the legitimacy of military courts. To counter these moves, in March 1981, General Zia issued a Provincial Constitutional Order (PCO).<sup>51</sup> The PCO terminated the right of the judiciary to scrutinize and judge politically important executive action. It also did away with the provision of elections to the parliament and the fundamental rights. The PCO provided the formation of a Federal Council (Majlis-e-Shoora) to be nominated by the President. It required the judges of the Supreme, High and Federal Shariat Courts to take new oath of office to uphold PCO. By and large the judges complied. However, it restricted their powers to issue bail before arrest. One observer has aptly remarked:

The PCO effectively extinguished the important constitutional role of judiciary forcing it to confine its



attention to purely criminal and civil cases not involving issues of political substance.<sup>5 2</sup>

The the supremacy of the regime was clearly established and judiciary was effectively marginalized.

#### **Containment:**

The regime devised ways and means to contain the PPP, Z.A. Bhutto and his family. In addition, through various ordinances and laws, students, labour, lawyers, women and the political parties were also contained. The regime made conscious use of terror as an instrument of containment policy. It made large scale arrests of the PPP workers to demobilize and exclude the party from the political process.<sup>5 3</sup> To ensure elimination of Bhutto, the regime charged that he had ordered the murder of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, which caused the death of his father, and initiated trial against Bhutto. Simultaneously, the regime sought and developed alliances with social and political groups that were opposed to Bhutto. Having eliminated Bhutto through the judicial process in April 1979, the regime proceeded to hold local bodies elections, on non-party basis in September 1979. However, the results of the local bodies elections turned out to be not according to the desired goals of the regime, as a number of the PPP members or sympathizers emerged as successful candidates. The regime did not hesitate to cancel the election of a number of undesirable successful candidates. Pressure was built around Bhutto family, and Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto were put under arrest for prolonged periods. The PPP leaders and workers were also continuously arrested. A large number of the PPP leaders and workers were forced to seek political assylum outside Pakistan.<sup>5 4</sup> Despite weakness of its organization, arrests of its top leadership the party survived and continued to retain its popular support base. However, the Zia regime was skillful

in managing the PPP and effectively demobilized and contained it. It was not until 1986 that the PPP was allowed to demonstrate its street power.

The industrial labour was coerced into submission. Union activities were banned and strikes in the industries were declared illegal. In 1978, the labour protest at Colony Textile Mills, Multan was suppressed through exemplary use of force. After that the industrial labour did not pose any serious threat for the regime. The labour was politically immobilized.

In the universities and colleges student organizations sympathetic towards the PPP were controlled. Zia regime did not restrain Islami Jamiat Tulba (IJT) from unleashing terror. The policy choice of Islamization advocated by the regime was used to its advantage by the IJT to advance its interests. At Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam, and the Punjab university the IJT was quick to establish its dominance by terrorizing student groups, university faculty and the administration. The Punjab university welcomed Martial Law and distinguished itself by conferring an honorary degree of doctorate to General Zia. The faculty members who did not agree to the awarding of the degree to the General, were transferred, harassed and their promotions were withheld.<sup>55</sup> The left leaning and pro-PPP student organizations were not only ideologically incoherent, organizationally weak, but also were reluctant to accept legitimacy of the regime. By 1983 when the regime banned the student unions, the IJT had clearly established its supremacy in the colleges and universities particularly in the Punjab. Thus, the student groups sympathetic towards the PPP had been effectively coerced and contained by the Zia regime by 1985, but not completely eliminated.

Women, who constitute almost 50% of the country's population, were another group which was systematically



contained. Women were perceived by the regime as an important constituency of the PPP. Therefore, the effort was to confine them to household roles. In addition, through symbolic and legal means attempts were made to project an inferior status of women in an Islamic polity. In 1979 Hudood and Zina Ordinances were initiated. In 1984, a law was passed whereby evidence of two women was made equivalent to that of one man in certain legal situations. According to Noman Omar,

“the 84 Legislation is, perhaps the only instance in the contemporary world where the state has initiated reforms which have taken away women’s constitutional rights”.<sup>56</sup>

Discriminatory laws against women evoked criticism from educated urban women groups, who voiced their resentment on such laws and began to organize women and public opinion against such laws. However, the regime remained firm in its attitude towards women and their role in the polity. General Zia-ul-Haq publically stated that a woman cannot hold the office of the Prime Minister. The Ansari commission Report supported the same view. It went on to the extent of recommending that a women should have her husband’s permission to participate in legislature.<sup>57</sup>

| The regime showed persistence and continuity in holding local bodies elections, on non-party basis. In regularizing the local bodies elections, the basic aim of the regime was to weaken the political parties and make them irrelevant to the national political process. So local, parochial issues gained salience and national issues became irrelevant. Politics of conflict and violence increased ethnic strife and religious intolerance gained momentum. Three local bodies elections were held in 1979, 1983 and 1987. Although people became familiar with the process of political participation, nevertheless political parties could not acquire organizational strength



and stability. They decayed and fragmented.

Lawyers were another group, whose working was effectively constrained by the establishment of military courts. Bar Associations were discouraged from inviting the political leader to address them. The military and special military courts had an adverse effect on the income of lawyers.

Through coercion, Martial Law ordinance and initiation of local bodies elections on non-party basis the regime between 1977-85 was able to skillfully contain the PPP and its potentially supportive groups.

#### **Economic Policies and Changes in International Environment:**

During 1977-85, the ruling coalition under General Zia-ul-Haq was able to change the relationship among the structural components not merely because of the coalitional mechanisms that it adopted, but largely due to external factors. Changes in international environment proved conducive for the economic policies and performance of the regime. During this period growth rate was phenomenal and averaged around 6.5% per annum. However, it did not promote industrialization or economic development.<sup>58</sup> The economic performance of the regime can be analyzed by focussing on four factors. First, in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan emerged as a "front line state". In pursuance, of their strategic interests the U.S. policy makers rediscovered, an ally in Pakistan. By 1981, the U.S. agreed to provide 3.2 Billion dollars in economic and military assistance for Pakistan.<sup>59</sup> The basic idea was to bolster Pakistan's defence capabilities in resisting Soviet-Afghan pressure. In the process however, the U.S. military economic assistance increased Pakistan's dependence on the U.S. and internally

strengthened the position of military viz a viz other political institutions. The second factor that contributed towards growth and economic stability during this period was the remittances from Pakistani workers in the Middle East. These remittances rose from 577.4 million dollars in 1976-77 to 2885.80 million dollars in 1982-83, reaching to the tune of \$ 2.5 to 3 billions in 1987.<sup>60</sup> Waseem has observed,

“these remittances overshadowed other sources of foreign exchange inflow, narrowed down the trade deficit and represented as much as 8% of the G.N.P. 75% of the migrant workers were under the age of 30, and only 4% of them were accompanied by their families, the rest sending three quarters of their foreign income back home”.<sup>61</sup>

The beneficiaries of migration to Middle East have been generally the poor households. According to one estimate about 10 million, i.e. 11% of the total population have benefited from the remittances from the Middle East. On the average the salaries of these low income households increased eightfold.<sup>62</sup> The economic condition of these low income groups improved as a consequence of remittances. It is interesting to note that most of the migrant workers hailed from the Punjab. Thus, as a consequence of improvement in income levels, the social complexion and value structure in the province changed rapidly.<sup>63</sup> The remittances or emigration of the labour to the Middle East undercut the support base of the PPP. This also partly explains why the MRD in 1983 was unable to mobilize the masses in the Punjab against Zia regime. It indicated that in Punjab a new middle class was emerging.

Third factor that contributed towards economic growth was that the economic policies of Zia regime were formulated in the broad framework of World Bank/IMF guidelines. These



encouraged import liberalization, withdrawal of subsidies and devaluation of exchange rates. Thus the regime adopted economic policies to appease the industrial-commercial groups. It opted for limited denationalization, liberal import/export policies, reduction or exemption from taxes. These policies facilitated the opening up of the country's market to foreign goods.<sup>64</sup>

Finally, good climatic conditions during this period led to bumper agricultural crops. So food shortages did not occur and export of cotton gained momentum. Agricultural groups remained contented.

Despite favourable external environment and internal economic policies, the industrial — business groups remained hesitant in making capital investments. They feared that the PPP had the potential of a come back, which could jeopardize their investments. Thus, despite incentives by the regime the investment in the manufacturing sector did not register an impressive growth rate.

In 1983 General Zia's ruling coalition was jolted by the MRD Movement. But it failed, to bring about its collapse or generate systemic crisis. The regime responded very skillfully to thwart the MRD protest movement. It insured that the movement does not gain momentum and mass support in the Punjab. However, in Sind, the MRD movement acquired the overtones of a popular upsurge against the regime. The regime responded by unleashing terror and treating it as an Indian inspired regional movement.<sup>65</sup> Such an approach alienated the social classes and groups in Sind. It also caused bitterness against the Punjabi political leadership for its inability to fully respond and participate in the MRD movement. Consequently, it promoted distrust between the Punjabies and Sindhis. Nevertheless, the MRD movement shook the very foundations of the regime. It began to plan for devo-



lution of power to a segment of feudal politicians and new commercial-industrial classes, who were willing to accept military's supremacy in power-sharing. It was with such a strategy in view that General Zia-ul-Haq held presidential referendum in December 1984. The MRD boycotted it.<sup>66</sup> Later in February 1985 the regime called for partyless elections. The MRD boycotted once again. However, through this two pronged strategy, the regime was able to retain its supremacy by installing a civilian government. It also helped the regime prolong its rule and also temporarily arrest the systemic crisis.

The 1985 transition elections initiated a phase of guided democracy in Pakistan. Under military's tutelage, restricted political participation was restored. However, the legitimacy of these transition elections was not recognized by the excluded political parties and social groups. Therefore, a potential for systemic crisis did persist.

It merits attention that the military under General Zia-ul-Haq retained hegemony and yet facilitated the creation of a civilian led government. As noted above, although the 1985 elections were held on non-party basis, yet as soon as the parliament met the need for a party led government became imperative. The military elites had carefully orchestrated the 1985 elections and were skillful in selecting who should participate in these. It had little difficulty in establishing patron-client relationship with the civilian leadership which had social origins in the land-owning elites and commercial-industrial groups. Mohammad Khan Junejo, a follower of Pir Pagaro, and a Sindhi landlord of modest means was installed as the Prime minister and accepted as the leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League. Members elected on non-party basis, were encouraged to join the Muslim League. The effort clearly was to develop Muslim League into a dominant parliamentary and national party. Thus, the Muslim League

that emerged was not a mass party, having strong ideological and organizational foundations, but as a party advancing the interests of a segment of feudals and commercial-industrial groups. Its policy instrument was patronage. Therefore the Party, remained fragile, faction-ridden and dependent on bureaucracy for protecting the interests of these groups.

### **Ruling Coalition and the Dynamics of Structural Change 1985-88:**

The ruling coalition that emerged under Mohammad Khan Junejo primarily comprised of the political elites, while military, bureaucracy, and industrial-commercial groups were accepted as the dominant partners (see diagram II). A significant aspect of this coalition was that it inducted and brought to surface a new generation of land-owning groups from Punjab and N.W.F.P. and from Sind to a lesser degree. The generational change was most visible in the Punjab, (where younger Chattas, Gilanis, Makhdooms; Shujjat and Parvez Elahi's etc assumed positions of power, while in N.W.F.P. Saifuallahs acquired salience). This meant the old guard was being replaced by the younger generation. This new breed of land owning elites (mostly in 30's and 40's) were relatively better educated as compared to their parents but in orientation and political outlook, not much different from them. Their leadership style and political training was traditional—providing patronage to their support groups and not very enthusiastic about popular participation. This new generation of political elites not only accepted the political framework provided by the military but also became its primary instruments, defenders and exponents. It is interesting to note that while in the other three provinces and at the federal level the military elites facilitated the political elites or their representatives to assume the offices of the Prime minister and the Chief ministers, the regime choose to install Mian Nawaz Sharif - a representative of new commercial-in-



dustrial groups in the Punjab. Here remittances, good harvests, and relative political stability had brought changes in the social class structure and value orientation. Contradictions between the land owning groups and new emerging commercial-industrial interests sharpened in the Punjab. However the military arbitrated and sustained the ruling coalition of political elites and new commercial-industrial groups that had emerged under the leadership of Junejo. Once the political process begun to unfold the contradictions between the military dominated civilian coalition began to sharpen. The military, under General Zia-ul-Haq had agreed to *share power* with the civilian leadership. They did not intend to *transfer power* to it.

Although the military-civilian relationship had begun on a cordial note, however, soon tension began to grow between the president and the prime-minister. The tension in relationship was not merely personal, but rooted in difference in outlook on internal and external policy matters. For example, on Afghanistan issue the prime minister sought political settlement through Geneva peace process. But, the President thought that this process compromised country's national interests. As the Prime minister became gradually more assertive, the President became skeptical about Prime minister's role in the ruling coalition. On 29th May, 1988, General Zia-ul-Haq with one stroke terminated the political structure that he had created. As President, he dissolved the national and provincial assemblies and dismissed the cabinet headed by prime minister Junejo.<sup>67</sup> The military under General Zia-ul-Haq had installed a docile and colourless prime minister, and had expected he would accept the supremacy of the military on policy matters. The President's decision did not evoke any popular protest. The Prime minister was installed by the President and removed by him. It reinforced the belief that in the ruling coalition the military was the real holder of power. As long as General Zia-ul-Haq could muster the support of



the military, continuity and stability of the regime was ensured. Civilian facade did not matter much.

It was General Zia-ul-Haq's accidental death on August 17, 1988 that put Pakistan on a path to redemocratization. After his death the military volunteered to withdraw from politics, and decided to hold elections and transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. There are reports to the effect that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) an integral component of the military, played an important role in unifying the political forces that were opposed to the PPP.<sup>6 8</sup> Irrespective of these reports, there are political parties and interests groups who have not been comfortable with the PPP and identified themselves with ideological legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq. As a result, the Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI) came into being. In the November, 1988 elections, the IJI was routed in Sind and marginalized in Baluchistan, although it emerged as the dominant force in the Punjab and did well in the N.W.F.P. (see table 1, 2). The PPP returned with simple majority in the Center. It did exceedingly well in Sind, especially in the rural areas. The elections brought to forefront the political and social groups which had been excluded from the political process for over a decade. Thus the 1988 elections paved the way for transition to democracy. The PPP assumed power at the center, and Benazir Bhutto assumed the office of prime minister of the country on 2, December, 1988.

#### **Ruling Coalition and the Dynamics of Structural Change - 1988—**

The ruling coalition that the PPP has ushered under Benazir's leadership is bound by "structural constraints". It comprises of the political elites (i.e. a segment of feudals), middle class intelligentsia - primarily represented by the urban professionals, middle farmers, women and in a margi-

nal sense industrial labour (see diagram II). No other ruling coalition has been faced with so heavy odds. On assuming power Benazir conceded that the PPP that has emerged on the national scene is not "a free agent". The PPP winning 93 seats in the national assembly (out of a total of 207 emerged as the biggest party having national bases (see table 1). However, in order to form a government it had to make a coalition with Karachi-Hyderabad based Qaumi Muhajir Movement (M.Q.M.).<sup>69</sup> In a recent article Thornton, has incisively summed up Benazir's predicament and the constraints under which the PPP has to operate and function. According to him,

Bhutto (i.e. Benazir) is still an unproven quantity. Thus far her track record as administrator, political operator and national leader has been mixed. She has necessarily moved slowly, but she and her aids have spent much more time politicking than developing and implementing programmes to address Pakistan's needs. Her policies and personal convictions have yet to be fully revealed, and it will take some time to see if the moderate views she has espoused in recent years will last under pressures from radical elements within her own party. . . . Her tactical position in parliament has become shaky: her key coalition partner, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement, has put her on notice that its interests must be more fully accommodated if she expects continued support. If it were to withdraw, the Bhutto government might well fall.

Beyond that, Bhutto is under considerable pressure from the Pakistani establishment, despite the setbacks it suffered in last November's national elections. The army, large landowners, industrialists and the bureaucracy maintain their bases of power, and Bhutto had to make important policy concessions to them in order



to take office. In elections for provincial governments, also held in November, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party did not do as well as it had in the parliamentary vote, gaining control of only one of Pakistan's four major provinces. The PPP's main rival, the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) formed the government of Punjab, Pakistan's key province, and has frustrated her efforts to oust it <sup>70</sup>

So the primary challenge that Benazir faces is how to demonstrate that in fact she is in command of the government. She needs to establish her authority over a political system that she does not completely control. She also needs to define her own policy goals. Besides structural constraints, there are other limitations too: First and foremost is the problem of prolonged exclusion from the political process, with the result that its leadership is not quite familiar with the administrative process. Secondly, the party leadership is relatively inexperienced, with the exception of a few "old guards" from the previous PPP government. Thirdly, there is ambiguity about long term policy goals or objectives. Finally, the party suffers from weak organization and ideological incoherence. Thus, at this juncture of Pakistani history, the capacity of the PPP and its leadership to reform the political order is at best limited.

The transition to democracy creates a situation of uncertainty. As a regime changes, rules, procedures go in a state of flux, political actors and groups began to jockey for power. Individual actors and groups seek to find a place in the political system. Stalemate, dissensus and uncertainties pose challenge for political leadership and put strain on the capabilities of the political system. Fears of systemic breakdown become pervasive, the very existence, of the nation-state is questioned. Unity, consensus building, and rational decision making with reference to political process appear



illusionary. To avoid uncertainty, new and durable methods rooted in democratic spirit need to be created. In a situation of transition to democracy, response and managerial skills of the political leaders acquire crucial significance. Levine analyzing the complexities of transition to democracy has observed, "In circumstances like these, a central task for political leaders is to order the transition in ways that ensure minimal loss and maximum possibilities for future growth and consolidation. Creation of durable methods for dealing with uncertainty is critical to the whole process. The *uncertainties* characteristic of democratic polities are not limitless, rather, they are *institutionalized*. If these incipient democracies are to have any hope of achieving durable legitimacy, structures and operating procedures cannot be uncertain in the same way outcome are".<sup>71</sup>

Transition towards democratic order in a number of third world countries is an outgrowth from military hegemonic system. Consequence of military hegemonic system is a fragmented polity and a polarized society. The fragmentary nature of political system in the post-military phase has at least three levels of conflict: ideological, ethnic and personal.

Pakistan in the post 1988 elections has emerged as such a polity. This puts tremendous pressure on the national leadership that has assumed power. Under such circumstances, consensus building appears as an ideal policy choice. While it is easy to recommend consensus building, it is difficult to operationalize it. That is where the test of leadership lies. In a post military system, a national leader has to be firm and yet flexible. He/She has to pursue a step by step approach. Has to be adept and skillful. And must have a sense of timing and proportion. Managing post-military system presents a challenge to the quality and skills of the leadership.

In the structural context, given the long rule of military,

its hegemonic position cannot be ignored nor over emphasised, it has to be accepted as a reality. The tragedy of military hegemonic system is that under it institutional dominance of the military increases. The only institution that grows, acquires stability, and expands political power is military itself. All other institutions like bureaucracy, political parties, autonomous groups, decay and fragment. Politics of protest, demonstration, violence becomes a norm rather than an exception. In the last decade or so politics in Pakistan has taken this direction. Under such conditions national political parties found it difficult to operate and function. The military elites perceived them as anti-military and a source of threat, therefore party based elections were either discouraged or disallowed. Party system decayed while small religious, ethnic and other parochial groups emerged. However, once the military allowed party based elections, it became imperative for political parties and the military to redefine their relations.

No wonder, as Prime minister Benazir Bhutto has been careful and cautious in dealing with the military. Under her leadership in the last 10 months civil-military relations have improved. She has shown realism and has adopted a pragmatic policy towards the military. Recognizing that hegemonic role of the military cannot be challenged, she seems to have accepted it as the most "durable" component of a ruling coalition in Pakistan. The military elites under the command of Chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, have responded affirmatively, by supporting the democratic political order of the country.<sup>72</sup>

To encourage transition towards democratic system, the military elites belief in upholding constitution and restoring democratic order is a pre-requisite. Their supervisory role needs to be institutionalized. Perhaps one can learn from the Turkish experience, where in 1960 the military made changes



in the constitution, and later in 1971, but more forcefully in 1980. It needs to be remembered that military stifles democracy everytime it intervenes. The whole process is reversed, each time after military's withdrawal political process and political institutions become more weak.

Military should pursue a self-imposed restraint, not to intervene in politics and thus let the process continue. Political process which appears to be ladden with conflict, chaos and anarchy, should not be equated with disorder. As in a post-military system it takes time before issues can be clearly spelled out and constitutional lines be clearly drawn. Political leadership will also take time to acquire confidence and develop skills of politics of accommodation, bargain, compromise and consensus building. Political parties which were further weakened as a result of local bodies and non-party based elections in the last decade or so would need time to achieve organizational stability and ideological coherence. It also needs to be stressed that under military-hegemonic system the 1973 constitution was drastically amended through various Martial Law ordinances, PCO, and 8th Amendment in order to concentrate powers in the hands of COAS/CMLA/President.

Quite understandably, therefore with reference to constitution one of the key issues that the PPP has been confronted with is restoring balance between the powers of the President and the Prime minister. It is in this context that the PPP leadership has been seeking changes in the Eighth Amendment, although without much success. However, by generating debate on the issue it has demonstrated that there is need to develop consensus on eliminating various provisions of the 8th Amendment, particularly those dealing with the powers of the President.

It must be underscored that democracy and electoral



process do not necessarily mean harmony or unanimity. Elections, howsoever, held do not always facilitate the emergence of a single political party or singular leadership on top. In Pakistan, the November 1988 elections have brought to the position of power individuals and political parties having divergent orientations, backgrounds and attitudes towards democratic process. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a Pathan-Civil Servant, has vast experience of government's working and is well entrenched in the bureaucratic and parliamentary structures of the country. His prudence and experience is unmatched compared to any political leader associated with the government. The office of the Prime Minister is held by Benazir Bhutto leader of the PPP, who is young, energetic and dynamic, who has fought against unprecedented odds and has finally emerged as the Prime minister but lacks experience in government. Yet she is expected to reveal managerial skills in steering Pakistan from the legacy of military hegemonoc system to democratic political order. On the other hand Nawaz Sharif, Chief minister of Punjab represents not only the industrial-commercial groups but also an ideological continuation of Zia legacy. Still on the other end Nawaz Akbar Bugti as Chief minister of Baluchistan represents ethnic leadership with regional orientations. Thus the government structure that has emerged after 88 elections has divergent centers of power. Within this political set up each political actor is striving to advance, protect and consolidate its interests. Besides these contending centers of powers, there are other political parties and interest groups that function as opposition to the PPP government at the federal level.<sup>73</sup> What one needs to appreciate is that the democracy would not come to an end because different political parties are in power in the provinces and the center.

Democratic opposition demands an effective organization. This implies that political leadership whether in opposition or government, must strive to create environment which

is conducive for debate and resolution of conflict through negotiations and inside the parliament. The leadership must be able to time when to mobilize the masses or groups for action on a specific issue, and when to restrain and bargain and seek accommodation. Still the more important thing is that the leadership must have control over its followers, particularly when they are launching a movement for the preservation of democracy. the leadership must have the ability to *mobilize to organize* for democracy, and to have *coherence* among the diverse groups for creating a democratic order. According to Diamond, "democrats in civil society must strike a balance between passion and prudence, between militance and moderation, between creative participation and the demands of organizational loyalty and coherence".<sup>74</sup>

Transition to democracy becomes all the more painful in a post-military hegemonic system, because democratic norms and attitudes have either been obliterated or made dysfunctional under persistent military rule. Therefore at transition stage the political system is torn between pro-democratic and anti-democratic social forces. Contemporary Pakistan is going through this transformation where struggle between pro-democratic and anti-democratic social forces has become complicated by ethnic cleavages and demands for provincial autonomy.

It is interesting to note that the province of Punjab has been politically the most stable region, under the military rule as a segment of its land-owning, commercial-industrial groups benefitted from the policies adopted by the military regime. The electoral results of the national and provincial assemblies of the Punjab reveal that the groups that benefitted by collaborating with the military in the last decade would like to ensure the continuity of policies designed under the military hegemonic system. By their political attitudes behaviour, orientations and interests these groups



tend to be anti-democratic.

Secondly, it also became evident that the middle class intelligentsia, the urban professionals, industrial labour and a segment of feudals, who had supported the PPP in 1970 elections have either withdrawn their support or have split up owing to the changing social and political complexion in the Punjab. In 1988, the PPP could not gain the overwhelming support that it enjoyed in the 1970. Thus the PPP-LJI split in the Punjab has acquired ideological overtones. On the one hand, the hidden agenda appears to be continuing and legitimizing the policies of the previous regime and protecting the interest of new-industrial commercial classes and a faction of feudals, who were associated with Zia regime and prospered under its umbrella. On the other hand the social forces that have emerged in the form of the PPP in the Punjab primarily comprise of the urban professionals a faction of the feudals, peasantry and industrial labour. In the Punjab, the urban and rural groups are thus split between the PPP and the LJI. The social and political forces that have emerged in the form of the PPP desire to break away from the legacy and policies of the previous regime. The result is that politics has become factionalized and conflict ridden. This is a conflict not merely of perceptions but of economic interests, ideological orientations and the very structures of power, which makes it all the more difficult to build and promote politics of accommodation and consensus.

#### Summary Conclusion:

At the global level, the coalition under Benazir Bhutto has continued to align itself with the U.S. It has also secured re-entry in the British Common Wealth. The changing strategic interest of the U.S. in Afghanistan provide Pakistan with an opportunity to encourage political settlement of the Afghan problem. The world has generally responded favourably to democratic transition in Pakistan. As a woman



leader, whereas she has earned global respect, her skills as a political leader have yet to be tested. In the regional context, Benazir government has taken a bold initiative in pursuing policy of accommodation with India. Like her father's previous PPP regime the Nuclear issue is likely to emerge as a key concern between U.S. - Pakistan and India-Pakistan relations in the future as well.

Internally the regime is faced with a number of challenges. First, the IJI opposition has been consistent in criticizing Benazir government's policy of accommodation towards India. It has propagated that Benazir has accepted India's hegemony. It has alleged that she has compromised Pakistan's national interests. On formulating policy towards India, the Benazir government would be well advised to seek consultations with some of the major political parties of the country. Secondly, in the last ten months or so regime's performance in dealing with the nature of center-province relation has been inept to a large extent if not dismal. Both in constitutional and political terms the Benazir government has not been able to effectively deal with the issue. The attitude of IJI opposition spearheaded by Nawaz Sharif has also not been conducive for democratic transition, but the stalemate has to be resolved in the larger national interest. On the other hand, in Sind the ethnic issue continues to persist, there is a need to evolve a serious national dialogue on ways and means to promote reconciliation among the various warring communities. This indicates that regional forces and separatist tendencies may gain momentum in the coming decade, if effective policy choice is not exercised now. However, one finds some hope that Punjab's specific demands on provincial autonomy (i.e., Provincial bank and television) would set limits on the issue and possibly define the question of autonomy for all times to come. Thirdly, the law and order situation continues to deteriorate, which suggests that the effectiveness of governmental authority is weak and the

PPP's struggle to establish its authority continues. The primary concern of the government has to be to improve law and order situation. Fourthly, economic policy of the regime has yet to emerge clearly, however, dependence on U.S. aid, remittances and good weather conditions is likely to persist. The PPP is caught between the economic realities and political imperatives. Economic arena is potentially more explosive than the political constraints that the Benazir government is faced with. Unemployment, inflation and paralysis of industrial sector demand immediate attention. So far the PPP government has concentrated on the politics of patronage only—there are reports to the effect that large scale inductions are being made in the financial, administrative and public sectors to accommodate the PPP sympathizers.<sup>75</sup> This has led to further inefficiency and sour feelings in these sectors. There is a growing public perception that the PPP is perpetuating corruption, and not eliminating it. Unless the PPP government devises long term economic policies to give relief to common man and restore the confidence of commercial-industrial groups, the longevity and performance of the government will suffer from uncertainties.

Fifthly, encouragement of dissent, social liberalism and effectiveness of opposition will depend on responsible press, stable political parties and independent judiciary. The opposition political parties and the press need to play a constructive role in promoting prospects for democratic political order.

Finally, the PPP as a party in government is faced with a serious predicament. On the one hand it suffers from organizational weakness and ideological incoherence, as a result factionalism is brewing in the party. Factionalism is on the increase because as a government, it is under tremendous pressure to accommodate interests and provide jobs, to party affiliates, supporters and sympathizers. As a result the PPP government is indulging in politics of patronage, i.e.



dispensing jobs and rewards to its supporters. On the other hand, bureaucracy is getting restive, under fears of revival of lateral entry system and large scale induction of party affiliates in bureaucratic positions. In addition, it is estimated that as many as 72 senior bureaucrats have been sidelined by the PPP government as Officers on Special Duty (OSD).<sup>76</sup> The skepticism between the PPP government and the bureaucracy is on the rise. It needs to be recognized that bureaucracies take pride and thrive on principles of merit, selection and promotion, while political parties invariably indulge in dispensing patronage. This is considered part of the political process in most of the democratic system. However, in Pakistani context merit and patronage are in conflict. The PPP needs to evolve a policy choice to co-opt bureaucracy, appease its institutional needs and restore confidence in party government as protector of its interests. A tenuous relationship between the PPP government and the bureaucracy can effect its performance and hamper the development of democratic order.

This brief and rather sketchy overview of political developments, social groups and issues under Prime minister Benazir Bhutto reveals that the PPP under her leadership is struggling hard to redefine nature of relationship with the durable components of political system that is military, bureaucracy, and the commercial - industrial groups. Some of these groups and institutions are well entrenched in Pakistan's power structure. Benazir has not been able to undercut the power of these groups and institutions. Nevertheless, gradually and slowly she has encouraged politics of accommodation but consensus on the nature and direction of the political system has yet to evolve.

The military's new posture of restrain and caution rather than intervention brightens the prospects of consolidation of a democratic order. Transition to democracy has



provided both the government and opposition, parties with an opportunity to not only rejuvenate the party system but also to ensure strengthening of democratic order through politics of accommodation. Politics of confrontation will intensify crisis and the political system may get back to square one.

### **Some Generalizations:**

The changes in international environment and performance of the government reflect cyclical shifts as a pattern of Pakistan's political system. Each systemic crisis gave birth to a new coalition which ventured to develop a favourable institutional balance. It introduced structural changes by demolishing the existing structures. The crisis remained latent, and reappeared as the ruling coalition became weak or one of the component's of the coalition found itself strong enough to disturb the relationships. The system underwent crisis, and a new cycle re-emerged. These cyclical shifts characterize the political system of Pakistan. It reflects a sequential pattern of development — systemic crisis, ruling coalition, structural change and systemic crisis (Diagram 3). The analysis of relationships and interactions among the various components of ruling coalition and structural components reveal the dynamics of the system. By focussing on the changing relationships of these components over a given period of time (i.e. 1947-89) and being able to identify the general pattern of changing relationships among these components, one can predict the likely behaviour of the political system.

In the broad perspective of systems logic it can be stated that in most of the developing societies ruling coalition making mechanisms are similar. The ruling coalitions in these societies do adopt mechanisms of selective co-option, collateralization, containment and reform through economic

policies to resolve systemic crisis and legitimize the position of the coalition in the system. In the broad context of system's paradigm Flanagan's model of systemic crisis and structural change does provide an insight into the nature of crisis and consequent change in these societies, where structural imbalance does exist, and relatively "durable", "structures" reveal propensity to dominate the political system, facilitates our understanding to identify the patterns and possibly predict change in the political systems.

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59. Mohammad Waseem. p. 381.
60. Ibid. p. 382 and also.
61. Ibid.
62. Omar Noman, p. 158.
63. Punjab, which constitutes 56% of Pakistan's total population, 70% of the migrant Workers came from there, the rest of the 30% hailed from the other three provinces. See, Gilani (etal) "Labour Migrants". PIDE. Research Report, 126.
64. Akmal Hussain, pp. 388-392.

65. Information based on my interviews with local PPP, JUI leaders and administrators, at Larkana, Khairpur and Sukkur in March 1989. For an intensely personal account of MRD movement, which has been termed as the "Sindh Uprising of 1983", See Benazir Bhutto. pp. 210-212.
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67. *Dawn*, Karachi, 30th May 1988. See also, *The Economist*, June 4, 1988. p. 25.
68. For ISI's role in the creation of IJI. see, The IJI comprised of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistan Muslim League, the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Deoband group), the National People's Party, the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith, the Jamiatul Mushaikh, the Hizbe Jihad, and Fakhar Imam's, Azad Group. It has been primarily an alliance of a faction of the feudals and religious, and the New Industrial - Commercial classes. PMC and JI being its principal components.
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76. About 70 are from the Punjab. It is estimated that as many as 20 senior bureaucrats are from the elite CSP..



TABLE 1  
Party position in the National Assembly.

81

Party	NWFP	Punjab	Sind	Baluchistan	Federal Capital	Federally Administered Tribal Areas	Total Number of Seats
Pakistan People's Party	7	52	31	1	1		92
Islami Jamhoori Ittihad	8	45		2			55
Mohajir Qaumi Movement			11				11
Jamiat ul Ulema i Islam (Fazlur Rehman Group)	3			4			7
Jamiat ul Ulema i Islam (Darkhwasti Group)	1						1
Pakistan Awami Ittihad		3					3
Awami National Party	3						3
Baluchistan National Alliance				2			2
Pakistan Democratic Party		1					1
National People's Party (Khar Group)		1					1
Independents	3	12	2	2		8	27
Total Number of seats on which election were held	25	114	46	11	1	8	205
Total Number of seats in the National Assembly	26	115	46	11	1	8	207

Elections to two seats, one in Punjab and one in NWFP, could not be held as a candidate in each of the two constituencies had died. They are postponed and will be held later.

Another chart on page 19

Source : Thirdworld, December, 1988, p. 11.

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TABLE 2

## PARTY POSITIONS IN THE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
IJI	108	1	29	8	146
PPP	94	67	21	3	185
IND	32	5	15	7	59
ANP	—	—	12	—	12
MQM	—	26	—	—	26
JUI(F)	1	—	2	11	14
BNA	—	—	—	6	6
PDP	2	—	—	—	2
PAI	2	—	—	—	2
PNP	—	—	—	2	2
PKMI	—	—	—	2	2
PPI	—	1	—	—	1
NPP(K)	1	—	—	—	1
WATAN	—	—	—	1	1
TOTAL	240	100	79●	40	459

●Elections postponed in one constituency because of the death of a candidate.

Source: The Herald, December 1988, p. 66.

DIAGRAM-1

# PROCESS MODEL OF CRISIS AND CHANGE

## PHASE COMPONENTS

Antecedent system

Environmental and performance characteristics of P. system

Environment performance changes

Changes in international  
Environment

Socio-economic changes

Changes in  
govt. performance

Demand mobilization

Demand polarization

coalition formation and crisis resolution

Crisis


Crisis resolution and Coalition making

developmental linkage and the resultant system

structural changes


Environmental changes

Rejuvenation







1. Coalition Pattern  
1947 - 58



2. Coalition Pattern  
1958 - 1969




3. Coalition Pattern  
1969 - 1971




4. Coalition Pattern  
1971 - 1977

(S L ) Students, Labor



COALITION PATTERN  
1977 - 85



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P.E. POLITICAL ELITES

B. BUREAUCRACY

M. MILITARY

I.M.C. INDUSTRIAL MERCHANT  
CLASSES

New NEW INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL  
I.C.C. CLASSES

M.F. MIDDLE FARMERS

New NEW BUSINESS COMMERCIAL  
B.C.C. CLASSES

M.C.I. MIDDLE CLASS  
INTELLIGENSIA


R.E. RELIGIOUS ELITES

J. JUDICIARY


S.L. STUDENT-LABOR

I.L. INDUSTRIAL-LABOUR


(DIAGRAM II)



COALITION PATTERN  
1985 - 88





COALITION PATTERN  
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INDUSTRIAL  
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WOMEN





**SYSTEM CRISIS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE CYCLE**



## Politics Of Islamization : The Ideological Debate On Pakistan's Political System

### Context

There is a general consensus among scholars that religion played an important role in generating group identity and nationalist sentiment among the Muslims of British India, which eventually led to the creation of Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> A consensus also exists among scholars that the movement for Pakistan was opposed by the traditionalists and neo-traditionalists (i.e. the religious elites, the Ulama, and the religio-political groups). And that the movement for Pakistan was led by the modernists (i.e. the relatively secularized, western educated, nationalist elites)<sup>2</sup>. This decisively modernist nature of the Pakistan movement and its inherent conflict with traditionalists and neo-traditionalists has been incisively summarised by Emerson in these words, it was "a movement fostered and directed, not by the religious leaders and devout of Muslim India, but by the same westernized class elements—the professional men and intelligentsia — as those which guided other nationalist movements. Jinnah himself was an outstanding example of such a man and certainly not one marked by deep religious concerns."<sup>3</sup> The traditionalists and neo-traditionalists adopt new tactics and reveal determination and ambition, as Emerson points out, "once Pakistan had been secured, the religious leaders swung into trans-

form it into an instrument for the achievement of Islam's purposes. The heart of their objection was that Islam and nationalism were diametrically opposite to each other in spirit and aims."<sup>4</sup>

So Pakistan was born with a cleavage among its dominant elites. Immediately after its inception a controversy ensued on the ideological nature and orientation of its political system. While Pakistan has passed through what Braibanti calls several, "traumas,"<sup>5</sup> the controversy exists and keeps the State in a frame of perpetual transition. Analyzing the relationship between religion and politics, Smith points out that in most of the Muslim countries a conflict between Islam and the nature of these countries, political systems' exists. This conflictual problem tends to effect the processes of "secularization" and "polity expansion", which consequently effects the nature and ideological underpinnings of political systems in these countries.<sup>6</sup> It is in this context that the nature of ideological controversy and its relationship with the political system is brought to light by Smith. He observes: "In the ideological debate which ensued and which continues, Islam as a group identity has become complicated by Islam as a belief system, particularly as political theory."<sup>7</sup> It is this "complicated" relationship between religion and politics that is difficult to disentangle, but certainly identifies the roots of ideological controversy and its effects on the political system of Pakistan.

### **The Problem Addressed**

In this chapter the effort shall be to focus on the nature of the ideological controversy, the way it emerged, evolved and continues to pervade politics in Pakistan. For analytical purposes three categories i.e. Modernists, Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists shall be used to identify, explain and analyze the views of the participants. Two sets of arguments

shall be pursued. First it shall be argued that Pakistan was conceived and created to grow as a participatory liberal polity, evolving into a modern democratic state. However, this idea was immediately challenged by the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists who had initially opposed the creation of Pakistan, but after its inception began to demand that it be developed into an "Islamic State." Second, it shall be emphasized that in recent years Pakistan has drifted away from its participatory liberal ideal to what has been termed as "Traditional Religio-Political System"—a political system in which authority is vested in religious institutions and religious values tend to dominate. In such a system religion and government emerge as the important institutions of social control.<sup>8</sup>

### Explanatory Categories

Before addressing ourselves to the nature of ideological controversy, it may be appropriate to identify the explanatory categories.

*Modernists* : Modernists are those who in the tradition of Allama Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher of Pakistan and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah — the founder of Pakistan, idealized that the political system of Pakistan will grow along liberal democratic lines. During the Pakistan movement they articulated their views by demanding a "Muslim State", in which Islam was perceived as a dominant religious faith, and the political system was to give birth to a modern democratic state. The Modernists were invariably exposed to modern education, had middle class, and at times upper class social origins.

*Traditionalists* : are those who opposed the creation of Pakistan, particularly the 'Ulama' of Deoband, the Majlis-



e-Ahrar, and the Khaksars. These religio-political groups were highly critical of Jinnah and his associates, and bitterly opposed the Pakistan movement. While the Deoband 'Ulama' were an all India phenomena, the Khaksars and Ahrars were mostly confined to the Punjab. Invariably these religious elites had lower middle class social origin but commanded respect because of their traditional learning. The Ahrar and Deoband 'Ulama' had decisive influence and control over the mosques and were potentially capable of mobilizing masses on religious issues. Sheila McDonogh has pointed out that since the collapse of Mughal political authority in 1857, 'Ulama' in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent have strived to find a role for themselves in the polity. However, once Pakistan came into being they started making efforts either to exercise political authority themselves or be able to influence or control the political authorities.<sup>9</sup> They believed that Pakistan should be a religion based political system. Caliphate was their ideal for an Islamic State.<sup>10</sup> This is how religion began to condition politics in Pakistan. religious beliefs and group identity became "complicated", and religious beliefs and political beliefs began to appear as two sides of the same coin.

*Neo-Traditionalists* : The distinguishing characteristic of the neo-Traditionalist's is that they have no connections with any formal religious school (Deoband, Nadva etc.) Late Maulana Maududi and his Jamat-i-Islami has been the spokesman of neo-Traditionalist view. Maududiti despised modernists and secularists as "spineless imitators of the west" and "the arch enemy of Islam", and considered traditionalists as "irrelevant to contemporary scene."<sup>12</sup> However, despite their dissatisfaction with the Traditionalists, the neo-Traditionalists also opposed the creation of Pakistan and idealized a religion based "Islamic State". Thus despising the Modernists and dissatisfied with Traditionalists, Maulana Maududi made the task of his organization to provide the right kind

of leadership who may be able to guide the destiny of an "Islamic State."<sup>13</sup> Ironically, Traditionalists treat neo-Traditionalists with equal degree of contempt. A devout Traditionalist states, "in fact Maududi and his Jamaat does not desire to have an Islamic System."<sup>14</sup> Late Mufti Mahmood the leader of JUI, describing the nature of differences with neo-Traditionalists, once remarked that "we have no personal or political differences with Maududi if he deletes all those derogatory references from his books, which he has made on Prophet and his Ashab (Associates) we shall be willing to accept him as our leader, we differ with his views because they are in conflict with the basic norms of Ahl-i-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (the tenets of Sunni Islam)."<sup>15</sup> Despite these differences of fundamental nature the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists have continued to collaborate with each other in the politics of Pakistan particularly in situations where they expected a challenge from the Modernists. It must be added that in such situations Malulana Maududi being much more articulate and his Jamaat-i-Islami more organized as compared to the Traditionalists provided the intellectual and political leadership.

### Nature of the Controversy

The ideological controversy over the nature of Pakistan's political system emerged as a contest for supremacy and leadership between the Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Traditionalists. After the creation of Pakistan the latter began to challenge the legitimacy of Modernist's basis of power. They challenged the legitimacy of Modernists' rule by referring to Islamic framework, calling them "secular", "western" or "not true believers", thus forcing a crisis of legitimacy for the Modernists. By resorting to such tactics the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists wanted to create a legitimate place for themselves in the political system of Pakistan. In their efforts to achieve their objective they began to



transform the basis of Pakistan's statehood by claiming that Pakistan has to be an "Islamic State". Only God can be sovereign in an Islamic State, asserted Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists. "No person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a whole can lay claim to sovereignty. God alone is the real sovereign, all others are merely His subjects,"<sup>16</sup> declared Maulana Maududi. This ideological Pakistan was almost like an anti-thesis and negation of Jinnah's framework of Pakistan's political system, who as early as 1946 formulated that, "the new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, color or creed."<sup>17</sup> Aziz Ahmed has observed that Jinnah and the Muslim League struggled within the democratic framework and at no point it was even thought that Pakistan would be "anything except a modern state."<sup>18</sup> Jinnah made consistent efforts to highlight the liberal democratic framework for Pakistan's political system. While making a speech on 11th August 1947, as President of the Constituent Assembly he delineated the difference between "citizenship" and "faith". He said, "you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims not in the religious sense because that is a personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state."<sup>19</sup> Iqbal was also very clear on the role of religion in the political system of a "Muslim State". In a letter to Jinnah in 1937, he explicitly stated, "For Islam the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form and consistent with the legal principles of Islam is not a revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam."<sup>20</sup> These views of the Founding Fathers of Pakistan made it amply clear that they perceived the political system of Pakistan to grow and evolve along liberal-democratic lines.



## Transitory Phase and the Controversy

During its initial and transitory phase from colonialism to political independence, 1947-1958, the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists gradually but successfully asserted to secure a legitimate role in the political system of Pakistan. They showed considerable determinism, political skill and political ambition. As early as 1948 Maulana Maududi made it clear that he intended to transform Pakistan into an "Islamic State". He said since the political system of Pakistan is in its evolutionary process. "So our effort is that it should evolve as an ideal Islamic State. If we succeed in our effort we can utilize the vast state apparatus to bring a moral and ethical revolution in the minds of Pakistanis, with societal change we shall be able to create an ideal Islamic State."<sup>21</sup>

The Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists struck their first victory in March 1949, when they succeeded in getting incorporated the Islamic injunctions which they considered important in the Objectives Resolution. This was moved by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and was readily adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It had two significant points which accommodated the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists view, namely; (1). Sovereignty shall rest with Allah (God); and (2) Minorities shall have a right of protection for practice and working of their religion.<sup>22</sup> Both these points were not in consonance with Jinnah's ideals. In fact he had already showed that there will be no minorities on the basis of religion in the political system of Pakistan.<sup>23</sup>

This was the first major compromise Modernists made on the nature of Pakistan's political system. It marked the beginning of Islamization of politics than the politicization of the masses of Pakistan. It revealed the fragility and lack of sense of direction among the Modernists. Objectives Resolution proved to be a turning point in the history of Pakistan,

as Pakistan began to drift from liberal-democratic ideal to the Islamic ideal.<sup>24</sup> Now the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists had legitimate claims for the creation of an "Islamic State" and for the creation of minorities on religious basis in an "Islamic State." Maulana Maududi asserted that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and should be transformed into an ideological state, "following Islamic policies and actively striving towards Islamic ideal."<sup>25</sup> Nothing could be far from truth. Charles Adam, a sympathetic observer of Maulana Maududi and his movement finds it difficult to accept Maulana's assertion and states that Pakistan was "won in the name of Muslims", and not Islam.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless politics of Islamization began to acquire significance in Pakistan. The anti-Ahmediya agitation of 1953 was the second major achievement of Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists. They effectively mobilized the masses in the name of Islam, demanding that since Ahmedis do not believe in the Finality of Prophethood, hence they be declared a minority. However, they could not get Ahmediyas converted into a religious minority. The demands and protests for Islamization of Pakistan's political system acquired greater momentum. The Modernists in actual control of government became fearful, and began to see their liberal-democratic ideal of Pakistan's political system sinking. Instead of organizing themselves Modernists became faction ridden and uncertain about their control of government. They revealed indecisiveness and poor capacity to combat the mounting pressure of Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists. The politics of agitation and protests increased social tensions and caused the deterioration of economy. In such a situation of crisis and Modernist's ambivalence, the 1956 Constitution was formulated. It was a sort of uneasy truce among the Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Traditionalists on the nature of Pakistan's political system. The Constitution incorporated Islamic injunctions and provided the basis for parliamentary democracy. However, it did not resolve what



should be the role of Islam in the political system of Pakistan. Thus despite the Constitution the elite consensus was at a minimal low.<sup>27</sup>

By generating ideological controversy over the nature of Pakistan's political system the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists Islamize the politics of Pakistan to an extent that crisis of economy, social cleavage and national integration deepened beyond proportions. The Modernist forces were on the decline, but the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists did not have enough support or infrastructure to replace them. Under such circumstances in 1958 Army intervened demolishing the fragile consensual piece of paper — the 1956 Constitution.

### Ayub Khan and Controversy

General Mohammad Ayub Khan assumed power and made efforts to rehabilitate the disintegrating Modernists. He was conscious of their weak position, and was aware of the cleavage between Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists. Ayub devised a three pronged strategy to further his objectives. He tried (i) to coopt or neutralize the Traditionalists where ever possible, (ii) rehabilitate the modernist principles and values according to his needs, and (iii) to contain or if possible eliminate the neo-Traditionalists. Ayub Khan propounded a simplistic soldierly view of Pakistan's political system. He believed that politics in Pakistan revolved around, "two classes, the educated classes and the Ulama."<sup>28</sup> He regarded the Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists as opponents of Pakistan, whose only motive was to seek supremacy in the political system of Pakistan. He believed, "Pakistan was the greatest defeat of nationalist Ulama. They just wanted to establish their hegemony in a state which they had opposed."<sup>29</sup> Ayub could not tolerate Maulana Maududi's concept of Islamic political system, infact he could not



comprehend that Maulana Maududi who had so "bitterly opposed" Pakistan, after its creation had assumed the role of transforming it into an "Islamic State". "This venerable gentleman was appalled by what he saw in Pakistan; an unislamic government, and an unislamic people. How could any genuine Muslim owe allegiance to such a government. So he set about the task of convincing the people of their inadequacies, their feelings and their general unworthiness."<sup>30</sup>

Ayub resisted neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists demands for an Islamic ideological state. He showed readiness to delete the word 'Islamic' from the preamble of 1962 Constitution. He strived to orientate the political system along liberal secular lines, and at the same time made an effort to institutionalize the role of Islam in the political system of Pakistan. He symbolized the predicament of the Modernists in Pakistan. Between 1958-62, he took three steps in such a direction. (1). in 1961 he introduced the Family Law Reform, which roused protest and agitation from neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists. Though reform bill was saved, the Ulama once again revealed tremendous capacity to mobilize the masses in the name of Islam. (2). He formulated an Advisory Council for Islamic ideology and ensured that besides lawyers and administrators only relatively emancipated Ulama become its members, something which was resented by the neo-Traditionalists. (3). He also established an Islamic Research Institute, with Dr. Fazalur Rehman, a modernist as its Director. But it was not long before neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists launched movements of protest against individuals heading the later two institutions. They claimed that only Ulama, who were trained in Islamic jurisprudence should head these institutions.

Whereas neo-Traditionalists continued to oppose the government, Ayub Khan made consistent efforts to neutra-

lize the Traditionalists. In 1964 while contesting for presidency under his Basic Democracies scheme, and facing a challenge from Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the Founder of Pakistan, he moved to persuade some Ulama to issue a Fatwa against Miss Jinnah, that under Islamic law a woman cannot contest for presidency. By such an act Ayub raised the regime legitimizing role of the Traditionalists and also facilitated the Islamization of politics. Maulana Maududi opposed Ayub, and supported the candidature of Miss Jinnah. Thus both Traditionalists and neo-Traditionalists in their own way succeeded in keeping the controversy on the ideological nature of Pakistan's political system unresolved.

### **Yahya Khan and Islamization of Politics**

The controversy on the nature of Pakistan's political system acquired new dimension under General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan's regime (1969-71). Yahya Khan took two important decisions which had deep repercussions on the political processes in Pakistan. He dissolved the one unit scheme of 1955, according to which West Pakistan's four provinces were merged into One Unit. Secondly he decided to hold general elections in 1970. In the legal Framework he provided, the National Assembly of Pakistan was to preserve the "Islamic Ideology" of Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> It was during Yahya's rule and electoral campaign that the term "Islamic Ideology" was explicitly used for the first time and acquired new meaning.<sup>32</sup> The neo-Traditionalists emphasized that Pakistan was an "ideological state" and in an "ideological state" political system has to evolve and grow along moral lines than in terms of Capitalism or Socialism.<sup>33</sup> The 1970 election results revealed the weak support base of Traditionalist, particularly the neo-Traditionalists who were completely routed.<sup>34</sup> It also revealed lack of consensus among Pakistan's elites on the ideological nature of Pakistan's political system. It brought to surface the social and economic cleavages of



Pakistan's political structure and revealed that Islam may no longer be the only integrative factor for the State of Pakistan.<sup>35</sup> It is interesting to note that neo-Traditionalists have been in general supportive of Martial Law regimes in Pakistan, with the exception of Ayub's rule. In march 1971 when the Armed Forces launched military operations in East Pakistan to preserve the "ideological frontiers of Pakistan", the neo-Traditionalists showed complete solidarity with the Army's action.<sup>36</sup> This Army-neo-Traditionalist collaboration, besides other factors, was a crucial factor which resulted in the break up of Pakistan.

### **Bhutto and Intensification of Ideological Controversy**

The disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 reflected the failure of elites to evolve any consensus over the nature of Pakistan's political system. The controversy re-emerged as Z.A. Bhutto assumed power in "New Pakistan". The neo-Traditionalists immediately challenged the legitimacy of Mr. Bhutto's government. The Traditionalists (particularly Jamiatul Ulama Islam) were not very critical, in fact, they shared power with Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in NWFP and Baluchistan. However, the neo-Traditionalists initiated a series of protests from "moral bankruptcy" of Bhutto's rule and government to prisoners of war issue, recognition of Bangladesh, improvement of relations with India. The neo-Traditionalists opposed Bhutto's government with same venom and ferocity as they had opposed the leadership of Jinnah and the creation of Pakistan. They despised his rule as immoral not in conformity with their ideal of an "Islamic State" and were "distrustful of his secular socialist ideology."<sup>37</sup> In early 1973, the Amir of Jaamat-i-Islami issued a statement prompting Army to take over the government, because it was immoral.<sup>38</sup>

By generating legitimacy crisis the neo-Traditionalists



kept Modernist forces on the defensive, polity polarized and controversy over the nature of Pakistan's political system unresolved. In such an environment of crisis and hostility Bhutto ventured to formulate the 1973 constitution. Bhutto succeeded in evolving elite consensus over the constitution, and for a while it appeared that ideological controversy over the nature of Pakistan's political system has been finally resolved.

The constitution provided more Islamic injunctions as compared to any previous constitution of Pakistan. Fundamental rights were defined and their enforcement is guaranteed, minorities were secured freedom of religion and cultural practices. It carried references to Islamic way of life, compulsory teaching of Holy Quran, Islamiyat and encouragement to learn Arabic. It gave commitment to promote the institution of Zakat, organize mosques and Auqaf, removal of repugnancy between the existing laws and the Holy Quran and Sunnah. It also provided the creation of an Islamic Council.<sup>39</sup> By securing such concessions of neo-Traditionalists through a gradual but consistent demand-agitation process legitimized their position in the political system. This demonstrated that the modernists despite popular appeal and mass support base could accommodate the neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists and integrate them in the system. It also helped facilitate polity expansion and ushered in a hope that through such a process an elite consensus may emerge which would settle the controversy over the nature of the political system. However, each concession in constitution (or the legal order) enhanced the confidence of neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists. It reinforced their vigor to Islamize politics and also to mobilize people on religious issues. In such a background we found that in 1974, the neo-Traditionalists supported by the Traditionalists launched a massive protest movement demanding that Ahmediyas be declared a minority. This was one issue on which the neo-

Traditionalists have been able to rouse passions and mobilize the masses. This time they succeeded in getting Ahmediyas declared as a religious minority by an Act of Parliament.<sup>40</sup>

The Islamic provisions in the Constitution and later the decision to declare Ahmediyas a minority, revitalized the Islamization of politics in Pakistan. The neo-Traditionalists, intensified their demand for an ideological Islamic political system, because it appeared to them that Bhutto is trying to legitimize his rule by means other than religion. A sympathetic observer of neo-Traditionalists view has pointed out that "with the passage of time it became clear to the Jamati-Islami that the more he (Bhutto) implemented Socialism and justified his policies through economic and not religious legitimization the more it led to the secularization of the State."<sup>41</sup> It was this secularization of polity expansion process of Bhutto that upset the neo-Traditionalists. They believed that Bhutto's Modernist rule was not only secularizing the political system, but was also undermining their support base. The modernizing effects on socio-economic structure of Pakistan were perceived by the neo-Traditionalists as leading to immorality in an "Islamic State". They called for transformation of society along moral lines, denouncing Bhutto's rule as "immoral" and "irreligious". To counter these charges Bhutto fell back on such ritualistic aspects of Islam, as inviting Imam of Kaaba to lead Friday prayers, enforcing prohibition and declaring Friday instead of Sunday as a holiday. These concessions did not appease the neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists. Infact this process of receding Modernist forces and ascending neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists forces gave further impetus to the politics of Islamization in Pakistan.

In July 1977 Bhutto's government was overthrown by the military in the wake of rising Islamic wave which was led



by the neo-Traditionalists and the Traditionalists (In the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) there were nine political parties, but Jaamat-i-Islami and Jamiat-Ul-Ulema-i-Islam were the principal anti-Bhutto parties and their leadership dominated the PNA)' During 1977 the PNA had mobilized the masses in the name of Islam. The PNA movement had been described as a "Middle Class Islamic Movement", in which middle classes alienated by Bhutto's rule and guided by the neo-Traditionalists openly revolted.<sup>42</sup> The politics of Islam in Pakistan was considerably influenced by the "Islamic Wave" in most of the Muslim Countries. During the 1977 Islamic Movement it appeared as if the Pakistanis had rediscovered their national identity in the resurgent Islam. Regional and ethnic cleavages seemed to have submerged in the unifying force of Islam.

With Bhutto's departure the modern-liberal features of Pakistan's political system collapsed once again. This time the influence of the neo-Traditionalists decisively increased and a shift towards the traditional religio-political system became visible.

Foregoing analysis of events, political processes and consequent failure of Modernists in Pakistan affirm the contention that in the Developing Societies "religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not".<sup>43</sup>

#### Zia and Islamic Transformation

As pointed out earlier the neo-Traditionalists had been inciting the military to overthrow Bhutto's "immoral" government. In the wake of Islamic wave of protests, the masses were highly mobilized and the country was highly polarized, consensus among the contesting elites was minimal. In a highly mobilized but divided polity, military intervened, as "the spectre of a civil war loomed ahead."<sup>44</sup>



General Zia ul Haq assumed power. He was readily supported by the neo-Traditionalists.<sup>45</sup> Zia revealed eagerness to transform Pakistan into an "ideological state" as perceived by the neo-Traditionalists. This identity of views between Zia and the neo-Traditionalists had brought about what Jansen calls "spectacular change in the Jammāt's fortunes."<sup>46</sup> For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the neo-Traditionalists found their dream come true — that they will finally be able to demolish the democratic-liberal basis of Pakistan and transform it into an "Ideological Islamic State". This is what they had been striving for and in this spirit considered most of the rulers of Pakistan as un-Islamic. For the neo-Traditionalists, Asaf has succinctly observed, "The creation of Umma was the ultimate objective, such an Umma, they believed could be created by a group of men who through training and personal development and personal life style could act as Islamic model for others. The difference between these men and those belonged to the anti-Islamic forces was that while former made serious effort to practice Islam and follow its precepts, the later was a muslim in name."<sup>47</sup> Zia the first practicing muslim "Ruler of Pakistan" approximated their precepts of "Islamic Model", and showed eagerness to transform the political system of Pakistan approximating the precepts of the neo-Traditionalists. In his first address to the nation on July 5, 1977, he spoke in the language of neo-Traditionalists that Pakistan, "was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country."<sup>48</sup> So Zia proceeded to formulate the parameters of "Islamic System" by erasing the already weakened liberal-secular structure of Pakistan in the name of eliminating evils of "Bhuttoism", and by imposing Islamic framework over the political system. The politics of Islamization helped him legitimize his rule and also provided him with an opportunity to develop solidarity with Saudi-Arabia and the

Islamic world in general. Through Islamization Zia sought the legitimization of military rule internally and for developing foreign relations with the Islamic countries.

Encouraged by the neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists Zia introduced normative and structural changes in the political system. He issued such value-reinforcing and symbolic Martial Law directives that during work hours people must say their prayers, on Friday's during prayer hours shops must be closed, and call for the prayer be announced on the radio and television. During the month of Ramzan the Muslim population must observe fast and observe prayer. For criminal offences Islamic punishments were announced and enforced. Criminals were publically flogged.

The Islamic punishment symbolism did generate desired effect, it demobilized the highly politicized masses, and enforced new norms of compliance.

At the structural level, in 1978 Shariah Benches were introduced to enforce laws according to Islamic jurisprudence. Ulama and Lawyers were appointed as members of these Benches. These Benches were to ensure that no law repugnant to Quran and Sunnah was formulated. The Shariah Bench Ordinance was silent on the status of the 1973 Constitution, Muslim personal law, and various taxation aspects. It did generate some controversy on these points. However, the neo-Traditionalists leadership hailed it as a "landmark in the history of the country."<sup>49</sup> To Islamize the economy on 10th February 1979 (On Prophet's birth-day) Zakat and Usher Ordinance was announced.<sup>50</sup>

Zakat fund has been instituted with an initial capital of over two thousand million rupees in addition to generous donations made by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates towards the fund. Zakat Ordinance was expected to perform



welfare functions for the state, taxing the wealthy to fulfill the needs of the relatively poor. Interest free banking was introduced and was hailed as a major step towards developing a framework for Islamic economic. To inculcate Islamic values among the youth Shariah Faculty (which is now a full fledged International Islamic University, generously funded by Saudia Arabia) was founded at Quaid-i-Azam University. Learning of Arabic was encouraged and Islamic studies was made a compulsory subject at the high school and college level.<sup>51</sup>

To formulate the basis for "Islamic democracy" and to develop the parameters for an "Islamic Political System", Islamic Ideology Council and Islamic Reserach Institute were revitalized. In 1978 Islamic Ideology Council proposed a scheme of "Establishment of an Islamic Society" (See diagram)<sup>52</sup> It sought Islamization of educational, economic, legal system etc. of the country. The scheme has yet to be fully operationalized. However the Ulama's long standing demand to have key positions in these institutions was acceded to. These measures considerably consolidated the position of neo-Traditionalists. Today these religious groups and elites are a force to be reckoned with.

The usage of religious symbolism has acquired new significance, the authroity vested in the religious institutions both in terms of value orientation and social control has visibly increased. The religiosity of politics has increased, whereas secularization of political processes is on the decline. Islamic rhetoric, Islamic identity, solidarity with Saudi and other Islamic countries, and visible emphasis on the Islamic ideology appear to be the emerging contours of contemporary Pakistan's political socialization process. The transformation from decaying liberal-democratic political system to traditional religio-political system is visible in Pakistan. Despite the current civilinization process the government



headed by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo is moving along the course charted by General Zi ul Haq — i.e. sustaining the Islamic symbolism and structures created by the General.

Here it would be useful to briefly comment upon two important but controversial Islamization measures — the Ninth Amendment and the Shariat Bill. The Ninth Amendment was trumpeted as a "major step in the Islamization Process" and a "brilliant achievement of the government."<sup>53</sup> The Amendment was introduced in the Senate on December 23, 1985 and was passed by it without any debate. The Amendment to the Constitution sought following objectives.<sup>54</sup>

- a. The injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation to be administered through laws enacted by the parliament and provincial assemblies, and for policy making by the government.
- b. It empowered the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) to make recommendations for bringing the fiscal laws and laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes in conformity with the said injunctions.
- c. It extended the jurisdiction of FSC to Muslim personal law and laws relating to the procedures of courts and tribunals.

The other bill known as Shariat Bill was introduced in the Senate by Maulana Shami-ul-Haq and Qazi Abdul Latif, the Jamaat-i-Islami Senators from the North West Frontier of Pakistan (NWFP). The Bill is being debated in and outside the Senate. The Bill once passed proposes fundamental restructuring of country's legislative, judicial and social system. Its main provisions are as follows:<sup>55</sup>

1. Shariah means that particular way of life which Allah has through the last of Prophet Hazrat Mohammad (PBUH), enjoined upon his subject. The main source of Shariah is the Quran and Sunnah and an act of Shariah be based on them.

2. All suits shall be decided in accordance with "Shariat". A decision which is against the Shariah shall be avoided and it shall be challengeable in the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) execution on it it shall stand suspended till the final decision of Shariah Court.
3. All the courts of the country shall be bound to decide all kinds of cases, including financial etc. according to the Shariah and cases decided in contravention of the Shariah shall be void.
4. No officer of the executive, including the President and the Prime Minister shall give directions which are against Shariah, and any decision so given shall be void and may be challenged in a court of law.
5. A decision of the FSC shall apply to all office bearers of the government.
6. The non-Muslim citizens shall be free to have religious education for their children and shall have the right to get their personal affairs decided in accordance with their own religious law.
7. Experienced, outstanding and recognized Ulama shall be appointed as Judges in all the courts.
8. Effective arrangements shall be made for the teaching of Shariah and Islamic Jurisprudence.
9. Mass media shall be purged from such programmes which are against the Shariah.
10. All earning of wealth through forbidden means and dealings contrary to Shariah shall be banned.
11. No order will be passed against the fundamental rights given by the Shariah to citizens of the country and any order so passed shall be void and may be challenged in a court of law.
12. This Act may be called the enforcement of Shariah Act and shall extend to the whole of Pakistan save the personal laws of the non-Muslim.

Apparently, the controversy on the ideological nature of Pakistan's political system is being debated but not resolved. Ethnic and social cleavages exist, whereas Islamic institutional framework is still weak and fuzzy. The broad features of

traditional-religio-political system are not clearly delineated, but they are evolving gradually as has been indicated. However one of the outstanding features of the emerging political system is the visibly expanding role of the neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists. This is being reinforced and legitimized by the governmental social control mechanism. For the first, time, since the inception of Pakistan, the neo-Traditionalists and Traditionalists have succeeded in establishing institutional advance and in some instances supremacy. They have in fact emerged as an important component of the political system. Due to their pre-eminence, national identity, national survival and relations with Islamic countries are being perceived as hinging upon this newly discovered Islamic bond. Consequently it appears that compared to the "Socialist" rhetoric of the previous government "Islamic" rhetoric of General Zia has become relatively more stable if not institutionalized.



## NOTES

1. See for example I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi: Karachi University Press, 1965. pp. 1-25, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Pakistan as an Islamic State*, Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1951, pp. 1-10. Richard S. Wheeler, *The politics of Pakistan; A Constitutional Quest*, Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1970. pp. 1-36, and pp. 208-209, and K. B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 1-8.
2. See for example Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. See pp. 28-29, 34-37, 92-93, Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1957. pp. 230-232. Aziz Ahmed, "Islam and Democracy in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent", pp. 123-142 in Robert F. Spencer (ed.) *Religion and Contemporary Change in Asia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971; and Sheila McDonough, "The Religious Legitimization Change among Modernists in Indo-Pakistan Islam", pp. 42-52, in Barndell L. Smith (ed.) *Religion and Legitimization of power in South Asia*, Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1978.
3. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self Assertion of Asian and African People*; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. p. 164.
4. *Ibid.* p. 164.
5. Ralph Braibanti, "The Research potential of Pakistan's Development", pp. 430-479, in Lawrence Ziring *et al*, *Pakistan; The Long View*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1977. pp. 438-440.
6. Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development*, Boston: Little and Brown, 1970. p. 161.
7. *Ibid.* p. 161.
8. *Ibid.* p. 6.
9. Sheila McDonough, p. 43.
10. Aziz Ahmed. p. 127.
11. McDonough. p. 45.
12. Smith. p. 161.

13. Kalim Bahadur, *The Jammāt-i-Islāmī of Pakistan : political thought and political action*: New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977. p. 15.
14. Ziaurrehman Faruqi, *Savānih Hayat: Mufti Mahmūd*; Lahore, Farooq Publications, (N.D.) (In Urdu) p. 150.
15. *Ibid.* p. 154.
16. A.A. Maudoodi, *Political Theory of Islam*, Rampur, (no date) pp. 29-30 and also (in Urdu) *Islāmī Rīāsāt*, Lahore: Islamic publications 1961, 1967. pp. 129-138.
17. Cited in Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, Lahore; Vanguard Books, 1980. p. 28.
18. Aziz Ahmed. p. 126.
19. Cited in Binder. p. 100.
20. Cited in Aziz Ahmed. p. 125.
21. Abu Tariq, (in Urdu) *Interviews of Maulana Maududi* Lahore: Islamic publication, 1976. pp. 26-27.
22. Callard. pp. 89-90.
23. Munir. p. 36.
24. *Ibid.* p. 36.
25. Charles J. Adam, "The ideology of Maulana Maududi", in D.E. Smith, (ed). *South Asian Politics and Religion*; Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1966. p. 376.
26. *Ibid.* p. 376.
27. Callard. pp. 227-229.
28. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography*, London; Oxford University Press, 1967. p. 200.
29. *Ibid.* pp. 202-203.
30. *Ibid.* p. 208.
31. G.W. Choudhry, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, Blooming-

- ton: Indiana University Press, 1974. p. 93.
32. Munir. pp. 84-85.
  33. Asaf Hussain, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State*, London: Islamic Foundation, 1979, pp. 162-164.
  34. G.W. Choudhry, pp. 113-115.
  35. Damdor Singhal, *Pakistan*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1972. pp. 56-57.
  36. Godfrey H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, London: Pan Books, 1979, pp. 153-154.
  37. Asaf Hussain, "From Nationhood to UMMA: The Struggle of Islam in Pakistan." *Asian Thought and Society*, Vol. V, No. 13, April 1980, pp. 47-57.
  38. Cited in Hussain (80), p. 49.
  39. *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Karachi, Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1975. pp. 1-11.
  40. Jansen. p. 153.
  41. Asaf Hussain (80), p. 54.
  42. William L. Richter, "From Electoral Politics to Martial Law: Alternative Perspectives on Pakistan's Political Crisis of 1977." in Manzooruddin Ahmed (ed). *Contemporary Pakistan; Politics, Economy and Society*; Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980. pp. 92-113, p. 103.
  43. Smith, (preface xii).
  44. A.K. Brohi, cited in Richter (80), p. 102.
  45. Richter, (80); pp. 103-105.
  46. Jansen. p. 153.
  47. Asaf Hussain (80), pp. 49-50.
  48. Cited in William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic



Resurgence in Pakistan." *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 6, June 1979. pp. 547-557.

49. Munir. p. 141.
50. Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam. It is leviable on the total wealth of a person at the rate of 2.5%, whereas usher is land tax, the produce of Barani (Rainfall) land can be taxed at the rate of one tenth and irrigated land at the rate of 5 percent.
51. Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society*, Durham; Carolina Academic Press, 1980. Introduction (pp. 1-45). pp. 27-37.
52. For an excellent discussion on Shariah Laws see Abdul Ghafur Muslim, "Application of the Shariah Laws. An investigation into the problems and principles in the field of Islamization "in *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*," Vol. VI, No. 2, July-December 1985. (pp. 19-36).
53. Tariq Saleem Sheikh, "Nineth Amendment: Toward Islamic Order." *The Pakistan Times*, Rawalpindi, 21 st July 1986.
54. Senate Paper: By *Senate of Pakistan* (As introduced in the Senate) A Bill, PCPPI - 5240 Senate 23.12-86-500.
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## Bureaucracy, Military and Party Politics: 1947-58

This article addresses a two-pronged question: What accounts for the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites and the decline of party politics in the pre-military hegemonic phase (i.e., 1947-1958) of Pakistan's political development? The considerable literature that addresses this question focuses primarily on political parties, constitutional process and the role of religion, and the dominant personalities of the times. A number of these works are insightful.<sup>1</sup> However, most of them are chronological, descriptive, and repetitive,<sup>2</sup> and do not provide adequate information about the structure and political process in Pakistan. According to their underlying assumptions and arguments and for the purposes of conceptualization, most of the literature can be divided into four types of competing approaches:

1. Praetorian approach;;
2. Ideological approach;
3. Marxian approach;
4. Elite approach.



Each approach provides interesting insights into Pakistan's political development. It will briefly describe the central arguments of these approaches and identify some of their inadequacies.

The praetorian explanation is most prevalent in the literature. Because of its wider acceptance, this will be discussed in some detail. This research will deviate from that pattern and assert that, given the early dominance of the bureaucratic-military elites in Pakistani politics, elite approach enhances our comprehension of the dynamics of political process. Structurally, politics in Pakistan has been dominated by the bureaucratic-military institutions, and the political process has revolved around the elites in these institutions. In the pre-military hegemonic phase, the political leaders and political parties were more visible, but they never had supremacy in the political system because the interests represented by the political parties were very weakly organized and ethnically divided, and lacked political-administrative experience. The political leadership, which in general came from the feudal classes, was more concerned with protecting its own class interests than broadening the participation of other classes and groups.

Three sets of arguments can be made. First, the bureaucratic-military elites dominated the power structure and made persistent efforts to monopolize the positions of power. Second, an "anti-politics" attitude—a perception that politics was conflictual and that politicians were incapable of governing the state—was at the heart of the bureaucracy's conviction that it must rule. Third, after 1951 the bureaucratic-military elites intervened in politics not by default but by design. This intervention was slow, gradual, and systematic.

#### Praetorian Approach:

The works of a number of Pakistani and Western scholars

can be conceptualized from the praetorian perspective. These works support Huntington's hypothesis that political institutions (i.e., political parties, interest groups) do not develop in the developing countries because societal cleavages are too strong.<sup>3</sup> It is asserted that societal cleavages hamper political institutionalization and promote praetorianism—defined to mean the intervention of the military in politics. In the words of Huntington,

In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts. 'Under such conditions', as Hobbes put it, 'when nothing else is turned up clubs are trumps'.<sup>4</sup>

In essence, then, praetorian societies are characterized by their low ratio of institutionalization to participation—that is, political participation outstrips the capabilities of existing institutions to mediate, refine and moderate group political action. Power is fragmented in a praetorian society, and there is little agreement on legitimate, authoritative means of resolving conflict. Accepted procedures for making demands heard, acknowledged and acted upon are virtually non-existent. Political loyalties lack any commitment and can be easily transferred from one group to another. Entry of new groups into the political arena exacerbates (rather than reduces) existing tensions. In Huntington's view, "military intervention is thus usually a response to escalation of social conflict by several groups and parties coupled with a decline in effectiveness and legitimacy of whatever political institutions may exist".<sup>5</sup>



Most of the works that explain the decline of party politics in Pakistan during the 1947-1958 period contend that praetorian conditions were exacerbated by the political leaders who failed to broaden and institutionalize participatory politics, thus causing the "decay" of party politics.

According to Sayeed,<sup>6</sup> the pre-military hegemonic phase was a "period of conflict". Apparently it was a conflict between the political leaders and the bureaucratic-military elites over the nature and direction of the political system (i.e., the constitution, the role of religion in the polity, socio-economic reform, and the quantum of provincial autonomy). However, Sayeed believed the sources of conflict were rooted in the tradition and culture of the regions that constituted Pakistan. The behavior of political leaders merely reflected these cleavages. East Bengal's political leadership had a degree of consensus on the issue of provincial autonomy. However, the West Pakistani political leaders were divided not only along parochial lines, but also along "feudal" cleavages, particularly in Punjab and Sind. Ridden with these cleavages, the political leaders could neither create a consensus among themselves, nor effectively challenge the bureaucratic elites.<sup>7</sup> They lacked the capacity to aggregate public interest and build political institutions. Sayeed's central thesis is that the incompetence and divisiveness of the political leaders brought about the collapse of the party system and facilitated the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites. He stated:

It cannot be said that Pakistan lacked strong leaders. There were too many of them and they were too strong for each other. What there often seemed to be was a total lack of loyalty to any ideal or set of principles or even to the country on the part of these party leaders. . . it was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power.<sup>8</sup>



Callard, a perceptive observer of Pakistan's early phase of political development, reflected the populist sentiment of Pakistanis when he commented, rather optimistically, that "Democracy has been accepted as an ideal; there is nothing to indicate that it cannot become a reality".<sup>9</sup> However, his argument was not too dissimilar from that of Sayeed, except that he had greater confidence in the neutrality and apolitical tradition of the bureaucratic elites. He believed that in Pakistan the party system would falter, not because of the bureaucratic-military elites, but because of the political leaders' inability to sustain the system. Callard conclusively stated:

The weakness of parliamentary government has been the failure of the elected politicians to make the system work. Ministries have been overthrown by intrigue, backed by threats, rather than any real violence. Holders of political office have shown themselves unscrupulous but not totalitarian. And there have been important sections of the community which have exerted pressure to keep the democratic system in operation. The courts have applied the law as they found it and that law is based on the British precedent. The civil service and the Army have shown no desire to back any potential dictator. There may be those who have toyed with the idea of suspending the parliamentary institutions, but they have produced no leader, who seems likely to obtain wide enough support to undertake such a step. If representative government collapses it would be because its legs are not strong enough to sustain its own body.<sup>10</sup>

Callard overemphasized the apolitical character of the bureaucratic-military elites, and, by focusing only on the dominant political personalities and the political parties, could not adequately comprehend the dynamics of the political process during this phase of Pakistan's story.

Rizvi, while analyzing the political developments of this period, echoed Callard, when he asserted that "political decay" occurred because:

Pakistan suffered from the lack of competent leadership and well organized political parties. The growth of regional and parochial forces, political bargaining and open defiance of the norms of parliamentary democracy encouraged instability which reduced the effectiveness of the governmental machinery, on the other hand the military was gaining strength.<sup>11</sup>

Huntington and others have noted that such conditions are conducive for praetorianism. Rizvi's arguments broadly fall into the Huntingtonian perspective, while emphasizing that it was the inability of the political leaders to build a party system that led to the proportionate increase in the strength of the military during the pre-military hegemonic political phase in Pakistan.

Rounaq Jahan,<sup>12</sup> a Bangladeshi scholar who made a pioneering study of the sources of the failure of national integration in Pakistan with commendable theoretical understanding and substantial empirical work, concluded that Pakistan failed to achieve national integration because its political leadership could not develop viable political institutions. Analyzing the 1947 to 1958 period, she claimed that party politics "decayed" in Pakistan due to inter-elite conflict. Like Sayeed, she also saw the pre-military hegemonic phase as a period of conflict between the "nationalist elites," who were mostly from West Pakistan, predominantly from Punjab, and the "vernacular elites," who were primarily from East Pakistan and other smaller provinces.

Since the "vernacular elites" particularly the Bengalis, did not have adequate representation in the military and civil



service, they were keen to have the democratic process of party politics, because that was the only way they could influence political decision making. The "nationalist elites" were predominantly from the bureaucracy and landed interests in West Pakistan and were less inclined to participatory politics. The inability of these elites to develop a consensus on the conduct of politics sowed the seeds of disintegration.

Rafiq Afzal<sup>13</sup> provides a graphic description of the events and personalities of this period. He too blames the political leaders for promoting the politics of non-consensus. He has argued that during this period it was the rivalry between the Punjabi and Bengali political leaders and the factionalism within the Muslim League that obstructed the development of party politics and led to the decay of the party system. A number of Pakistani scholars concur with this view and consider non-consensus among the political leaders and factionalism within the Muslim League as the principal causes for the non-institutionalization of party politics.<sup>14</sup>

Ziring,<sup>15</sup> an astute observer of Pakistani politics, has placed the burden of responsibility for the decay of party politics on the political leaders and the "structural weakness" of the Muslim League.

The Muslim League leaders were frightened and defensive people. . . . Instead of expanding its vistas, broadening its expression, appealing to a wider cross-section of society, the Muslim League tightened its circle, rigidified its practices, and left little room for maneuvers or adaptation. . . . Structural weakness brought the bureaucracy and eventually the armed forces into the picture. Observing the ineptness and quarrelsome nature of the Muslim League politicians, it was left to the professional administrators to manage the day to day affairs of the



country. The deeper the politicians plunged themselves into philosophical controversy and personal rivalry, the less time they had for governing the country.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, according to Ziring, the bureaucratic-military elites entered the political arena not by intent but by default. He shares the broad theoretical argument of Huntington on "political decay" and "praetorianism," while explaining the failure of political institutionalization in Pakistan.

Burki<sup>17</sup> has also formulated his argument in broad Huntingtonian terms. Nevertheless, as compared to most of the Western and Pakistani scholars, his explanation of the collapse of the party system is distinctively different. He has contended that during this period, Pakistan suffered from "institutional disequilibrium", while different groups competed to establish their control over the decision-making process. Unlike most of the other studies on Pakistan that have been discussed above, Burki contends that the politics of Pakistan during the pre-military hegemonic period can best be explained by examining the groups that competed during this phase. According to him it was a period of conflict between two groups, the "outsiders" and the "insiders." The outsiders were defined as the migrant groups that came to Pakistan from India in the wake of independence and settled in different parts of Pakistan. According to Burki, they were urban professionals and had a culture and value system that were different from those of the areas that constituted Pakistan. The "insiders" were defined as the "indigenous groups" that were rural, hierarchical, and traditional. Burki had claimed that during its early phase (i.e., 1947-53) the Muslim League was dominated by the "migrant groups," while the "indigenous groups" were excluded from the political arena. Thus ensued a struggle for power between the two groups. According to him this conflict was resolved in 1953 with the ascendancy of Ghulam Mohammad — a bureaucrat who

facilitated the entry of the "indigenous groups" into the political arena. Burki has asserted that the "indigenous groups," rooted in the rural structure, were less mobile and thus more stable than the "migrant groups" and had greater institutionalization capacity because they were less mobile. Therefore, according to him, what occurred was not a collapse of party politics but of the relatively modern urban group's influence. The more traditional rural groups had come to power, and the weak Muslim League's rule was replaced by that of relatively stable groups. Burki has equated rural status quo with political stability.

Burki has provided a neat dichotomy between the "insiders" and "outsiders" that obscures more than what it tells. He assumes that the "indigenous groups" were a homogeneous monolith, the fact of the matter is that these groups were faction-ridden. He obfuscates the anti-democratic role and attitude of the bureaucratic-military elites. Burki has quite conveniently overlooked the "migrant" and "indigenous" groups' alliance at the level of bureaucratic-military institutions, which was not only most powerful but also instrumental in deciding the nature and direction of the political process in Pakistan.

### **Marxian Approach:**

The Marxists in general have interpreted the pre-military hegemonic phase of Pakistan's history in terms of the crisis of the "ruling classes" and the "imperialist intrigue". The Marxists have argued that during this period political and economic decision making in Pakistan was dominated by the "feudal" and "commercial" classes. They regard the military and the bureaucracy as an extension of these classes. It is asserted that when the feudal classes could not protect their interests through the facade of parliamentary politics, the bureaucratic-military elites stepped in and assumed power to



resolve the crisis of the "ruling classes" and thus reinforced the status quo.

Gankovsky<sup>18</sup> and Tariq Ali<sup>19</sup> have noted the contradictions of the "ruling classes" and both claim that these classes were manipulated by the outside powers—implying Great Britain and the United States. This manipulation is mostly explained by focusing upon the U.S. policy of containment of communism in the 1950's and Great Britain's deep impact on the "ruling class". It is conjectured that while the British patronized the political leaders, i.e., the "feudal" and commercial classes, the United States patronized the bureaucratic-military elites. Thus the collapse of party politics is viewed as arm-twisting by the United States to replace "parliamentary democracy" with "military dictatorship"<sup>20</sup>. Both emphasize the external variable, as the key factor in aggravating the crisis of the "ruling class," and hastening the decay of the party system. They also provide some documentation on leftist politics and claim that the repressive policies of the "ruling classes" were instrumental in curbing the leftist movements and the growth of the middle classes and urban-rural proletariat.

Mubashir Hassan,<sup>21</sup> a former Federal Minister and General Secretary of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), has asserted that it was the "weak nationalist" and "pro-imperialist" character of the Pakistani "ruling class" that brought about the collapse of party politics in the pre-military hegemonic phase. According to Mubashir, the Pakistani "ruling class" had three components, the "feudal" class, the "capitalist class," and the "middle class." Interestingly he regards all these classes as vassals of "imperialism," none having any indigenous or autonomous roots. To support this contention Mubashir and others have pointed out that after the first War of National Independence in 1857, the British encouraged the formation of feudal classes to expand and consolidate



their rule. According to him, since these classes were completely dependent on their "imperialist masters," they were incapable of independent governance. Mubashir has rather contemptuously commented:

Our feudal class is fake, our capitalist class is fake, our middle class is fake too. From the point of fulfilling their responsibility all these classes are like counterfeit coins. Neither of these classes can produce or lead to prosperity. They are all rulers and owners merely in name. These classes are incapable of performing their own responsibilities.<sup>22</sup> (My free translation).

He further continues, since these classes are "fake," they are devoid of any "self-confidence". Thus, Mubashir conclusively asserts, "These classes are always looking towards their imperialist bosses for guidance and direction"<sup>23</sup>. He does not provide any evidence to support this assertion.

From Mubashir's perspective, very much like the other Marxists, the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites; in the pre-military hegemonic phase was a function of external dependence rather than internal competition or conflict among different classes. The Marxist argument is correct to the extent that historically most of the feudal classes emerged in the late 19th century when the British introduced property rights and tenancy laws. To imply from this that these classes were incapable of governance does not seem plausible. Second, the Marxists fail to appreciate the autonomous character of the bureaucratic-military institutions. Third, Mubashir's argument in particular ignores the contributions of some of the feudals and commercial groups in the struggle for Pakistan. Fourth, the Marxist writings on Pakistan hardly provide an insight into how and why certain classes were co-opted to the ruling classes and others were excluded. Finally, the major problem with Marxist writings on Pakistan, parti-

cularly the ones by Pakistani scholars, is that they are loaded with strong assertions and provide little empirical evidence; hence they do not adequately facilitate our understanding about the dynamics of the political process.

### Ideological Approach

The proponents of the ideological approach contend that the principal issues in the pre-military hegemonic phase of Pakistan's political development were: (1) What would be the role of Islam in the new state, and (2) What would be the role of religious elites or religious groups in the political system? The central thesis of this school is that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and as such it was to be an "Islamic state"<sup>24</sup>. It was asserted that in the ideological state sovereignty resided in Allah (God) and the laws of Sharia were to be implemented within the territorial boundaries of the state. The political leaders were to act as the agents (Khalifa) of Allah and implement the Islamic order.

However, the movement for Pakistan was led by modernist political leaders. Consequently, after independence a conflict emerged between the "modernists" (i.e., political leaders and the bureaucratic-military elites) and the "religious elites," who were keen to find a legitimate place in the political system. Therefore after independence the religious elites began to raise demands for "Islamization"<sup>25</sup>. Given the appeal of religion at the mass level, the religious elites attempted to mobilize public opinion on religious issues, so as to influence the constitutional process. However, the failure of one component of the modernists (i.e., the political leaders) and the religious elites to develop any consensus on the nature and direction of the political system led to that system's decay while activating the other component of the modernists, the military-bureaucratic elites to intervene.



Binder can be regarded as the most articulate and systematic exponent of this approach. Analyzing the events and active participants of the pre-military hegemonic period, he identifies three primary elite groups and evaluates the attitude of these groups toward the role of religion in the political system<sup>26</sup>. The elite groups analyzed are: (1) The secularist modernists, who were exposed to Western education and had their social origins in the landed and professional classes. (2) the traditionalists, the Ulama, the traditional carriers of Islamic legal and political thought. Binder observed that they were conservative, rigid, unwilling to change, but could constitute a vital linkage between the government and the people. The Ulama were perceived as having influence with the masses because they dominated the mosques. (3) The fundamentalists were described as "puritans" of some kind. Unlike the Ulama, the fundamentalists did not have any formal religious schooling. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and its leader, Maulana Maududi, were projected as reformists struggling to fight the orthodoxy of the Ulama and the secularism of the other elite groups. Binder observed that the Jamaat was more rational in its approach toward religion than were the traditionalists. The Jamaat aimed to revive the "original law" and the "spirit" of Islam<sup>27</sup>.

Binder was so overwhelmed with the organization and the discipline of the Jamaat, its leader, and members that he devoted major portions of his book on the party. He was so impressed with the Jamaat that one gets the impression that it was the only party struggling to find a legitimate role for Islam in the political system of Pakistan. Binder recorded:

The Jamaat-e-Islami is the only significant organization in Pakistan, and its chief, Maulana Maududi, is its principal thinker and spokesman". In his estimation Jamaat played a major role in generating controversy for an Islamic constitution. During this period Binder thought



Jamaat's primary objective was to mobilize public opinion for an Islamic constitution and seek a legitimate role for the religious elites. "By its propaganda and maneuverings it forced both the "Ulama" and the modernist or secularist politician to alter their positions, and it even proffered a solution that formed the basis of a short-lived agreement. The Jamaat forced the pace of the treatment of this issue, and prevented its being worked out, if ever, by a long drawn-out process of mutual accomodation. Although many underlying questions of theory were never the subject of argument, the Jamaat forced the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to attempt to settle these questions by the implication of concrete law".<sup>28</sup>

First, Binder does not explain why the product collapsed even after reaching an "agreement". Second, no effort is made to relate the attitude of various contenders to the social structure of the society. Third, Binder has treated the Constituent Assembly as an independent factor, whereas it was the body in which most of the participants were pitted against each other. Finally, Binder reviews the period as if socio-economic issues never existed and various elite groups were motivated by religion and religion alone.

Asaf<sup>29</sup> like Binder has also considered religious elites pivotal in an "ideological state". He has claimed that since Pakistan is an "ideological state," political development should have taken place along religious and moral lines and not along "feudal-capitalist" lines<sup>30</sup>. According to him this was the principal issue in the early period. Asaf thought religious elites were a potent force during this phase. Like Binder, he was particularly impressed by the Jamaat and its leadership. He observed that the Jamaat made strenuous efforts to present Islam as the defining principle in the constitution-making process. Furthermore, he contended that it

was the mobilization capacity and strategy of the religious elites that expedited the decay of party politics in Pakistan, and facilitated the emergence of military rule.

### Elite Approach;

Since Pakistan's inception, the bureaucratic-military elites have been the most distinctive feature of its political system. Whereas the cohesiveness, organizational superiority, and privileged position of the bureaucratic-military elites were generally recognized, little effort was made to analyze the impact of these elites in shaping the political system of Pakistan in the pre-military hegemonic phase. Some excellent studies were made, particularly on the bureaucracy of Pakistan, but most of these studies focused on the recruitment pattern, organizational skills, and nation-building role of the bureaucracies<sup>31</sup>. Little attention was paid to the "anti-politics" attitude of the bureaucratic-military elites—an attitude that was to influence the direction of the political process in Pakistan.

I concur with LaPorte's observation that one can better explain the "continuities" and "discontinuities" of developments in Pakistan by focusing on the bureaucratic-military elites<sup>32</sup>. These elites, more than any other class or group, were the hub of political activity in the 1947-58 phase. It was during this period that the foundations of the military hegemonic political system were laid. An understanding of the working and operation of the bureaucratic-military elites is imperative to explaining the "political institutionalization" or the lack of it in Pakistan..

In the early seventies, particularly in the context of the "Pakistan crisis of 1971" which led to the establishment of an independent Bangladesh, a re-examination and re-interpretation of Pakistan's history began to emerge<sup>33</sup>. The



exponents of this approach correctly pointed out that in the pre-military hegemonic phase, the bureaucratic-military elites had dominated the politics of Pakistan. How did these elites come to dominate the political process? And what impact did they have in determining the nature and direction of Pakistan's political system?

The emergence of this approach may be attributed to two developments. First during the 1950's and 1960's, social scientists were impressed with the bureaucracy and the military as twin institutions that were involved in the process of nation-building and economic development in the developing countries. In this spirit the bureaucratic-military elites were regarded as "modernizers" and "institution builders"<sup>34</sup>. In the early 1970's as the aura of "modernization" and "development" began to fade, and the political protests and demands for political participation proportionately increased in the developing countries, the scholars also began to uncover the repressive policies of these "modernizing autocracies"<sup>35</sup>. The authoritarian structures these elites created in the garb of "modernization" and "development" came under severe criticism that revealed the types of governing mechanisms such regimes had established<sup>36</sup>. In most of the cases, it became apparent that the bureaucratic-military elites had very limited capacity to build political institutions. Second, coincidentally, this re-evaluation of some of the "political development" literature coincided with the changes in the reality of Pakistan's political development. The bureaucratic elites, who were once regarded as the epitome of "status," "power" and "prestige" in Pakistani society, were incapacitated by their policies during the Pakistan crisis of 1970 to 1971 and came under severe attack. The military elites, who were once regarded as the symbol of "national integration" and had represented the most "sacred" institution, had to take the wrath of national disintegration and the humiliation of defeat<sup>37</sup>. It is in this



broad context that the contributions of the elite school will be examined.

LaPorte can be regarded as the principal exponent of this school<sup>38</sup>. His is the first study that systematically focused on the bureaucratic-military elites and argued that these elites were instrumental in shaping the political system of Pakistan. LaPorte's elite is composed, after Laswell, of political, economic, and social elites, with an emphasis on the first two. Political elites include senior military officers, civil servants, and members of large landowning families who chose to be outside the military or civilian bureaucracies. According to LaPorte, all these elite groups stem from the same social base of traditional wealth and power: land in Punjab and Sind, and tribal leadership and land in Baluchistan and the Frontier<sup>39</sup>. Analyzing the circumstances during 1947-58 period, LaPorte correctly noted that the "real issue" during this period was not the inability of the political leaders to build a consensus on the nature and direction of the political system (as the Praetorian school emphasizes), but rather, who would dominate the political system, the "representative institutions" or the "non-representative institutions?"<sup>40</sup> The debate among the leadership-elite circles was over how Pakistan could evolve from a "colonial" to a "participatory" society<sup>41</sup>. In this debate, "the hidden agenda," LaPorte has aptly remarked, "was whether the viceregal system of government inherited from the British... would be modified and transformed to fit the needs of a decolonized society"<sup>42</sup>. The bureaucratic elites were convinced that the "viceregal" system was well suited to the needs of Pakistan, and the military elites shared this perception. The bureaucratic-military elites showed a definite preference for the continuity of the "viceregal" tradition of governance.

In fact, the facade of parliamentary politics during this

period provided the civilian and military bureaucrats with an opportunity to continue to rule without any accountability for their actions. If and when a situation arose that challenged the continued dominance of the bureaucratic-military elites (as in 1954 when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and later in 1958 when martial law was imposed) steps were taken to thwart such a threat.

This study will go a step further and hypothesize that the dominance of the bureaucratic-military elites results not so much from their organizational superiority as from the pre-emption and monopolization of key governmental offices in the political system by the elites. Such a pre-emption prevents political leaders from building political organizations (i.e., political parties) that could function as alternatives to the bureaucratic-military institutions<sup>43</sup>. In Pakistan's case, it was not merely the 'organizational superiority' of the bureaucracy or dissension among the political leaders alone that led to the ascendancy of the bureaucratic elites and paved the way for the development of the military hegemonic system. It was "pre-emption and monopolization of key government offices" by these elites that led to their ascendancy in the political system.

Pre-emption is a process through which the bureaucratic-military elites prevent the political leaders (mostly through executive decrees and martial law regulations) from organizing political parties. Political leaders who accepted the viceregal system would be co-opted, while others who resisted it would be excluded, thereby promoting factionalism within the political parties, and making them irrelevant to the political process. Second, the bureaucratic-military elites, primary strategy was to monopolize the key governmental positions, thereby denying the political leaders and the political parties the advantage of distributing rewards and patronage. In the developing countries, who controls key



government positions can be instrumental in determining the growth of the political parties or lack of it. Myron Weiner, making a case study of India, has succinctly pointed out that in some of the developing countries the major problem is "scarcity of resources"; who controls, allocates, and distributes these resources determines the shape of the political system. In India, after independence the political leaders were confronted with the task of "reducing scarcity"<sup>44</sup>. The political leaders were quick to establish their supremacy over the bureaucratic institutions, and the Congress party took control of the key government positions, using them as a vehicle to distribute and allocate the resources among the competing groups. Thus, the party system was consolidated.

On the other hand, in Pakistan, the bureaucratic elites took over this function and pre-empted the political leaders who suffered from dissension, but the bureaucratic elites supported by the military elites exacerbated this dissensus.

Here one can provide an overview of the pre-military hegemonic phase (1947-1958) of Pakistan's political development. The first phase (1947-1951) was a period of transition and adaptation from the colonial rule to statehood. The second phase (1951-1958) was marked by the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites. One can identify some of the factors that facilitated the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites and explore how these elites came to dominate the structures of economic and political decision-making during this phase.

Pakistan was born a fragile nation state. It was burdened with ideological and ethnic cleavages, and administrative chaos. The nationalist movement that culminated in the creation of Pakistan in 1947, although populist in character, cohered singularly around the Qaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). An event-making role,



determination, single-mindedness of purpose, and faith in democratic constitutionalism have generally been recognized as some of the attributes of Jinnah's leadership<sup>45</sup>. In a recent study, this is how the American historian Stanley Wolpert has summed up Jinnah's role in the making of Pakistan:

Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three. . . . Jinnah virtually conjectured the country into statehood by his indomitable will<sup>46</sup>.

Jinnah's vehicle for the creation of Pakistan was the Muslim League. The League formed in 1906 to articulate the interests of Muslim elites in British India. Between 1937 and 1947 Jinnah transformed it into a mass nationalist movement. Apter has observed that mass movements more often carry a high degree of emotional appeal, are spontaneous and simplistic in their objectives, and that their leadership establishes a direct relationship with the people<sup>47</sup>. Under Jinnah, in the relatively short period of ten years, the League acquired these characteristics. Its primary goal was simple: Carving Pakistan out of British India. Thus Pakistan was born out of a mass movement, but without a well-organized political party. Motivated to make Pakistan a reality, Jinnah could not concentrate on building the organizational structure of the League, nor was he able to build a second line of leadership. With the creation of Pakistan, the League and its leadership was confronted with the task of building a political administrative structure for the new state.

Few states are born with so many drawbacks as Pakistan. To explain what caused the ascendancy of the bureaucratic-military elites and inhibited the transformation of the Muslim League into a well-organized political party, I will identify

and analyze some of these drawbacks.

- (1) Regional diversity.
- (2) Relatively small bureaucracy.
- (3) Fear of India and rapid growth of the Pakistan military.
- (4) Adoption of 1935 Act and viceregal system.

The areas that constituted Pakistan (in West Pakistan, Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. , and Baluchistan; in East Pakistan, East Bengal) were some of the most educationally backward, socially conservative, predominantly rural, and politically least experienced parts of British India<sup>48</sup>. The physical separation of East and West Pakistan by 1500 miles of Indian territory was complicated by the differential impact of British rule and its policies on the historical and political development of these areas.

West Pakistan (i.e., contemporary Pakistan) is culturally and linguistically heterogenous (see Table 1). It was not until 1849 that the British were able to bring West Pakistan under control. British policy in this area was influenced by "imperial geo-strategic" considerations. In the later half of the 19th century the British were preoccupied with containing Czarist Russia. In addition, these areas, particularly, Punjab, were an important recruitment base for the British Indian army<sup>49</sup>.

Given these considerations the British were reluctant to disrupt the existing social order and the local patterns of relations. Therefore, these areas were ruled indirectly, by expanding and consolidating the existing elites and perpetuating the social structures (i.e. , feudal class relations). Indirect rule primarily meant rule through advice, persuasion,

and occasional but brutal use of force<sup>50</sup>. This advisory function was performed by the British members of the Indian Civil Services (ICS) or Indian Political Service (IPS). Indirect rule had many variations. In Punjab, the John Lawrence model of patronage of the feudal classes through the ICS was adopted. Through this method, groups of loyal feudals were coopted and consolidated<sup>51</sup>. In the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, the Sandeman or Sardari system was applied<sup>52</sup>. The Sandeman system upheld and promoted the supremacy of Sardar (tribal Chiefs) and created and promoted loyal Sardars. Tribal Riwaj (custom) was not distrusted, and, if need be, force was provided to uphold the authority of the tribal chief. These areas were controlled through a combination of patronage and coercion.

Between 1850 and 1937 the tribal resistance to British rule continued and was controlled through the use of force and by promoting loyal tribal chiefs<sup>53</sup>. The N.W.F.P. was ruled through the Punjab until 1901, and later, between 1901 and 1937, as a special province<sup>54</sup>. Similarly, Sind was annexed by the British in 1843 and was not separated from Bombay until 1937. Baluchistan did not have any representative government throughout the British period.

Consequently, West Pakistan was exposed to the British representative institutions and participatory politics very



TABLE I

Frequency of Languages Commonly Spoken as Mother  
Tongue in Pakistan (Percentage of population)

Language	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Pakistan	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
Bengali	98.16	98.42	0.02	0.11	56.40	55.48
Punjabi	0.02	0.02	67.08	66.39	28.55	29.02
Pushtu	—	0.01	8.16	8.47	3.48	3.70
Sindhi	0.01	0.01	12.85	12.59	5.47	5.51
Urdu	0.64	0.61	7.05	7.57	3.37	3.65
English	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02
Baluchi	—	—	3.04	2.49	1.29	1.09

Source: Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 11-12.

late. Among the provinces of West Pakistan, Punjab was the only province that acquired some political experience under British rule. However, the political leadership was dominated by Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslim landlords, with their nucleolus Unionist party<sup>55</sup>. The urban professionals (e.g., lawyers, teachers, students, engineers, etc.) were small in size and did not have much political influence. Clearly West Pakistan was predominantly feudal and tribal in its social relations and mode of economic development. Its political administrative experience was that of indirect rule, controlled politics, and coercion.

East Bengal's experience of political development was quite different from that of West Pakistan. Bengal was

linguistically and culturally homogenous and was exposed to British education and political institutions in the early 19th century. Although Calcutta was the political, economic, and cultural center and the Muslim areas of East Bengal were rural hinterland, by the early 20th century, Bengal had become the hotbed of radical politics<sup>56</sup>. Thus, East Bengalis were highly political, and their politics were dominated by lawyers, small landlords, and, to some extent, by local religious leaders.

In the words of one observer, East Bengal was "political," while West Pakistan was "governmental"<sup>57</sup>. In the post-independence period these different experiences of the regions that constituted Pakistan influenced the patterns of political development.

The existing heterogeneity of Pakistan was made complex by yet another factor. The creation of Pakistan was followed by the exodus of an estimated 14 million people<sup>58</sup>. Thousands were killed during this mass migration. An estimated 6 million Hindus migrated from the areas that constituted Pakistan to India. Most of the migrating Hindus were landowners, businessmen, and urban professionals. An estimated 8 million Muslims migrated from various parts of India (mostly from East Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Bihar) to Pakistan. Most of the Muslim emigres were urban professionals, small peasants, and artisans. These Muhajirs (migrants) were motivated by considerations of economic opportunity and hoped to be compensated for the sacrifices they had made for Pakistan<sup>59</sup>. The Muslim League leadership had not anticipated migration on such a large scale. The League's immediate problem was how to and where to rehabilitate the Muhajreens. Before the Muslim League's organizational structure could be built, it was confronted with the problem of administering the new state, hence the creation of governmental structures rather than party-

building became the immediate priority.

With the emergence of Pakistan, the British Indian Civil Services and the military also were divided between the two countries, but the number of Muslim officers was very small. (This is because the Muslims in general were slow to accept English education. Second, West Pakistan was exposed to the British educational system in the late 19th century).. At the time of independence, the Pakistani bureaucratic elites consisted of 157 officers drawn from the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and Indian Political Service (IPS). Of these 136, were available for domestic service. From among these-60 were British officers-only 86 Muslim officers were available. Most of them had little experience and were in junior positions<sup>60</sup> In the formative phase the British officers played a key role in the promotion, placement, and career development of the bureaucratic elites.

The situation of the Army Officer Corps was no different than that of the bureaucracy. At the time of independence, the Pakistan Army had four Lieutenant colonels, 42 Majors, and 114 Captains. The first commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, General Ayub Khan, was promoted to the rank of general from lieutenant colonel in less than four years. Fear of India was an important factor that contributed to the rapid expansion of the Pakistan Army. An early conflict with India over Kashmir (1948) reinforced the perception among the Pakistanis of the Indian threat. Consequently, between 1948 and 1959, 60 percent of Pakistan's total budget was spent on defense<sup>61</sup>.

The problems of administration and security needs placed the bureaucratic-military elites at the core of Pakistan's power structure.



The leadership of the Muslim League was predominantly feudal, with only a small number of urban professionals, mostly migrants and leaders from East Bengal. At the time of independence, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan had 69 indirectly elected members. Of these, 16 belonged to the Pakistan National Congress representing the 22 million Hindus from East Bengal. To accommodate the Muhajir leadership, the size of the assembly membership was raised to 79<sup>62</sup>.

All this is to suggest that at the time of independence, the Pakistan that Jinnah and his Muslim League inherited was not only regionally diverse, but had a highly unrepresentative form of government. They also inherited a very small group of individuals who later came to dominate the power structure in Pakistan.

In West Pakistan, the political leaders came from predominantly feudal and tribal backgrounds. Urban professionals were insignificant, while the bureaucracy and the military were dominated by the Punjabis, but Muhajir and Pathan Officers were also visible. In contrast, the East Bengali leadership came from urban professionals (predominantly lawyers) and small land owners, and the province was negligibly represented in the bureaucracy and the military<sup>63</sup>.

With this legacy the legal instrument of governance that both India and Pakistan inherited was the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The former act provided for a "controlled" parliamentary form of government, the later gave India and Pakistan a dominion status.

The 1935 Act was created by the British as a corollary to the process of devolution of power to the Indians that they had initiated in the 1920's. The Act facilitated the emergence of limited parliamentary politics, but actual power

remained with the Viceroy, who possessed immense authority and ruled with the help of a powerful civil-military bureaucracy free from the limitations of the parliament.<sup>64</sup> The Act clearly perpetuated the executive supremacy over the legislature.

Confronted with the problems of creating an administrative structure in the new state, Jinnah chose to become the first Governor General of Pakistan, while Liaquat Ali Khan was chosen as the first Prime Minister (1947-1951). Since Jinnah was the "founding father" of the country, as long as he was alive (he died in September 1948) the office of the Governor General came to be recognized as the focus of power and authority<sup>65</sup>.

The position of the Prime Minister was overshadowed by that of the Governor General. The problems of ensuring the survival of the new state led to increased reliance on the bureaucratic elites, parliamentary politics remained peripheral. This led Sayeed to assert that Jinnah perpetuated the viceregal tradition of political rule in Pakistan and that Liaquat Ali Khan continued it<sup>66</sup>. Hamza Alavi has disputed this contention, he points out that at the time of independence Jinnah was a very sick man and could not actively participate in the political decision-making process<sup>67</sup>. "Inevitably the officers on whom he (Jinnah) had come to rely were virtually free to deal with the business of government. Extraordinary powers had been vested in the Governor General which greatly strengthened their hands".<sup>68</sup> To support his contention, Hamza Alavi points out that a number of constitutional amendments were made by the bureaucracy in the name of the Governor General. One such example was Section 92-A, inserted in the 1935 Act in July 1948 (at a time when Jinnah was a very sick man) in the name of the Governor General<sup>69</sup>. This section empowered the Governor General to suspend the normal constitutional machinery in a

province, and directed the provincial governor to assume the responsibilities of the provincial government.

In the subsequent years, this section was frequently invoked by the bureaucratic elites to dismiss the provincial governments<sup>70</sup>. Between 1947 and 1954, 9 provincial governments were dismissed (see Table 2.2). The sequence of dismissals was as follows:

TABLE 2.2

## Sequence of Dismissals

1947	Dr. Khan Sahib of the N.W.F.P.
1948	Ayub Khuro of Sind.
1949	Khuda Bux of Sind.
1949	Khan of Momdot of the Punjab.
1951	Khuro of Sind.
1953	Mumtaz Khan Daultana of the Punjab.
1954	Pirzada Abdul of Sind.
1954	Fazlul Huq of East Pakistan.
1954	Malik Feroze Khan of the Punjab.

After Jinnah's death, the focus of power shifted to the Prime Minister's office. Liaquat Ali Khan continued to hold that office, while Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, an East Pakistani became Governor General.

Liaquat was confronted not only with maintaining the unity of the Muslim League but also with such issues as constitution-making, refugee rehabilitation, formulating policies of economic and industrial development, reorganization of defense, and defining relations with India<sup>71</sup>. Liaquat's rule was prematurely terminated by his assassination in 1951. During his rule, three trends emerged that accelerated the



ascendency of the bureaucratic-military elites.

First, under Liaquat's government, Ghulam Mohammad, (a member of the bureaucratic elite) Finance Minister of Pakistan (1947-1951), initiated commercial and economic policies and institutions that enhanced the powers of the bureaucratic elites in acquiring control over various governmental and semi-governmental organizations. Thus, quite early the bureaucratic elites came to dominate economic policy-making institutions.

Second, problems of organization of the Army and the perceived threat from India gave salience to the military elites. In 1951, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army discovered a plot (Rawalpindi conspiracy) to overthrow the civilian government of Liaquat Ali Khan. The conspiring officers were tried and imprisoned. This raised the specter that the army could intervene in politics<sup>72</sup>.

Third, after Jinnah's death, provincial Muslim League leaders began to foment intensified factionalism within the Muslim League. Liaquat found it difficult to manage these factional rivalries. These rivalries can be analyzed at two levels. At the first level, they were of a personal nature between those leaders of the Muslim League who had access to government power and those who did not. At the second level, the issue is more complex because it means defining the basis of center-province relations. The provincial leaders found the viceregal approach of the center too overpowering. The opposition parties also demanded greater share of power for the provinces<sup>73</sup>.

To deal with the opposition and to discipline factions within the League, the Liaquat government came out with two responses. First, it equated opposition to the Muslim League government with that of opposition to the State of

Pakistan. Opposition parties were called traitors. This response was to promote anti-democratic tendencies and intolerance of opposition in the later years.

Second, in order to discipline the factional leaders within the Muslim League, there emerged under Liaquat government the first act that was designed to punish political leaders for misconduct in office. It was called the public and Representative Office Disqualification Act, 1949 (PRODA)<sup>74</sup>. Under PRODA misconduct included corrupt practices, willful administration, and abuse of power and position. A political leader found guilty of these charges could be disqualified from holding public office for a period of six years. Increased reliance on such control mechanisms enhanced the power of the bureaucratic elites and inhibited both the development of the Muslim League into a well-organized political party and the development of party politics in general.

With Liaquat's death, the facade of "parliamentary democracy" began to erode. The bureaucratic elites did not take too long to convert the office of the Governor General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention. In the provinces on several occasions bureaucratic intervention occurred in the garb of the Governor's rule. The chief ministers were dismissed despite the fact that their parties had a majority in the provincial assembly (see Table 2.2).

From 1951 to 1958, while Pakistan had only two Governor Generals and one commander-in-chief, while seven prime ministers stumbled one after the other<sup>75</sup>. Bureaucratic intervention, pre-emption, and dissent among the political leaders made the parliament and the cabinet government a laughing stock. The facade of "parliamentary politics" persisted but in reality the focus of power shifted to the bureaucratic and military institutions<sup>76</sup>. In Pakistan, politics was bureaucratized. Elite manipulation, political intrigue, and



factionalism emerged as the salient characteristics of Pakistan's political system.

Between 1947 and 1951 the political leaders did not interfere much with the processes of economic decision making and depended on the bureaucratic elites for the formulation and execution of economic policies. This helped the bureaucratic elites to consolidate their hold on the ministries of commerce, trade, and economic planning. Having established effective dominance and control in the economic decision making, the bureaucratic elites entered the political arena in the post-1951 period.

In the economic sector one of their major contributions was to help facilitate the emergence of the financial-industrial groups. At the time of independence, this class was almost a non-entity in Pakistan.<sup>77</sup> What Pakistan had was a small merchant-trading class comprising a number of minority Muslim communities (Memons, Bohras, Ismailis), who had emigrated from India to Pakistan. These groups had tremendous entrepreneurial skills, but they did not have large surplus capital,<sup>78</sup> nor had they any experience in industrial management. Besides, given the uncertain political environment in the new state, they were unwilling to make any major investment without some degree of assurance and patronage from the government. The bureaucratic elites found this a fortuitous opportunity to expand their role and power in developing a bureaucratic political system. Ghulam Mohammad, formerly a member of the Indian Audit and Account Service, later Finance Minister (1947-1951) in the Government of Pakistan, and the Governor General (1951-55), was a bureaucrat instrumental in initiating a number of economic policies and in building economic institutions that defined the parameters of the "patron-client relationship" between the bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups. The first industrial policy (April, 1948) placed under



the public sector only three groups of industries: arms and ammunitions, generation of hydroelectric power, and the manufacture and operation of railway, telephone, and wireless equipment. All other avenues were left open for the private sector.<sup>79</sup> To facilitate the transformation of the trader-merchant classes to financial-industrial groups, the private sector was provided such incentives as tariff protection and tax holidays. In 1949, the Industrial Finance Corporation was formed by the government to grant loans for industrial projects on long-and medium-term bases. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was established in 1950, however it did not go into operation until 1952, when Ghulam Faruque, a Pathan civil servant, was appointed its first chairman. With the establishment of such economic institutions, the bureaucratic elites not only came to dominate the policy-making process but also acquired the control of key positions in such institutions. According to a well-informed observer of Pakistan's economic scene, Ghulam Faruque:

. . . was a strong willed powerful individual who made rapid decisions, saw them carried out, and worried about government rules, procedures, or approval only afterwards, if at all. He was prepared to take substantial risks, smothered opposition by a combination of ability and ruthlessness, and thought constantly of growth and expansion.<sup>80</sup>

In addition, Faruque recruited a number of bureaucrats into his corporation. Individuals like Faruque reflected the spirit, ideology, and ethos of the bureaucratic elites who were enthused to have monopoly control of the institutions that they directed. Under Faruque's chairmanship, the PIDC came to play a major role in the industrialization, and in the transformation of the merchant-trader classes into financial-industrial groups. Why did the bureaucratic elites come to

dominate this process? One explanation is that it was the most familiar pattern for the business communities of Pakistan: bureaucratic control, intervention, and guidance were accepted and considered workable by these classes. Second, the society in general accepted the superiority of the bureaucratic elites, while the business groups were regarded as having "lowly status." Papaneck has succinctly noted:

The assumption of government officials, businessmen and the public was that the government would and should dominate the economy. Even the most self confident industrialists saw their position vis-a-vis the government as the supplicant, rather than master. They largely accepted that the government was the guarantor of the social good, not that a minimum of government activity would lead to maximum social benefit<sup>81</sup>.

Having established dominance in the economic decision-making arena, the bureaucratic elites began to pre-empt control of key government positions from the political leaders.

How did the bureaucratic elites expand and consolidate their political power and why did the political leaders fail? It will be argued that cabinet instability and the weakening of party politics was as much a function of the bureaucratic intervention and pre-emption as of the "praetorian conditions," and not merely the failure of political leaders to organize party politics.

Lawrence Ziring has suggested that most of the important political decisions after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan were "conceived and executed" by the "Punjabi bureaucratic elite"<sup>82</sup>. To support his contention he names two men as constituting the core of this "Punjabi bureaucratic elite": Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhari Moham-



mad Ali (a member of the Indian Audit to the Government of Pakistan, later Finance Minister and Prime Minister of Pakistan). Ziring says these two men "coopted" Iskander Mirza, a non-Punjabi (an officer of the Indian Political Service, former Defence Secretary Government of Pakistan, later Governor General and President of Pakistan). Ziring does not provide any evidence to support his "cooption" theory. A number of Pakistani and Western scholars recognize that Punjabi bureaucrats did dominate the process of political decision-making during this period. Others have noted the rivalry between Chaudhary Mohammad Ali and Ghulam Mohammad and suggest that the latter was more skillful in building a coalition of senior civil and military officers.<sup>83</sup> The fact remains that a small number of bureaucratic-military elites made some of the most important political decisions that were to influence the future course of political development in Pakistan.

These political decisions should be analyzed in the context of the domestic crisis and external developments. I will argue that it was the inter-relationship between these domestic and external factors that facilitated the consolidation of the bureaucratic-military elites and inhibited the growth of party politics in Pakistan.

Some of the significant political decisions that the bureaucratic-military elites made were:

- (1) Dismissal of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din as Prime Minister of Pakistan.
- (2) Appointment of Mohammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister.
- (3) Dismissal of Fazlul Haq as the chief minister of East Pakistan and subsequently imposition of



governor's rule in the province.

(4) Dismissal of Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

(5) Creation of "One Unit" by amalgamating the four province of West Pakistan.

After Liaquat's death, Ghulam Mohammad (Governor General, 1951-1955) and Iskander Mirza (Governor General and President, 1955-1958) not only came to dominate the national political scene, but also accelerated the pre-emption of political leaders. In particular, they excluded and alienated the East Bengali leadership.<sup>84</sup> They revived the viceregal system with a new vigor. During their reign, the office of the Prime Minister and parliamentary politics were trivialized by frequently using the powers of Section 92-A. Prime Ministers were appointed and dismissed at will by the Governor General, the former functioning with the Governor General's support and not the Assembly's. An American advisor to several of Pakistan's prime ministers from 1955 to 1957, commenting on the political styles of Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza, remarked:

... each in his way, represented the viceregal system under new conditions without foreign principal. Each scorned politics, except his own ruthless kind, which neither acknowledged under that name . . . . Each was possessive of executive ascendancy, regarded with repugnance the very idea of parliamentary experiments in Pakistan, and professed to prefer presidential government on the American model, though without having any insight into the political character of American presidency. Each fancied himself a strong man.<sup>85</sup>

This perception about Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza is widely accepted by scholars.<sup>86</sup>

Under Ghulam Mohammad's direction the viceregal tradition was revived and the bureaucratic elites did not take too long to establish a paternalistic relationship with the political leaders, particularly in West Pakistan, and thus abort the process of party politics. Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din certainly was a weak prime minister and his government (1951-53) was confronted with a host of problems.<sup>87</sup> However, the bureaucracy was least supportive of his government. The Bengali language crisis (1952), the food crisis (1952-53), the Ahmedia issue (1953), the growing class antagonism in rural areas of West Pakistan, and increased demands for provincial autonomy by East Bengal were blown out of proportion because these were perceived by the bureaucratic elites as threatening to the continuity of the viceregal order and weakening the center's control.<sup>88</sup> Thus, asserting that the government headed by the Prime Minister had failed to manage the crisis, the Governor General dismissed the cabinet government in 1953, despite the fact that the Prime Minister's party had a majority in the National Assembly.<sup>89</sup> This was the end of party politics and the Muslim League, and a death blow to the democratic ideal in Pakistan. After this, bureaucratic intervention in the name of governor's rule became a norm in Pakistani politics (see Table 2.2). Setting aside the parliamentary norms, the Governor General installed Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Ambassador in the United States, as the prime minister. Bogra had no base in the Muslim League, he had little if any choice in selecting his cabinet. He was a handpicked man of the Governor General.<sup>90</sup> The League leadership showed complete acquiescence to the governor's will, nine of the eleven members of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din's cabinet joined the new prime minister's cabinet.<sup>91</sup> Parliamentary process and party politics had become irrelevant in Pakistan. The bureaucratic elites' perception of the crisis, the Muslim League's leaders' meek response, and a certain degree of compliance with the bureaucratic actions brought about the "decay" of the party politics



in Pakistan.

Now it is widely accepted by scholars that the bureaucratic option that the Governor General exercised to resolve the socio-political crisis of Pakistan was solidly backed by the military elites.<sup>92</sup> The Ahmedia riots (1953) and the subsequent martial law in the Punjab brought the military elites into the political arena. The public (in Punjab) was generally receptive to the military's swift handling of the crisis.<sup>93</sup> This gave the military elites a sense of confidence. It also became apparent that, given the increase in populist demands, the move by urban professionals, the lower classes, and other groups to seek entry to the political system, and the increase in the politics of protest and demonstration, the bureaucratic elites alone would not be able to manage the crisis.<sup>94</sup> The military elites had to support them to ensure the continuity of the viceregal system. The crisis of 1953 laid the foundations of an institutional collaboration between the bureaucratic and the military elites: the political exclusion of the political leaders was a matter of time only.

In addition to the internal crisis, the Pakistani political leaders and the elites alike perceived a threat from India. This insecurity, combined with the Kashmir dispute, brought the military into the political arena almost from the inception of Pakistan. In this India-Pakistan tension, a militarily strong Pakistan was considered imperative. This encouraged the military elites to participate in the political arena. Both Jinnah and Liaquat were conscious of the weakness of Pakistan's military strength vis-a-vis India.<sup>95</sup> The Kashmir War (1948) and the cease-fire (1949) reinforced that in Pakistani politics the military elites would not be staying out of Pakistani politics too long. In view of the fact that both the Indian and the Pakistan armies were commanded by British generals, a number of Pakistani senior military officers were not satisfied with Liaquat's handling of the Kashmir cease-



fire. This strained relations between Liaquat and some of the senior officers.<sup>96</sup> Thus Liaquat's decision to appoint the first commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army was highly colored by political considerations. In 1950, when he appointed General Ayub Khan as the commander-in-chief of the Pakistani Army, Ayub was neither the most senior nor the best.<sup>97</sup> General Ayub Khan's career history showed administrative experience in Staff appointments rather than field command. Beside administrative-managerial skills at the time of his appointment, he was believed to respect the civilian leadership and was not in any way associated with the Kashmir War.<sup>98</sup> General Ayub was quick to establish his "loyalty" to the civilian leadership as he discovered the "Rawalpindi conspiracy," in which a general was involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the government of Liaquat Ali Khan. Thus, the military was in politics. Until recently, a number of scholars regarded the "Rawalpindi conspiracy" as an uneventful, isolated event which did not have much impact on the military elites.<sup>99</sup> However, in recent years another General of the Pakistan Army has alleged in his autobiography that Ayub used the conspiracy case to promote a coterie of like-minded generals in the Army and successfully created a core of generals who were willing to act under Ayub's command.<sup>100</sup> In addition, the "Rawalpindi conspiracy" provided General Ayub Khan with an opportunity to get in close contact with the bureaucratic elites, such as Iskander Mirza and Ghulam Mohammad. The interaction grew not only into friendship, but also into a sharing of ideas on the nature and direction of Pakistan's political system.<sup>101</sup> There is evidence to suggest that while involved in the modernization and organizational improvement of the Pakistan Army the general had policy differences with another influential bureaucrat, the Secretary General of Pakistan (Chaudhary Mohammad Ali).<sup>102</sup> However, in this bureaucratic struggle for power, Chaudhary Mohammad Ali lost quite early, and contact between Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza and Ayub developed into a powerful

bureaucratic-military partnership in the political system of Pakistan. Having forged a unity with the bureaucratic elites, the military elites expedited their efforts to equip the Army with modern weapons. In fact, when Pakistan's prime minister visited the United States in 1951, procuring modern weaponry for Pakistan's armed forces was high on his agenda.<sup>103</sup>

Between 1951 and 1953, the military elites pursued a two-pronged strategy, forging unity with the bureaucratic elites and cultivating relations with the United States, impressing upon the U.S. government Pakistan's need for military aid. General Fazal Muqem recorded, "It is not known when the government of Pakistan decided to ask for military aid from the United States. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan was, however, definitely thinking along these lines in August 1951",<sup>104</sup> He speculated that consultation between the governments must have started sometime in 1952. Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, the Prime Minister and Chaudhury Zafar Ullah, the Foreign Minister did not approve of an alliance with the United States; they preferred closer ties with Great Britain.<sup>105</sup> However, the bureaucratic-military elites did not pay much attention to their (i.e., prime minister, foreign minister) preference.<sup>106</sup>

The military elites were able to expand their role in Pakistan's political system with relative ease, because there was no inter-service rivalry. Second, until as late as 1957, the Air Force and the Navy (until 1953) were commanded by the British officers.<sup>107</sup> Thus, the Army leadership could present itself not only as the embodiment of nationalist aspirations, but also as the sole representative of the Armed Forces. Thus, by the middle of 1952, the military elites were exploring the prospects of forging an alliance with the United States almost independently.<sup>108</sup>



In October, 1953 the Commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army paid an informal visit to the United States, apparently on personal initiative and without any formal approval from the cabinet government.<sup>109</sup> Through perseverance the military elites developed durable contacts with the U.S. military elites. This elite connection was effectively used by Pakistan to procure military aid. On February 25, 1954, the U.S. president announced military aid for Pakistan. On May 19, 1954, the United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, which provided for military equipment and training assistance for the Armed Forces of Pakistan.<sup>110</sup> The agreement gave a new sense of confidence to the bureaucratic-military elites. The military elites began to perceive themselves as the stabilizing force in Pakistan's politics. The Agreement with the United States and the inflow of modern military equipment were equated with enhanced Pakistani defence capabilities and the development of a professional military.<sup>111</sup> This gave a sense of assurance to the military elites. In their minds, they had not only procured military aid, but also, in the process, won a "dependable friend" for Pakistan.<sup>112</sup>

It is in the context of these internal and external political developments that the decisions to remove A.K. Fazalul Haq, Chief Minister of East Bengal, to dissolve the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on October 24, 1954 by the Governor General, and to create "one unit" must be examined and analyzed.

In early 1954, general elections for the East Bengal Assembly were held. The elections proved a disaster for the Muslim League, but the election results were also distasteful to the bureaucratic-military elites.<sup>113</sup> The change in East Bengal was perceived by the bureaucratic-military elites as threatening to the existing political arrangement and a challenge to their rule. Because the provincial government



demanding greater provincial autonomy in the wake of electoral success, the bureaucratic-military elites were alarmed and refused to concede to any demands.<sup>114</sup> In fact, the new-found relationship with the United States had given them a sense of confidence. Ten days after signing the U.S.-Pakistan Agreement on May 29, 1954, the central government dismissed the popularly elected government of Fazalul-Haq the chief minister of the province. It was alleged that the chief minister had made a statement that was prejudicial to the integrity of Pakistan.<sup>115</sup> This manifested the attitude of the bureaucratic elites towards the representative leadership. The governor's rule was imposed in the province. Major General Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary, was appointed Governor of East Bengal. The Governor General's actions precipitated the crisis at the Center. The National Assembly of Pakistan was debating the framing of a constitution for Pakistan.<sup>116</sup> The governor's action impressed upon political leaders that the powers of the Governor General had to be restricted if participatory politics in any form was to grow in Pakistan. For about five months, the political leaders at the national and provincial assemblies struggled to limit the powers of the Governor General, without much effect.<sup>117</sup> On October 24, 1954, the Governor General made his final move, he dissolved the National Assembly of Pakistan.<sup>118</sup> It is now widely accepted that the Governor General could not have acted without the support of the military elites. Mohammad Ali Bogra remained the prime minister with a so called "cabinet of talents". This included General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief, as the Defence Minister, and Major General Iskander Mirza as the Interior Minister. The dominance of the bureaucratic elites was well established and the regime in Pakistan were from then on clearly military-supported.<sup>119</sup> However, the parliamentary facade was retained while participatory politics was delegitimized. The political leaders continued to head the cabinet government, but the real power was monopolized by the bureaucratic-

military elites who emerged as the primary operators of the centralized system.<sup>120</sup> Elections and the electoral process were perceived by the bureaucratic elites as divisive. They believed that the electoral process brought to power the political leaders who were region-based and had parochial outlooks, and that these leaders aimed to undermine the center.<sup>121</sup> They equated the demands for provincial autonomy with secession, particularly those coming from East Bengal. They believed that such demands were either sponsored by India or would encourage India to attack Pakistan. A symbiosis of the international crisis and external threat alarmed the bureaucratic-military elites, and they moved to contain this. It has been correctly pointed out that the bureaucratic-military elites exaggerated the food crisis of 1953 to create a political environment in which they could portray the United States as a friend, willing to bail Pakistan out of its food crisis. The elites felt that this would facilitate the signing of the U.S. — Pakistan Agreement.<sup>122</sup> Before signing the agreement, the bureaucratic-military elites had shown signs of ambiguity, but once the agreement was signed, they became not only confident but also decisive in imposing their decisions.

To thwart the perceived regional forces and to preserve the viceregal arrangement, two steps were taken. First, ten days after signing the U.S. — Pakistan Agreement, the National Assembly of Pakistan was dissolved. Second, to effectively meet the challenge of the regional forces it was decided to unify the four provinces of West Pakistan into one unit.<sup>123</sup> A unified West Pakistan was equated with a strong center and centralized political control. To achieve this objective, the "One Unit Scheme" was designed. Sayeed has attributed the authorship of the scheme to a Punjabi political leader,<sup>124</sup> while Von Vorys claimed that General Ayub Khan was the author of the scheme. In his autobiography Ayub has supported Von Vorys claim.<sup>125</sup> The scheme envisaged consolidating



the four provinces (i.e., Punjab, Sind, the North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan) into one unit and named it West Pakistan. The scheme clearly established the dominance of the bureaucratic-military elites. It was easier for the central government with one provincial administration rather than four. The "One Scheme" was in general resented by the smaller provinces. It had no popular mandate and never acquired any popular acceptability. The smaller provinces saw it as a conspiracy of the Punjabis to perpetuate their dominance over the smaller provinces.<sup>126</sup> It was certainly more than that; undoubtedly the Punjabis constituted the largest component of the bureaucratic-military elites, but theirs was an institutional dominance, not merely an ethnic or regional dominance. The bureaucratic elites, irrespective of their origins, were in general agreement on building a strong center and imposing their dominance.<sup>127</sup> They believed that the political leaders were corrupt, parochial, and incompetent. On the other hand, the political leaders did little to develop any consensus among themselves on the nature and direction of the political system. The lack of consensus among the political leaders provided the bureaucratic-military elites with an incentive to intensify the process of pre-emption.

The rise of Iskander Mirza as the Governor General, in July 1955, marked the culmination of the bureaucratic-military elite's complete dominance in the political system. The years between 1955 and 1958 were the era of Mirza and the bureaucratic manipulation at its peak.<sup>128</sup> In the words of Marshall: "Mirza understood the routines of administration, the negative business of maintaining order and the techniques of divide and rule. Politics as a business of producing consensus was beyond him—something fearful and strange".<sup>129</sup> The making and breaking of the cabinet governments became a norm in Pakistani politics. This not only discredited the political leaders, but also undermined the



party system. As the bureaucratic elites expanded and consolidated their power, the impact of the political leaders and the political parties proportionately declined.

The Pakistani case reveals that there is a corresponding relationship between the ascendancy of the bureaucratic elites and the decline of the political parties. This decline occurred not because political leadership failed to organize political parties, but because the bureaucratic-military elites succeeded in pre-empting control of key governmental positions from the political leaders. Access to government is a key factor for party development in a developing country like Pakistan because, through control of government, the party can dispense patronage. This function was assumed by the bureaucratic-military elites, thus inhibiting the process of party building. During the Mirza years, the office of the Governor General and later the President's office became the epitome of bureaucratic control, manipulation, and pre-emption of the political leaders. The cabinet governments stumbled one after the other, at the center the average life of the cabinet was about a year. The cabinets fell not because the party in power failed to hold a majority, but because the Governor General interfered in the process. The cabinet instability discredited not only the political leaders, but also parliamentary politics. Since 1954, the bureaucratic elites had been publicly asserting that democracy was unsuitable for Pakistan, and that some kind of "controlled democracy" was needed.<sup>130</sup> The cabinet instability enhanced bureaucratic power and impressed upon the public that the political leaders were incapable of providing a viable government.

Mirza had no faith in democracy. He was autocratic and authoritarian and manifested the beliefs of the bureaucratic-military elites regarding the nature and direction of the political system. To promote the politics of pre-empting control from the political leaders, Mirza created the Republican

Party.<sup>131</sup> It was a conglomeration of those feudals who shared Mirza's anti-democratic and authoritarian traits. The Republican Party was used to make and break the cabinet governments and influence party politics in West Pakistan. Those political leaders who joined, or formed an alliance with, the Republican Party were duly rewarded.<sup>132</sup> It became a vehicle of patronage to the feudal classes. These maneuvers intensified the factional struggle within the Muslim League, whose leadership also came from the feudal classes. The factional rivalry among the leaders of the feudal classes in the League prompted the middle class political leadership to make efforts to capture the League's constituency leadership and rebuild its middle-class and mobilist character.<sup>133</sup> Party politics intensified and the Muslim League acquired a revivalist spirit, particularly in West Pakistan. Mirza systematically began to promote individuals who were known for being anti-democratic and had also opposed the Pakistan Movement. Ziring has pungently recorded, "Mirza chose men who had supported the bureaucratic elite and had a basic antipathy for the Muslim League which still claimed dominant influence in the province." Dr. Khan Sahib had never supported the Pakistan Movement and had "definite authoritarian traits".<sup>134</sup>

By the middle of 1956 Muslim League leaders such as Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, who can be described as representing the urban middle classes, began to mobilize the masses in West Pakistan. Nishtar made vigorous efforts to build the organizational base of the League and mobilized the masses by arranging public meeting.<sup>135</sup> The Muslim League adopted a reformist posture and demanded elections, and its leaders created the illusion that if allowed to organize the political parties they would be able to build an alternative system to the bureaucratic dominance.<sup>136</sup> The mobilization effort of the Muslim League combined with the cabinet instability made the political



situation look extremely grim.<sup>137</sup> Under Mirza's guidance the bureaucratic elites had gone beyond the limits of their role and found it difficult to exercise their control effectively. The government announced that elections would be held in March 1959. In West Pakistan the Muslim League, although still faction-ridden, made a heroic mobilization effort under Nishtar-Qayyum's leadership. Confronted with its very existence, the League struggled hard to organize itself. The bureaucratic elites equated these mobilization efforts of the League with political chaos. The mobilization effort of the League also alarmed the military elites<sup>138</sup> from 1957 to 1958, when Mirza's maneuvers began to fail and the impact of the League's mobilization was felt in West Pakistan. In East Bengal the economic discontent developed into a smuggling menace and the Bengal political leaders intensified their demand for provincial autonomy.<sup>139</sup> The military elites were convinced that they had given Mirza and the bureaucracy enough support. They believed that the democratic process and the elections, if held as scheduled, might jeopardize the continuity of the viceregal pattern and threaten the territorial integrity of the country. They were skeptical of the bureaucratic elites' ability to preserve the order. The prospect of the elections entailed uncertainty, the military elites decided to remove this uncertainty by establishing the hegemony of the military.<sup>140</sup> The conditions for such a move were favorable, with the bureaucracy having been incapacitated by its overstretched role and the instability of the cabinet government having undermined considerably the position of the political leaders. Before the electoral process could acquire any legitimacy, the military elites decided to establish their hegemony and delegitimized participatory politics, and the political parties. The bureaucratic-military elites and the political parties had reached an impasse. The level of bitterness between the two can be understood from the martial law proclamation that Mirza made:



The mentality of political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable government. . . . The same group of people who have brought Pakistan to the verge of ruination will rig the elections for their own ends. I am sure the elections will be contested mainly on personal, regional, and sectarian bases. However much the administration may try, I am convinced, that elections will neither be free nor fair. They will not solve our difficulties.<sup>141</sup>

## NOTES

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127. Interview:
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129. Marshall, p. 251.
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131. According to Ziring, (1980), Republican party had, "no philosophy or credibility and had been conceived merely to serve the interests of the landlord or feudal classes in the country", p. 81.

132. The party was used to give patronage to feudals other than Muslim League. Such as Mushtaq Gurmani, Dr. Khan Sahib.
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## Public Policy, Financial - Industrial Groups And Development Of Economic Institutions In Pakistan

### The Experience of Sixties

This article will examine the relationship between policy making and development of financial - economic institutions in general and transformation of trader - merchant class into financial - industrial groups in particular under the regime of President Mohammad Ayub Khan. The purpose is to analyze the policies how they were formulated and which groups benefitted from these. It will be argued that specific policies led to the consolidation of economic institutions and facilitated the development of financial - industrial groups.

The military regime under president Mohammad Ayub Khan (1958-69) created financial and economic institutions: Internally it fostered an alliance between the military-bureaucratic elites and the financial industrial groups. Externally, the regime played the role of a bridge between the indigenous financial-industrial groups and the international aid donor agencies, particularly the United States. By expanding these institutional linkages and by promoting informal contact among the military-bureaucratic elites and the business groups the regime was able to expand the base of industry and industrial groups. Despite Ayub's efforts in building institutional network the financial-industrial groups could not stand on their own. These groups could not develop

an autonomous base. The regime's ability to sustain economic development (despite consolidation of financial-industrial groups) depended on its ability to insure the flow of economic aid to sustain military hegemony. It was instrumental in creating economic institutions and promoting a symbolic relationship with financial industrial groups. However with hindsight it appears as military hegemony weakened, economic aid declined, the regime drifted towards political instability.

So far Ayub regime's contribution in creating (as well as consolidating the existing) financial-economic institutions has not been given adequate attention. These institutions (i.e. Planning Commission, PIDC, PICIC etc) were pivotal in facilitating the development of financial-industrial groups in Pakistan. This study would examine how these institutions led to the transformation of trader-merchant classes into financial-industrial groups. Under the civilian regime of Zulifkar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) these institutions were considerably weakened. The regime also pursued a policy of breaking channels of access between these institutions and financial-industrial groups. It restricted, suppressed and constrained the functioning of financial-industrial groups. However under General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, once again an effort was made to reactivate the above mentioned financial-economic institutions to stabilize and strengthen the financial-industrial groups, who had been shaken by Bhutto regime's policies.

The institutional collaboration between Ayub's regime and the financial-industrial groups did not develop immediately but evolved in phases. According to Stanely Kochanek it evolved through three distinct phases.<sup>1</sup> First phase lasted the initial months of martial law and was marked by hostility in which the military regime arrested some of the leading businessmen. Simultaneously it introduced centralization and

control. This was manifested through policies of strict price control, harsh punishments for hoarding, smuggling and black marketing.<sup>2</sup>

Second phase coincided with the launching of the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65), which led to an alliance among military, bureaucracy and the financial-industrial groups. During this period the Government pursued policies of price decontrol, development of private sector, encouragement of foreign trade and foreign loan inflow into the country.<sup>3</sup> Third phase began with the 1965 Presidential elections and led to complete identity of views and interest between President Ayub, his family, and some of the leading financial-industrial families (e.g. Dawood, Saigol, Sumar and Habibullah etc). It merits attention that in the post-1960 period, in addition to institutional linkages between military-bureaucratic elites and financial-industrial groups, informal channels were also strengthened. Business groups initiated inter-marriages with military-bureaucratic elites and even did not hesitate to employ some of them after retirement from government service or their near relatives in industries. By late 1960s the association of some of these leading families was so close with Ayub regime that an attack on "Twenty Two" families came to be equated with an attack on the Ayub regime. With decrease in foreign aid inflow, bad harvest, war with India and decline in industrial growth rates, the regime came under severe criticism from disaffected groups.<sup>4</sup> Under politics of protest and agitation Ayub regime collapsed. However the financial-industrial group that it facilitated to emerge came to stay in Pakistan's political economy.

### **Trader Merchant Class and its Transformation into Financial - Industrial Groups**

Governmental policy played a major role in transforming trader-merchant classes into financial-industrial groups. In



the early phase of Pakistan's history, the trader-merchant class was associated with economic policy making institutions. It reflected Jinnah's belief that in an independent Pakistan, private enterprise and industrial development would be encouraged by the government.<sup>5</sup>

At the time of independence, Pakistan inherited a small but cohesive trader-merchant class. This was primarily comprised of the minority Muslim communities (like, the Bohras, the Khojas, and the Memons) and two trading families from Punjab (the Saigols and the Chinioti Sheikhs). Prior to independence this class of Muslims trader-merchants was widely dispersed in India. Its members were dynamic and skillful entrepreneurs who had emerged successful in undivided India.<sup>6</sup> This dynamism was rooted in family as the principal means of acquiring entrepreneurial skills. Trading or business was a hereditary profession to them and did not require any formal schooling. This class was small, close knit, clan, caste-like communities.<sup>7</sup> After independence, most members of this class established their headquarters in Karachi and Lahore (See Table I). As is evident from Table I, only two families the Chiniotis and the Hotis had headquarters of their business in areas that were to constitute Pakistan after 1947. Two factors contributed towards the transformation of trader-merchant : classes into industrial groups: (i) the policy of bureaucratic patronage and (ii) the Korean boom. The bureaucratic elites aimed to embark Pakistan on a path towards industrialization. After the Korean war in 1952, the environment for industrialization became more conducive. As Javed Masud has incisively observed:

Once the conditions for profitable industrialization had been created there was a scramble for industrial sanction by the trading community. The government's task was suddenly changed from encouraging new entrants to a selection from a large pool of intending potential industrialists. Thus the government assumed

the role of actually converting a trader into an industrialist, merely through the process of issuing industrial licences.<sup>7 a</sup>

Recognizing the favourable disposition of the policy makers, the trade-merchant community was quick to seek bureaucratic patronage and soon came to dominate the commercial-industrial life in Pakistan.<sup>8</sup>

The institution that represented the interests of trader-merchants was the 600 - member Pakistan Chamber of Commerce. To encourage private enterprise, Jinnah extended recognition to the Chamber as a legitimate body representing the interests of the trader-merchant class, giving it the right to elect the management of major public and semi-public economic decision making institutions of the country.<sup>9</sup> The Chamber had representation in such important bodies as the Central Sales Tax Committee and the Import-Export Advisory Council. The 1948-49 Year Book of Pakistan noted that the Chamber advises the government, "on the formulation of policy in regard to income tax rules, Estate Duty Bill, fixation of Annual Tariff Rules, import, trade policy and national standards organization".<sup>10</sup> The Chamber was given representative and advisory role, but how effective it was in influencing the formulation and implementation of various policies is not clear.

During the (1947-58) period, the regimes in Pakistan continued to encourage the participation of the trader-merchant class in the economic policy-making process. However, this class could not organize itself effectively because it operated through caste, sect, clan or community loyalties rather than shared economic interests and goals. Consequently its impact on economic policy making remained marginal. During this period business organizations proliferated. According to one estimate, in 1958 there were more



than 250 business organizations. Almost every major city had a Chamber of Commerce, but there was no coordination among them.<sup>11</sup> "Formal interest organizations in business", Mumtaz Ahmed has pointed out, "could not emerge strongly because of the existence of business families in Pakistan who rivaled each other in expanding their business interests and building private empires".<sup>12</sup> The military found a large number of business organizations too cumbersome. Therefore, under the Central Ministry of Commerce, an office of the Director of Trade organizations was created in 1958. In 1961 a reorganization scheme was introduced that abolished all the competing organizations. The Director was given wide powers to form new organizations. He could inspect their records, attend their meetings, and even reject the formation of new organizations. He could modify and amend any resolution adopted by any business organization, including the Chamber.<sup>13</sup> Previously the Chamber of Commerce had the right to elect the management of public or semi-public institutions. According to the new law, the Chamber could only nominate its members to these bodies. The director regulated the membership of the Chamber. This centralization established bureaucratic control of the commercial and economic policy arena. Instead of creating an atmosphere in which business could grow and expand through competition under free market principles, the military preferred to reinforce the patron-client relationship with the trader-merchant class—a policy that was initiated by the bureaucratic elites.<sup>14</sup> The President of the Chamber of Commerce protested the measures, but without effect.<sup>15</sup>

In addition to the policy of bureaucratic patronage, another factor that facilitated the transformation of the trader-merchant class into financial - industrial groups was the vacuum created by the migrating Hindu trader - merchant class. This opportunity was skillfully and effectively exploited by the Muslim trader - merchant class. Operating relative-



ly small and cohesive family businesses, this class had an initial advantage of experience and skill compared to other classes in Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the areas that constituted Pakistan were strongholds of agrarian social structure and tradition; the indigenous trader - merchant class was almost nonexistent. By 1960-61, a small segment of the trader merchants dominated the trade and commerce in Pakistan. Industry was almost nonexistent in the new state, while the dominant rural classes were deeply entrenched in the rural structure and were involved in insuring their dominance. The peasantry was powerless and weakly organized and found it difficult to dislodge the feudals.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the bureaucracy, confronted with restoring law and order in the urban centers, was keen to preserve stability in the rural areas.

Thus, in the new state, the areas of growth and expansion were commerce and industry. Since the effort was to create an infrastructure for a modern state without rocking the agrarian structure, the regimes during the first decade of Pakistan's history gave priority to the development of the industrial sector (large-scale manufacturing). A number of institutional measures were initiated during the 1950s to transform the trader-merchant class into financial-industrial groups. Agriculture was stagnant with no prospects of growth. Therefore, it was used as a source of transferring surplus capital (resources) to other sectors which had more potential for growth (e.g. large scale manufacturing, industry, services etc). This was part of our growth strategy in the early phase of Ayub regime i.e. 1958-64. Since most of the trader-merchants had settled in West Pakistan (i.e. Contemporary Pakistan) that area became the primary beneficiary of the industrialization.

## **Economic Institutions**

In creating a role for itself in the economy, the Ayub regime was also instrumental in developing economic institutions. The regime consolidated the financial-industrial groups and reshaped the economic institutions. According to a well informed observer of Pakistan's economic scene, Ayub "was deeply concerned with economic development and threw his weight on planning activities".<sup>18</sup> The antecedents of Ayub's role in fostering economic institutions and planning activities can be traced to 1953-54. It was in 1954 that the U.S. military and economic aid began to flow into Pakistan. By procuring aid, the military elites under Ayub enhanced their position in the country's politics, developed a strategic link with the U.S., and were able to obtain U.S. expertise for developing economic institutions.<sup>19</sup> In the same year, two advisory groups, one military, the United States Military Assistance group (U.S. MAAG), and the other economic, the Harvard Advisory Group (HAG), began operations. Here focus will be on the HAG, which played a key role in creating, promoting and expanding the planning and economic institutions in the country.

## **Planning Commission**

One of the most important contributions of the military connection with the U.S. was the creation of the Planning Commission, an institution that became the pivot of economic planning, development and growth in Pakistan.

In February 1954, the government of Pakistan, the Ford Foundation, and Harvard University signed an agreement stating that the University, with funds from the Ford Foundation, "would recruit and guide a group of experts who would assist Pakistan's Planning Commission. . . to prepare the first comprehensive plan for long range economic

and social development.<sup>20</sup> Under the agreement, the HAG was to assist the Planning Commission in three ways:

1. to organize and develop a long term development plan;
2. to recommend and analyze major economic policy questions;
3. to help train professionals in various sectors of national planning.

It also started a one year fellowship program to train the members of the Commission at Harvard.<sup>21</sup> The HAG prided itself in providing the Commission, "with intellectual and administrative leadership".<sup>22</sup> It is generally recognised that the HAG was instrumental in shaping the intellectual and ideological orientation of the Commission.

Members of the HAG arrived in April 1954. A project that was expected to last 18 months ultimately lasted 16 years (1954-70). The Planning Commission was set up in 1953, but it attained prestige and power once Ayub came to power and "remained a cockpit of economic decision-making until 1972".<sup>23</sup> Under the military regime, the Commission developed into the primary economic policy institution in the country. It not only provided the guidelines for a capitalist road to development, but also served as a vital bridge between the military and business interests. Sabhia Iqbal noted:

The Planning Commission became an effective mechanism of policy and created a framework for business interests to prosper. The military dominated the political scene but operated in conjunction with the industrialists, landlords, and top-level civil servants. The indus-



trialists benefited from the incentives used to catalyze the rush to industrialize and export.<sup>24</sup>

The three Five Year Plans of Pakistan were formulated under the guidance of the HAG. In the guise of import-substitution policy, the HAG established strong ties between the local industrialists and the international donor agencies, thus, strengthening the hold of U.S. and others on Pakistan. The performance of the Commission was astounding. A Ford Foundation report published in 1965 could claim with satisfaction that the Commission had, "attained competence in its role as originally conceived - a technical body".<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the report praised the efforts of the military regime in encouraging private enterprise.

Pakistan has evolved as an enterprise system combined with a government - formulated framework of policies and planning. Eighty percent of its output is privately produced while the government has protected, stimulated, financed and guided its agriculture and industry. It has relied heavily on private initiative in its economic growth.<sup>26</sup>

There has been debate over the degree to which the HAG was able to influence the economic decision making in Pakistan. Asaf Hussain, has asserted that the HAG was an instrument of "U.S. imperialism", and he alludes that it contributed to promoting the economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan and their eventual disintegration.<sup>27</sup> I concur with Laporte's view that the HAG had a decisive impact on the Planning Commission and the economic policies that emanated from it.<sup>28</sup>

Under the military regime, the Planning Commission was made part of the Presidential Secretariat. This further enhanced the power and prestige of the Commission. Under

the regime, the Commission emerged as an important channel for institutionalizing the patron-client relationship between the military - bureaucratic elites and the financial - industrial groups. In addition, the regime was instrumental in fostering a linking between the financial industrial groups and international capital. In 1965, according to Mason,

foreign assistance from all sources accounted for 8 percent of Pakistan's gross national product, 40 percent of its total investments, and 55 percent of its total imports. The Planning Commission occupied a central position in the negotiations for foreign assistance and in directing its use.<sup>29</sup>

Besides the Planning Commission, Ayub also ventured to streamline the existing economic institutions. In 1959 a Credit Enquiry Commission was created to examine financial institutions. Upon its recommendations, most of the financial - economic institutions were renamed, reorganized, and merged to constitute new ones.<sup>30</sup> These institutions were given new priorities and goals (See Table 2 ). The underlying assumption was to centralize and effectively control the economic decision making process.

#### **Economic Institutions and the Financial - Industrial Groups**

In the following pages, the effort shall be to analyze the role of three financial - economic institutions and their policies in facilitating the consolidation of the financial - industrial groups.

1. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC)
2. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP)

### 3. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC)

#### PIDC

The PIDC was instrumental in transforming the trader-merchant class into financial industrial groups. The PIDC had been in operation since 1950; however, it reached its zenith in 1959-62. The Corporation was bifurcated in January 1962 between East and West Pakistan. The move was made to pacify East Pakistanis who believed that the Corporation did not give adequate attention to the needs of East Pakistan. The industrial projects the Corporation initiated certainly reflected a bias towards the Western wing. However, the author's concern here is not to demonstrate the regional imbalance that may have resulted from the PIDC's industrial policies, but to underscore its role in consolidating the financial-industrial groups. The Corporations' declared objective was

... to promote enterprises which private industrialists were unable or unwilling to undertake. Its policy is to supplement, not to displace private enterprise. . . Every effort is needed to attract private capital into PIDC projects, and where private enterprise is not forthcoming at the outset, to transfer the complete projects to private ownership when the conditions for such transfer are fulfilled.<sup>31</sup>

It is quite evident that the primary purpose and policy of the Corporation was to create a class of private entrepreneurs under governmental patronage. The PIDC did succeed in performing that task. Between 1950 and 1962, the PIDC completed 55 industrial projects; of these, 33 were located in West Pakistan and 22 in East Pakistan.<sup>32</sup> In addition, during 1962-69, another 25 projects were built by the West Pakistan



PIDC. It was primarily involved in building jute, textile, sugar, cement, fertilizer, paper board and ship-building/repair industries. On completion, most of these industries were transferred to the financial-industrial groups. This was done through what PIDC called a policy of disinvestment. According to one study, 47% of the private industrialists in 1959 reported the occupation of their fathers as traders (see Table 3). It clearly suggests that those who were to become industrialists in sixties, their parents were trader-merchants in forties and fifties. However, changes in governmental policy transformed some of these trader-merchant families into "Industrial houses". Amjad has pointed out that ten major "Industrial Houses" emerged as beneficiaries of the PIDC's disinvestment policy (Table 4). In addition, the financial-industrial groups had considerable influence in the policy making process. There was close collaboration between the PIDC and the "Industrial Houses". Members of these Houses were represented on the Board of Directors of the PIDC.<sup>33</sup> Interestingly, the PIDC not only transferred industries to the private sector, but also refrained from setting up in these enterprises in which the private sector was active. By 1960 Pakistan had achieved not only rapid industrialization and one of the highest growth rates in the world, but the pattern of ownership of industrial assets was also quite unusual. Two major industries, cotton textiles and jute, were dominated by a hand-full of these Houses. Amjad has estimated that five Houses controlled about 80 percent of the jute industries and ten Houses controlled about 50 percent of the cotton textile production.<sup>34</sup>

#### **PICIC AND IDBP**

In addition to the PIDC, two other financial institutions (PICIC and IDBP) acquired salience under the military regime. Both the PICIC and IDBP played a key role in promoting the expansion of the financial industrial groups in facilitating

their linkage with international capital.<sup>35</sup> These two institutions not only provided an opportunity for these groups to procure loans for expanding their investments, but also established their hold in the banking structure of the country. The foreign aid that the military regime began to receive was funnelled through the PICIC to the financial industrial groups.<sup>36</sup> The PICIC emerged as the primary money lending institution. For the installation of new industries it could lend up to 1.5 million rupees in West Pakistan and up to one million rupees in East Pakistan. There were no upper limits for the PICIC loans.<sup>37</sup> The breakdown of the PICIC loan size as shown in Table 5 indicates that almost 71 percent of the loans sanctioned were of the amounts above 2.5 million rupees. The primary beneficiaries of the PICIC loans were the financial - industrial groups. It appears that the policy making elites and the PICIC operated on the principle of credit worthiness of the loan receiving group. They did not take the risk of providing loans to new groups but relied on the tried, tested and apparently sound, financial-industrial houses. This way, the PICIC not only promoted class consolidation, but also helped to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few industrial houses. In addition the Board of Directors of the PICIC was also dominated by the representatives of the financial industrial Houses like Dawood, Fancy, Adamjee, Amin, Crescent, and Valika, the projects sanctioned by the PICIC not only rotated within class, but also within a limited number of the Houses. *Amjad has noted that 70 percent of the loans sanctioned by the PICIC went to only 11 Industrial Houses.* (The names of the houses given in Table 6.). This led Amjad to conclude that there is a definite relationship between borrowed capital and industrial expansion in Pakistan. His data suggest that out of 20 Houses, 12 were dependent on borrowed capital for more than one-third of their growth. This correlations between borrowed capital and industrial expansion clearly indicates that the PICIC served as a vital link between the financial - industrial groups and inter-



national capital.

To sum up it is evident that the PICIC was instrumental in (1) consolidating the financial-industrial groups, (2) promoting the linkage between the financial - industrial groups and international capital, (3) squeezing the small and medium size industrial enterprises, and (4) doing little in mobilizing and domestic savings.

The third important financial institution, the IDBP, provided only 20 percent of its total loans to the financial industrial groups. Its primary purpose was to provide credit facilities to the medium and small industrial units in the private sector. Yet, the breakdown of loans (Table 7) suggests that a major portion of loans (almost 66 %) were of over one million rupees and they went to a small portion (about 9.2 %) of the total borrowers. Thus, Amjad concluded that the IDBP encouraged the formation of a small, indigenous-financial class in Pakistan.<sup>40</sup>

### Foreign Aid, the Military and the Financial Industrial Groups

Through these financial - economic institutions, the military regime under Ayub was able to consolidate the financial industrial groups. The phenomenal economic growth, development of the economic institutions and concentration of economic wealth that occurred during the military regime was a function of its ability to procure foreign aid (see Table 8). As the regime's ability to insure the flow of aid weakened, the rate of economic growth slowed. The fall in growth sharpened the gap between the beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries of these development policies.<sup>41</sup> This resulted in the politicization of the urban middle classes and industrial labour. Since the regime had made little effort to develop political institutions that would



give the urban middle classes and the urban proletariat a sense of political participation, the crisis of unequal economic growth and the resultant slowing down of economic development promoted a crisis of political participation.

Ayub Khan's ability to procure foreign aid weakened after 1963, when Pakistan began to pursue a more independent foreign policy (see Table 8). Since 1958, Pakistan had closely identified itself with the West and particularly with the United States. Pakistan remained a member of the Western Pacts, but began to cultivate relations with the Communist Block, particularly China, and vigorously participated on issues of Third World's concern. To what degree Ayub encouraged and guided such a shift continues to be debated. However, the issue did create two groups within the Ayub cabinet. The Foreign Ministry under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto asserted that Pakistan should pursue closer relations with China, identify itself with Third World causes in international politics, seek a settlement with India on Kashmir, and tailor foreign aid negotiations according to guidelines provided by the Foreign Ministry.<sup>42</sup> The Planning Commission, under the direction of Mohammad Shoaib, the Finance Minister, asserted that economic growth and development in Pakistan had occurred because the military regime was able to procure foreign aid by pursuing a pro-West foreign policy. Furthermore, he believed that Pakistan as a small country should insure the flow of foreign aid, abandon the desire of an independent foreign policy, and remain within the Western fold. The conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the Planning Commission reached its peak during the September 1965 War between India and Pakistan. According to one observer, during the War, the channel of communication between the U.S. and Pakistan was not the Foreign Ministry but the Planning Commission.<sup>43</sup> Later in the year, the United States terminated aid to Pakistan. Said Hasan, a former Deputy Chairman of the

Planning Commission reported that President Ayub Khan was led to believe by the Foreign Minister that an independent foreign policy would not imply stoppage of the aid from the United States and that in such an eventuality, Pakistan would be able to secure aid from alternate sources.<sup>44</sup> The stoppage of aid from the United States in 1965, the War with India, and a bad harvest had adversely effected the economy. These exogenous factors slackened the growth rate and simultaneously politicized the urban middle classes, industrial labor and petty government employees. The regime had paid little attention to the absorption of these classes in the economy, and their political exclusion was sought through political control and centralization. Therefore, a decline in growth rate and consequent politicization adversely affected the regime's ability to coerce and sustain hegemony.<sup>45</sup> Although later in 1966 the U.S. restored aid to Pakistan, the damage was done. The economy was unable to recover, however the military did retain its hegemony.

The politics of protest reached a turning point in January 1968. President Ayub had a near fatal stroke, which shook the very foundations of the regime. It revealed that the regime had failed to develop any mechanism of succession of power. Ayub had not fully recovered from the stroke yet when, in April 1968, the Chief Economist of the regime revealed that 80 percent of Pakistan's economic wealth was concentrated in the hands of 20 families.<sup>46</sup> After this declaration the economic policies of the regime came under severe criticism from the politically excluded classes, political leaders and the political parties. By November, the protest against the regime developed into a mass movement. The financial-industrial groups that had benefited from the policies of Ayub regime were not forthcoming in supporting the regime. These beneficiaries could have helped Ayub by meeting some of the demands (such as wage raise) of the protesting labour. Since the financial-industrial groups had

not emerged and developed in a free competitive environment, but a protected market, they did not not acquire the modern industrial/corporate attitudes and work ethics. For their advancement these groups were dependent on the regime but showed lack of will to rescue its political decay. Ayub was forced to resign, but the military hegemonic system that he built remained. The weakening and decline of the system brought about the collapse of the Pakistani state. The financial, industrial groups and economic institutions that Ayub created and consolidated were weakened with the collapse of "United Pakistan" but not destroyed.



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44. Ibid., p. 127.
45. Walter P. Falcon and Joseph J. Sten, "Pakistan's Development". An Introductory Perspective", in Walter P. Falcon and Gustav F. Papanek, *Development Policy II- The Pakistan Experience*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). pp. 5-6; Moin Baqai, pp. 48-49.
46. Haq, cited in Rashid Amjad, p. 22.

TABLE 1  
BACKGROUND OF INDUSTRIAL FAMILIES

Industrial House	Community	Family Origin/Area	Settled	Business Hdqtrs pre - 1947
Adamjee	Memon	Kathiawar/ Jetpur.	Karachi	Calcutta
Dawood	Memon	Kathiawar/ Bantwa.	Karachi	Bombay
Saigol	Punjabi Sheikh	W. Punjab/ Chakwal.	Lahore	Calcutta
Valika	Dawoodi/Bohra	Bombay	Karachi	Bombay
Colony	Punjabi Shiekh Chinioti.	W. Punjab/ Chiniot.	Lahore	Lahore
Fancy	Khoja Ismaili	Kathiawar	Karachi	E. Africa
Bawany	Memon	Kathiawar/ Jetpur.	Karachi	Rangoon
Crescent	Punjabi Sheikh/ Chinioti.	W. Punjab/ Chiniot.	Lyallpur	Delhi
Beco	Punjabi	E. Punjab	Lahore	Batala
Wazir Ali	None, Syeds	W. Punjab/ Lahore.	Lahore	Lahore
Amin	Punjabi Sheikh	W. Punjab	Karachi	Calcutta
Nishat	Punjabi Chinioti.	W. Punjab/ Chiniot	Lyallpur	—
Hoti	Pathan Landlord.	Charsaddah	Charsaddah	Charsaddah *
Fateh	Marwari	Gujarat	Karachi	
Isphahani	None	Iranian	Karachi	Calcutta
Karim	Bohras	Bombay	Karachi	

Habib	Khoja Ismaheeri.	Bombay	Karachi	Bombay
Hysesons	None	Madras	Karachi	Madras

Sources : Rashid Amjad, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Lahore: South Asian Institute, Punjab University Press, 1974), p. 15; H. Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 21 (October 1972), p. 21.

; Stanley A. Kochanek *Interest Groups and Development Business and politics in Pakistan* Karachi ; Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 93.

\*Most of the Studies have erroneously put Charsaddah as place of settlement and Business headquarters of Hotis, where they are settled in mardan and their Business leaders are also located there.



TABLE 2  
FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Institution	Year Formed	Peak Years	Declared Objectives/Functions
PIDC <sup>1</sup>	1950 (Operational, 1952)	1959-69	To encourage industry where private enterprise was shy.
PIFC <sup>2</sup> Renamed IDBP	1949-61 1961		Long-term loans to medium and small-scale industries.
PICIC <sup>3</sup>	1959		Provide long-term loans, credit and foreign exchange to FGC's 40 % of capital share held by U.S., U.K., Canada, Japan, W. Germany; 60 % by Pakistani private investors.
ADFC & ABP merged to ADBP <sup>4</sup>	1952, 1957 1961		Provide credit cash for agriculture, cottage industry, livestock, fisheries, forestry, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation

<sup>2</sup> Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation and Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan.

<sup>3</sup> Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation.

<sup>4</sup> Agricultural Development Finance Corporation, Agriculture Bank of Pakistan, and Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan.

TABLE 3

PRIOR OCCUPATIONS OF MUSLIMS<sup>a</sup> WHO WERE PRIVATE INDUSTRIALISTS IN 1959 (%)

S. No.	Antecedent Characteristics	Previous Primary Occupation		Previous Secondary Occupation <sup>b</sup>		Father's Occupation
		Indus.	Indus./ Invest. <sup>c</sup>	Indus.	Indus./ Invest.	Indus./ Invest.
1.	Indus. pre-1947	17	16	4	30	6
2.	Small Industry, handicrafts.	18	6	23	7	16
3.	Traders—import, export.	17	41	30	25	11
4.	Traders—internal, government contractors	28	22	39	24	36
5.	Employees (professional, other)	18	10	4	12	20
6.	Agriculture	3	6	negligible	1	11
Total		101	101	100	99	100

Note: Totals differ from 100 % because of rounding.

<sup>a</sup>Excludes those who immigrated from the Near East in the last century

<sup>b</sup>Primary and secondary are determined according to proportion of income received.

<sup>c</sup>Proportion of total industrial investment controlled by each category.

Source: Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development—Social Goals and private Incentives* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 85-86, 111-116.

TABLE 4

P.I.D.C.'s TOTAL AMOUNT DIVISTED IN FAVOR OF  
INDUSTRIAL HOUSES

(TO JUNE 1962)

S. No.	Group/Companies	Rupees million	% of Each Group	% of Total Disinvestment by PIDC
1.	Amin Amin Jute Mills	20.00		
	Total	20.00	7.0	5.0
2.	Adamjee DDT Factory, Nowshera Adamjee Indus. Adamjee Chem. Works Adamjee High Grade Board Paper Mill, Nowshera	3.02 30.00 75.00		
	Total	108.02	37.9	27.2
3.	Bawany Latif Bawany Jute Mills	7.50		
	Total	7.50	2.6	1.9
4.	Dawood Karnaphully Paper Mills	65.90		
	Total	65.90	23.1	16.6
5.	Fancy Karachi Gas Co. Peoples Jute Mills, Ltd.	15.00 20.00		
	Total	35.00	12.3	8.8
6.	Isphani Chittagong Jute Mfg.	12.50		
	Total	12.50	4.4	3.1
7.	Nishat Nishat Jute Mills, Ltd.	4.08		
	Total	4.08	1.4	1.0



S. No.	Group/Companies	Amount Rupees Million	% of Each Group	% of Total Disinvest- ment by PIDC
8.	Saigol Jauharabad Sugar Mill	10.85		
	Total	10.85	3.8	2.7
9.	Karim Karim Jute Mills	7.50		
	Total	7.50	2.6	1.9
10.	Hoti Charsaddah Sugar Mills	13.80		
	Total	13.80	4.8	3.5
	GRAND TOTAL	285.15	100.00	71.7

Source : Rashid Amjad, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Lahore : South Asian Institute), 1974, p. 19.

TABLE 5  
DISTRIBUTION OF PICIC LOANS BY SIZE\*

(TO JULY 31, 1969)

Size of Loans	Amount	%
Under Rs. 0.5 million	597,11	3
Rs. 0.5 million — Rs. 1.0 million	101,224	6
Rs. 1.0 million — Rs. 2.5 million	359,198	20
Over Rs. 2.5 million	1,271,066	71
Total	1,791,199	100

\* Rupees Million

TABLE 6  
LOANS THROUGH PICIC

Industries	Industrial Houses
Adamjee Industries	(Adamjee)
Crescent Jute Products	(Crescent)
Ismail Cement	(Colony)
Packages	(Wazir Ali)
Pakistan Paper Corporation	(Hoti)
Steel Corporation of Pakistan	(Fancy)
Crescent Sugar Mills	(Crescent)
Hyesons Sugar Mills	(Hyesons)
Premir Sugar Mills	(Premier)
Shahtaj Sugar Mills	(Shahnawaz)
Karnaphully Rayon & Chemicals	(Dawood)

Source : Amjad Rashid, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Lahore : South Asian Institute, 1974), p. 36.



TABLE 7

BREAKDOWN OF THE SIZE OF IDBP LOANS\*  
(AUGUST 1, 1961 to JUNE 30, 1969)

Loan Size	WEST PAKISTAN		EAST PAKISTAN		PAKISTAN	
	No. Cases	Amount	No. Cases	Amount	No. Cases	Amount
To 0.5	1359	145,739	1,658	215,245	3,107 (84)	360,984 (20)
0.5 - 1.0	158	109,545	189	139,093	347 (7)	248,638 (14)
1.0 +	156	604,700	186	589,858	342 (9.2)	1,194,568 (66.)
Total	1673	859,984	2,033	944,206	3,706	1,804,190

Source : Rashid Amjad, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Lahore : South Asian Institute, 1974), pp. 35-37.

\* Rupees Millions (The figures in parenthesis are percentages).

(The figures in parenthesis are percentages).

TABLE 8  
U. S. GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND CREDITS TO PAKISTAN

Year	Amount (U.S. Millions)
Pre - 1953	8
1953	99
1954	12
1955	67
1956	154
1957	100
1958	145
1959	142
1960	229
1961	218
1962	323
1963	380
1964	377
1965	349
1966	221
1967	331
1968	282
1969	209
1970	239
1971	216
Total :	4,101

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1972 and previous years). Pakistan ranks fourth among Asian nations (India, South Korea and South Vietnam have received more) and sixth among all nations in term of total U.S. grants and credits extended during the post-WW II period. On a per capita basis, Pakistan has received relatively more aid than India, although India's total figure is not quite double that of Pakistan's. In Robert La Porte, *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 145.

## Public Policy And Reform In Pakistan 1971-77: An Analysis Of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Socio - Economic Policies

This study will briefly describe and evaluate policies of socio-economic reform (nationalization of industries and banks, labor, land reform, education, and health policies in Pakistan) under the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77). It will be argued that Bhutto was a reformist political leader who ventured to reorient and rebuild the socio-economic structure of Pakistan by pursuing policies of gradual or incremental change. He orchestrated social change and redefined the priorities of social development and economic growth in Pakistan. However, he could not provide optimal solutions as a reformist leader. The policies he proposed needed corresponding changes in institution building. To explain and analyze the relationship between public policy and Bhutto's reformist leadership, I will address myself to the following questions: Under what sorts of constraints did Bhutto devise his policies? How did these policies of socio-economic change affect the patterns of resource allocation, economic growth, and distribution? Who benefitted from these policies and at what costs?

Bhutto's reformist policies have evoked considerable scholarly description and analysis of his political leadership. According to Ziring, Bhutto was a "typical Sindhi landlord."<sup>1</sup>



Heeger has described his leadership as "patrimonial."<sup>2</sup> Sayeed found in Bhutto all the "Bonapartist" tendencies and has described him as a "Bonapartist" leader.<sup>3</sup> I propose to describe and analyze Bhutto as a "reformist" political leader. According to Huntington, the reformer (1) must possess political skills, (2) should be adept in methods, techniques, and the timing of introducing changes, and (3) should have a clear vision of his priorities, choices, and the types of reform he intends to institute. The reformer needs a higher order of political skills because invariably he is involved in a "multi-front war." His enemies on one front may be his allies on another. Unlike the revolutionary, who thrives on polarization, a reformer is confronted with having to satisfy both the radicals and the conservatives. He is burdened with reducing cleavages and building a consensus. In the process of reform making, he may confront both and end up pleasing none. The most critical task of the reformist leader is that he must be able to devise policies of incremental change and not usher an abrupt and total change.<sup>4</sup> A reformist is not status quo oriented, but is a gradualist. He can adopt a "Fabian" approach, i.e., a policy of incremental change pursued through piecemeal reform. Bhutto had these attributes of a reformist leader and he made efforts to introduce his reforms through incremental change.

### Constraints of Structural Collapse and Psychological Loss

In December 1971 Bhutto assumed power in a chaos-ridden and disintegrated state of Pakistan. He was confronted with the task of rejuvenating a nation-state. It was not a situation of merely replacing a government, but of also reconstituting a collapsed nation-state system.<sup>5</sup> Before Bhutto could play the role of reformist leader, he needed to restore national confidence and rebuild the fabric of nationhood. The crisis had two dimensions—structural collapse and psychological loss. The country was polarized vertically and

horizontally. Vertical polarization was reflected by the agrarian tension between the land-owning elites and the highly politicized peasants and tenants. Conflict existed between the industrialists and the laborers. A defeated military was ridden with high command mistrust and junior insubordination. The bureaucracy was paralyzed by its inability to enforce law and order. Horizontally, since the very fabric of nationhood was torn apart, fissiparous tendencies were increasing. In the "New Pakistan," regionalization of politics emerged with new intensity.

The opposition parties and leadership of smaller provinces—i.e., North-West Frontier Province and particularly Baluchistan—perceived the emergence of Bhutto as continuation of the dominance of the larger provinces. They saw reformist policies as interventionist and resisted them. A cleavage existed at still another level; the religious political parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, perceived Bhutto as *kafir* (non-believer) and his party's socialist program as antireligious. They believed Bhutto's policies must be resisted under all circumstances. In short, Bhutto was confronted with organizing national life in Pakistan, restoring national confidence, and rebuilding an institutional order. Bhutto had little, except to fall back on the decaying authoritarian structures of governance (military, bureaucracy, and police) and to rely on his political skills. Bhutto was conscious of what he had inherited, but he strove to build hope for the future of Pakistan and promised reform of the socio-economic structure. In his first address to the nation he stated.

Every institution in Pakistan has either been destroyed or threatened and that is why we face this state today. We have to rebuild democratic institutions, we have to rebuild confidence, we have to rebuild hope in future—we are facing the worst crisis in our country's life, a deadly crisis; we have to pick up the pieces, very small pieces, but we will make a new Pakistan, a prosperous and



progressive Pakistan, a Pakistan free from exploitation.<sup>6</sup>

Accounting for the nature of crisis, he pointed out that reform was needed in almost every aspect of life in Pakistan, but asserted that, "fundamentally it is the economic system, the social and economic system that requires change and adjustment. We intend to put the social and economic system right."<sup>7</sup> It was with these kinds of constraints and ambitions that Bhutto proceeded to institute socio-economic reform in Pakistan.

Given the nature of psycho-structural crisis, Bhutto adopted a Fabian approach to rebuild and reform the socio-economic structure in Pakistan. In his speeches, statements, and writing he constantly reminded his followers about the inequity of Pakistan's socio-economic system. Through piecemeal reform and incremental change, he aimed to achieve economic growth and build a framework for a more just socio-economic order. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1973, Bhutto defined the socio-economic parameters of his reformist framework:

The economy we envisage is a mixed one in which private enterprise is neither crippled nor allowed to appropriate the nation's wealth for the benefit of few. . . .

Our target in our socio-economic program is not only a statistically gratifying increase in the GNP but an improvement in the lot of the common man, in the living standards of workers and peasants and a radical change in the social milieu.<sup>8</sup>

Evidently Bhutto propounded a developmental strategy which was different from the developmental policies of the previous regime, which had promoted the principle of "functional inequality," asserting that for initial growth some degree of social inequality was necessary.<sup>9</sup> For Bhutto economic growth without social improvement was meaningless.



He sought a shift in the existing developmental strategies. His developmental strategy had multiple goals, such as reducing social inequality, raising literacy level, enhancing employment opportunity, and generating economic growth and consolidation of the nation-state.

These goals were believed to be achievable within a gradualist framework only if a relatively long period (ten to fifteen years) of political stability was ensured. Nevertheless, to achieve these goals Bhutto evolved policies of incremental change which can broadly be categorized into two types: (a) Socio-economic and (b) politico-administrative reforms. Socio-economic policies are the primary focus of attention in this article.

#### **Nationalization and Labour Reform:**

To give meaning and substance to his vision of optimal "mixed economy," Bhutto began by redefining the role of Financial Political groups (Finpols) within government and in the national economy. An ex-post review of nationalization policy reveals that the Bhutto government's strategy was to transform the industrial sector from its consumer-industry bias toward setting up of basic industries by expanding the public sector.

The Finpols were primarily the commercial/business families, who during the final phase of Pakistan movement provided financial support and acquired preeminence in the new state. They developed a close relationship with the political leadership and were instrumental in providing the infrastructure (banks, chambers of commerce, etc) in the formative years of Pakistan's development.<sup>10</sup> During President Ayub Khan's rule (1958-69) these families progressed; some of them were transformed into industrial "Houses." They expanded their power base by inducting some new

families into commerce and industry. As a consequence of Ayub's developmental thrust of "functional inequality", these Finpols acquired pivotal position in the national economy, and on the basis of their wealth and financial power they were symbolically referred to as the "22 families". During the 1960s while armed forces governed, these Finpols dominated Pakistan's economy.

Finpols were nervous as Bhutto assumed power. They perceived him inimical to their interests. Skeptical of Bhutto's reformist zeal, the Finpols immediately lent "discrete support" to the opposition political parties.<sup>11</sup> This conflict of perceptions and interests persisted during Bhutto's rule.

In January 1972, Bhutto announced the nationalization of ten basic industries: iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, heavy electrical, motor vehicles, tractor plants, heavy and basic chemicals, cement, petro-chemicals, gas and oil refineries. The policy of nationalization was adopted with a great degree of caution. No foreign investment was nationalized. The policy had three salient features, aiming at : (1) decentralization of wealth, (2) reorganization of industrial units, and (3) consolidation of the public sector. It was incremental and spread over a period of two years. The major instrument of change was the abolition of the "managing Agency System."<sup>12</sup> This system had its origins in nineteenth-century British India. Under the system, the company's director could give its management to an agent who controlled and regulated the finances of the company as a separate corporate entity. Thus, directors could abuse power and

Table 1 PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT

(million of rupees)

Year	Private	Public	Total	Public Investment as % of Total
1971-72	1,235	99	1,334	7
1972-73	1,018	111	1,130	10
1973-74	1,023	391	1,414	28
1974-75	1,437	1,065	2,502	43
1975-76	1,818	3,182	5,000	64
1976-77	1,795	4,315	6,110	71

Source: *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976-77* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, 1977), p. 43.

concentrate wealth. The system was a primary pillar of Financial Political groups' power. In 1961, the Ayub government considered abolishing it, but under pressure from the Finpols, dropped the idea. The abolition of the system did erode the power of Finpols. Through such policies of gradual change, Bhutto sought to restructure the economic system. However, despite assurances, appeals, and threats, the Financial Political groups remained inflexible in their response toward the government's policies.<sup>13</sup> Bhutto found it difficult to win their confidence. They perceived Bhutto as a rabble-rouser, who by his reformist policies was pampering labour.<sup>14</sup>



Unable to generate investments from the private sector, by 1973 the Bhutto government was concentrating on expanding the role of the public sector in the national economy (see Table 1). In 1971-72, public investment in the industrial sector was 7 % of the total, and by 1976-77, it had reached 71%, about a tenfold increase. Investments in the private sector in this period declined from 93% to 29%.

If, on one end, Finpols were resisting reformist policies, on the other end labour was getting restive. Bhutto's dilemma was how to reconcile the interests of highly politicized labour with the interests of highly skeptical Finpols. Analyzing the Labor-Finpol relationship, Gustafson has incisively remarked, "Bhutto's problem here was that he clearly had a tiger by the tail. Much of his urban support came from the labor and the stance of the Pakistan People's Party on labour issues— and against the 22 families — had emboldened labor considerably from its old passive attitude."<sup>15</sup> It was under these circumstances that Bhutto introduced labor policy in February 1972.<sup>16</sup> The policy aimed at regulating the labour behavior. Its broad features can be summarized: (1) It provided respectability and legitimacy to labor in its dealings with the management. (2) Providing the regulatory mechanism and recognizing the right of labour to strike, it encouraged labor and management to seek adjudication in the labor court. (3) It ensured material benefits, raising the profit share for workers from 2 % to 4 %. Payment of bonus to labour was made compulsory. It also provided compensation for injury and an old-age pension, fixed a minimum wage scale, and provided free medical and free education for the children.

These wage and welfare increases did provide some relief to labour but production did not increase and investments in the private sector shrank further, because social costs were considered too heavy. Besides this crisis of pro-

duction and decline in the private sector's investment, the government was confronted with a massive unemployment problem. According to official estimates during 1972-73, the labor force was increasing at a rate of 3 % per annum — about 600,000 persons entered the labour force each year. The unemployment rate stood at 13 %. In the urban areas it was as high as 17.7%. The estimated rate for the rural areas was 11.5%<sup>17</sup> (The lower rate in the rural areas may be disguised as a large percentage of the population may show itself "self-employed.")

To resolve the unemployment situation the Bhutto regime adopted a direct strategy. It took two policy initiatives: (1) the public sector was expanded and (2) a "labor exchange" program was evolved with the Middle Eastern countries. According to an official publication, the number of employees in the public sector industries increased from 40,817 in 1972-73 to 57, 827 in 1976-77, an increase of 41%. Furthermore, to absorb the educated unemployed, two organizations— National Development Volunteer Corps (NDVC) and National Development Corporation (NDC)—were created. These two organizations absorbed about 15,000 persons.<sup>18</sup> However, the most effective employment policy was the "labour exchange" program. The policy made a deep impact on national economy, particularly on the rural sector. According to one estimate, by 1981 there were 2.1 million Pakistani workers serving in different countries of the Middle East.<sup>19</sup> The official estimates reveal that remittances from these workers were \$ 339 million, which rose to \$ 2,218 million in 1980-81. This was equal to country's total export earnings and worked out as 10 % of the G.N.P. in 1980-81.

It is interesting to note that 63.1% of the migrant workers belonged to rural areas; out of a total of 2.1 million workers who were overseas in 1980-81, 1.33 million came



from the rural areas. This is about 6.8% of the total labour force. Since these workers were male it worked out to be 7.9% of the total male labor force. That inflow of remittances to rural areas for 1980-81 was \$ 1,343 million, which is equivalent to about 20 % of the total agricultural output for that year.<sup>20</sup> These statistics reveal that the "labor exchange" policy did reduce unemployment pressure, but this contributed little in boosting industrial production. Nevertheless, by the mid-seventies, foreign exchange earnings through these remittances were showing an upward trend.

### Nationalization of Banks

The policy of bank nationalization was a corollary of nationalization of industries, labor-employment policies, and the expansion of the public sector. Most of the 15 commercial banks were either owned or controlled by the Financial Political groups.<sup>21</sup> According to Ahmed and Amjad, the nationalization of banks had a deep impact on the national economy, and it served "to break the link between the industrial and financial capital which had built up over the last twenty years, and which has helped foster the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few families."<sup>22</sup> Before nationalizing the banks in January 1974, the government provided the Banks (i.e., the Finpols) an opportunity to reorient their policies. In 1972, the commercial banks were instructed to provide credit facilities, loans and advances, to the small and middle farmer and industrial entrepreneur; but the response of the banks was poor. Finding the Finpols unresponsive to governmental policies, the regime decided to nationalize the banks. This further antagonized the Finpols, but provided government with an opportunity to control and regulate credit, and establish an investment pattern.

\* In 1973, Pakistan's 15 commercial banks had about 2,942 branches. By 1977 the number of branches reached



6,275.<sup>23</sup> About 60 % of the new branches were opened in the remote and rural areas of Pakistan. Nationalization of banks has had deeper effect on the social structure of rural Pakistan. Bank nationalization linked the rural sector with the national and international market. The government had aimed at nationalization because it wanted to boost agricultural production by providing credits and loans to the farmer. The credits and loans from the nationalized banks to the farmers increased from 85 million rupees in 1971-72 to 700 million rupees in 1975-76.<sup>24</sup> This facility of loans and credits, along with an increase in procurement prices of agricultural commodities (which increased by almost 100% during this period), clearly meant an "attempt to alter the pro-industry anti-agriculture bias of the previous growth strategy."<sup>25</sup> This indicated that banks acquired new meaning in the social life of rural Pakistan.

Nationalization of industries and banks, and of labor and employment policies, did define the parameters of mixed economy and also provided some benefit to the disadvantaged groups, such as labor, educated unemployed, and the small-scale businessman; but it facilitated little in generating economic growth. In the final analysis, however, the industrial sector's productivity remained low as bureaucratization and inefficiency increased.

### Land Reform and Agrarian Change

Agrarian structure is another area in which Bhutto attempted to bring about reform. In rural Pakistan, social and economic relations revolve around the control of land. Land is the source of power, privilege, and patronage. Land-owning elites monopolized social power in the rural structure. Landowning elites and Finpols dominated the socio-economic structure.

Pakistan has a highly skewed pattern of land distribution, and none of the land reforms introduced has been able to substantially change this pattern. According to the 1959

TABLE 2 STRUCTURE OF LANDHOLDINGS

Size of Holdings (Acres)	Number of Owners (0000's)	% of Total Owners	Area Owned (0000's)	% of Total Area
Less than:				
5	3,266	64.4	7,426	15.3
5 - 25	1,452	28.7	15,438	31.7
25 - 100	287	5.7	10,616	21.8
100 to 500	57	1.1	7,671	15.8
500 +	6	0.1	7,491	15.4
Total	5,068	100	48,642	100

Source: Commission for West Pakistan, *Report of Land Reforms* (Lahore, 1959).

Land Reforms Commission Report for West Pakistan, 0.1% of the Landowners, with a landholding size of 500 acres or more, owned 15 % of the total land area. Another 15.4 % of the land was owned by 1.1 % of the landowners with a landholding size of 100-500 acres. On the other hand, 93.1% of total landowners owned 47% of the total land area with landholdings of less than 5-25 acres (see Table 2).

In the 1959 land reform, Ayub Khan introduced the notion of a land ceiling in the agrarian structure of Pakistan. Ownership of ceiling was fixed at 500 acres for irrigated lands and 1,000 acres for non-irrigated lands. These reforms

had marginal effects on the agrarian structure of Pakistan. Bhutto adopted a bolder agrarian reform policy. He attempted to synthesize ceiling and tenancy reform by a gradual approach. He adopted a policy of incremental change to transform and, to some degree, restructure the agrarian economy. As a reformist leader Bhutto's predicament was how to reconcile the interests of landowning elites with those of the peasants, middle farmers, and landless tenants. To create harmony between the socially powerful and the socially powerless, Bhutto adopted a policy of reorienting and transforming the relationship between the two. He proposed to transform the "feudal" landowner into a "humane" agricultural entrepreneur, simultaneously elevating the social consciousness of rural masses and improving their self-image and well-being.<sup>26</sup>

While announcing the land reforms in March 1972, Bhutto sounded radical, but was clearly aiming at an *attitudinal change and incremental structural transformation*. The agrarian reforms he envisaged will effectively break the inequitable concentration of landed wealth, reduce income disparities, increase production, reduce unemployment, streamline the administration of land revenue and agricultural taxation, and truly lay down the foundation of honor and mutual benefit between landowner and the tenant. . .

Enterprising and enlightened farmers should continue to live on the land and give agriculture the sense of purpose it deserves. For these compelling reasons, we are following exactly the same principle of the enlightened entrepreneur. We are as much against the ignorant and tyrannical landlord as we are against the robber barons of industry. We are as much for the creative and humane landowner as we are for a productive and conscientious owner of industry.<sup>27</sup>

Bhutto strove to implement agrarian policies in three



stages. In the first stage, individual ceilings were reduced to 300 acres of non-irrigated land and 150 acres of irrigated land. The ejectment of a tenant was made illegal, subject to the condition that the tenant does not fail to pay rent. The landowners were made responsible for bearing the cost of water rate and seeds. The costs of fertilizers and pesticides were to be shared equally by the landlord and the tenant. No compensation was paid for the land resumed. The land thus acquired was distributed among the tillers free of cost. All state land was reserved exclusively for landless peasants, tenants, and owners of below-subsistence holdings.

The second set of agricultural reforms introduced in 1975 was substantive. For the first time in Pakistan's history, an effort was made to correct the land tenure system. By this measure, small peasants and middle farmers were exempted from land revenue. Levy of any cess and *begar* (forced labor) was banned. Persons owning land between 12 acres of irrigated or 25 acres of non-irrigated land were exempted from revenue taxation. By this reform method, it was claimed that some 7.27 million peasants and farmers benefited. For farmers owning 25 acres of irrigated or 50 acres of nonirrigated land, and farmers owning 50 acres of irrigated or 100 acres of nonirrigated land, the increase in revenue was 50 % and 100 % respectively.<sup>28</sup>

In the third phase of agrarian reform, a National Charter for the Peasants was announced by the government in December 1976. According to the Charter, the government was to distribute cultivable land and cultural wasteland among the landless peasants. Besides, in ejectment cases, after the appeals, a revision was permissible only to the tenants and not to the landowners. It was estimated that by

TABLE 3 LAND REFORMS IN FOUR PROVINCES

Province	Area Resumed	Area Allotted	Balance	Persons Benefitted
Punjab	331,268	242,840	88,428	36,948
Sind	317,896	238,637	79,259	16,497
NWFP	141,877	132,860	9,017	12,639
Baluchistan	515,105	198,295	316,810	9,129
Total	1,306,146	812,632	493,514	75,213

Progress of 1977 Land Reforms up to 30 June 1980 Under Act II of 1977.

Punjab	93,806	23,426	70,380	1,543
Sind	31,741	19,966	11,775	1,496
NWFP	23,787	4,162	19,625	781
Baluchistan	17,502	269	17,233	14
Total	166,836	47,823	119,013	3,834

Source: Government of Pakistan, *Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, 1980* (Islamabad, 1981), p. 99.

this measure about 2 million acres were distributed among 100,000 peasant families. In early 1977, land ceiling was further reduced to 200 acres of non-irrigated and 100 acres of irrigated land. In this event the resumed land was acquired on payment of a compensation of Rs. 30 per Production Index Unit (PIU). However, the resumed land was given free to tenants, peasants, and other cultivators (see Table 3). By this measure about 4 million acres of land were redistributed among 40,000 families.<sup>29</sup>

These policies ran into difficulties of implementation because little effort was made to organize the peasants or

create a social environment in which reforms could be implemented. In addition, the entire task of implementing the land reforms was entrusted to bureaucracy- the deputy commissioners and the revenue departments became the primary instruments of implementation. But given their attitudes, social backgrounds, and contacts with the rural elites, effective enforcement of land reforms could not be expected.<sup>30</sup> Consequently, the effectiveness of these land reforms on the rural structures was marginal.

These reformist policies did not solve the problem of rural poverty, but created a socio-political environment in which people started to assert that if the government were to

TABLE 4 PROVINCEWISE DISTRIBUTION OF IRDP  
MARKAZ (CENTERS) BY 1976

Punjab	38
Sind	31
NWFP	33
Baluchistan	21
Azad Kashmir	10
Northern Areas	1
Federal Capital	2
Total	136

Source: *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976-77*.

introduce appropriate policies, the inequitable social structure of rural areas might undergo gradual transformation. Khalid B. Sayeed, who has contended that Bhutto introduced these reforms for self-aggrandizement, and wanted the masses to believe that he was their "Supreme benefactor", has also



conceded that "Bhutto's great contribution was that he had aroused both a new hope and political consciousness among these classes that, given certain decisive policies on the part of the government, their lot could improve."<sup>31</sup>

Bhutto's reformist policies increased the credibility of his government among the rural masses. As a reformist leader he was preoccupied with evolving social harmony and redistributing resources in the rural sector. He believed that a relatively egalitarian social order, if allowed to evolve in the long run, would provide an infrastructure for generating growth in the agricultural sector. To promote social harmony and to diffuse class antagonism, the government introduced two rural programs, the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) and the People's Works Program (PWP). In spirit and organizational structure, the programs were an adaptation of "Chinese Communes." The primary objective of these programs was to introduce a sense of sharing and promote effective resource use. The IRDP was to establish self-sufficient production units comprising about 50 to 60 villages having their own agricultural, health-care, technical, and educational infrastructure. By 1976, according to official estimates, 136 such units were established in rural areas of Pakistan (Table 4).

The Annual Development Plan covering these programs rose from 49 million rupees in 1971-72 to 211 million rupees in 1975-76 (Table 5). It is appropriate to point out that in these years (1971-76), Pakistan's currency was devalued by 130 %, and there was double-digit inflation as well. This

**TABLE 5** SECTORWISE DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOCATION OF ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS (SELECTED SECTORS) (MILLION RS.)

	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Total	2,002	3,368	4,977	8,788	13,365
Allocation:					
Education & Training	188	271	313	486	636
Health	151	140	192	309	649
Social Welfare	7	9	30	15	18
Manpower, Employment	4	8	39	28	32
Peoples Works Program	49	96	183	—	211

Source: *Pakistan Economic Survey 1976-77*, p. 189.

considerably compromised the real value of this amount. However, these programs increased public investment in the social sector. Given the credit facilities by the government, these programs improved irrigation and roadbuilding facilities. According to official estimates, yields per acre increased and some wasteland was transformed into cultivable land. Not enough data are available to estimate the impact of these programs on the rural structure of Pakistan. These policies did indicate, however, that Bhutto was able to build a substantial support base in the rural sector.

In the agrarian structure, Bhutto introduced two policies which were premature, if not radical. First, in April 1976, an ordinance was issued abolishing the Sardari system.<sup>32</sup> This ordinance struck at the very foundations of power of the "Sardars" and "Khans" (tribal and feudal chiefs) in Baluchistan. Sardars were denied judicial powers, and they

were not allowed to retain private jails, arrest any person, take any free labor, or receive a tribute. The Baluch Sardars looked upon this ordinance as a personal affront. They intensified hostility toward the government and its policies. In Baluchistan, Bhutto found it difficult to co-opt the Sardars the dominant social class; the tribesmen were too weak, and there was hardly any small or middle peasant class as was the case in Punjab, Sind, and Northwest Frontier Province, which Bhutto could mobilize. In retaliation, Baluch Sardars hardened their antagonism toward the Bhutto government, and made an alliance with the dissatisfied landowning classes of other provinces and the Financial Political groups.

The second premature, or radical, policy was the decision to take over the cotton, rice, and flour mills in July 1976.<sup>33</sup> There were 2,752 such mills (cotton ginning, 555; rice husking, 2,072; and flour milling, 125). The policy had two objectives. First, to eliminate the middleman—the broker who operated between the farmer and the market. Second, to establish the hegemony of the public sector in the national economy. It hurt a large middle class of traders, shop-keepers, and small-scale agricultural entrepreneurs. This middle and petty business community felt threatened by the policy and was quick to show resentment.

These two policies proved a turning point for the Bhutto government. The Financial Political groups, the landowning elites, the "Sardars," and the middle and petty business community began to believe that Bhutto was transforming the economy into a socialist system, which would eventually eliminate the right of private ownership.<sup>34</sup> This perceived fear was an important factor that contributed to the formation of a broad antigovernment coalition.

### **Policies of Reform in Education and Health**

Education and health were two important areas in the



social sector that underwent transformation under Bhutto's education and health policies. Through the expansion of education, health-care, and improved housing, the government sought nationalization of economy. Through the enforcement of these policies, the government penetrated into tribal areas, Northern areas, remote parts of Baluchistan, and rural areas of Punjab and Sind. The 1972 Education Policy aimed at democratization of higher education and universalization of primary education.<sup>35</sup> Its thrust was developmentalist, i.e., opening up new universities, upgrading and expanding the facilities of existing institutions, and, simultaneously, enlarging the infrastructure of the Ministry of Education for effective coordination and planning. The policy was egalitarian, modernist, and democratic in content and objectives. It improved teachers' pay scales and lowered tuition fees. The most controversial and distinguishing feature of the 1972 Education Policy was nationalization of private schools and colleges.

Analyzing the education policy, Jones has observed, "The education proposals were nationalist in content, developmental in design, and radical in spirit. Infused with ambitious egalitarian rhetoric, they promised to bring about a wholesale restructuring of values, local participation in educational affairs, equal access to education, and eradication of illiteracy."<sup>36</sup> It was in this spirit that about 3,000 private schools and 175 colleges were nationalized. In most of these private schools and colleges, teachers were underpaid. They welcomed the reform, while the owners of these institutions resisted the education policy.

The prime beneficiaries of educational reforms were educated, urban middle classes and lower-middle-class students from rural and urban areas. However, in the remote rural areas, opening up of the educational institutions generated new social awareness. In terms of Gross National Product

ratio, though, expenditure on education rose to only 2.1% in 1976-77, from 1.6% in 1971-72.<sup>37</sup> In terms of actual Annual Plan Allocations, the rise was substantial (see Table 5).

Although the 1972 Educational Policy was reformist in spirit and content, it lacked specificity. The policy was sketchy and its implementation mechanisms were not well planned. Consequently, it increased an element of uncertainty rather than stabilize the educational institutions.

The health sector has been the most neglected area in Pakistan. This was one area which needed reform and improvement. Health expenditure as a ratio of GNP was only 0.46% in 1971-72, rising to 1% in 1976-77. The per capita expenditure on health during the same period was only Rs. 3.00, which rose to Rs. 16.75. During Bhutto's rule, the Annual Development Plan allocation for the health sector substantially increased (see Table 5). However, the figures indicate how insignificant the health sector's allocation and role were in the national economy.

In order to improve the quality of life, the regime announced a health policy in March 1972. It emphasized improving the existing facilities, increasing the number of dispensaries, hospitals, and medical colleges, and establishing health centers in the rural areas. It made substantial increases (see Table 5). However, the basic thrust of the policy was to lay down a framework for an effective health service. The People's Health Scheme provided a three-tiered system, focusing on increasing the number of doctors, paramedical auxiliary facilities, and community health workers. The scheme proposed that for a village population of about 1,000, there would be one community worker who would help in combating simple and minor diseases. For a population of 10,000 there would be a basic health unit with a paramedical staff of four-to-six workers. Health centers would be manned by



two doctors.

For the first time, there was an ambitious and comprehensive health scheme. It did generate awareness on health issues. The policy also suffered from a lack of well thought out implementation mechanisms. In urban areas some health centers became operative. However, in the rural areas, the infrastructure remained weak, though some of the health units and centers did begin to operate in the remote tribal and rural areas.<sup>38</sup>

### Conclusion

Bhutto's policies of incremental change generated mixed results. These policies created an environment for socio-economic change, but institutionalization of that change required a longer period of political stability. In general it can be stated that in developing societies, policies of gradual transformation introduce a phase of transition, resistance to change, and uncertainty. Under Bhutto's reforms, Pakistan underwent such an experience. There is a general consensus among scholars that Bhutto's policies created new classes and groups, but that he could not institutionalize the role of these new classes and groups in the national polity.<sup>39</sup>

His policies benefitted the disadvantaged classes and groups, including the peasants, industrial workers, the urban middle classes, the professional groups, the middle farmer and small-scale industrialist/entrepreneur; but they alienated the Financial Political aligarchy, the landowning elites, the "Khans" and "Sardars" (in NWFP and Baluchistan) who resisted these policies and turned hostile to Bhutto's rule. Confronted by their hostility and alienation, Bhutto found it difficult to integrate the interests of established groups with those of disadvantaged classes and groups. Nevertheless,



through his policies of gradual reform, he did succeed in achieving some measure of "social justice."<sup>40</sup>

The disadvantaged classes and groups received wage and welfare benefits, and found some new employment opportunities. Middle farmers and some small peasants benefitted from "generous. credit and loan facilities. Despite these modest achievements, industrial production stagnated, private investments declined, and the economic growth rate fluctuated. Industrial production stagnated for three reasons. First, nationalization of industries led to bureaucratization of industries, resulting in high inefficiency and low productivity. Second, by 1976 over 70 % of the public sector was committed to heavy industries like steel, cement, and fertilizer. These industries had very large capital-labor ratios. Burki has estimated that the Karachi steel mill required a \$ 100,000 investment for each job it created, whereas private large-scale industry required \$ 20,000 for each job, and for small scale enterprise the capital-labor ratio was estimated to be only \$ 500.<sup>41</sup>

Third, to overcome that lack of private investment in the industrial sector, the government's preferred priority was to expand the agricultural sector. Agriculture contributed 36.50 % of the total GNP and grew at a rate of 2.2%. The industrial sector's contribution to the GNP declined from 16.31% in 1970-71 to 14.25% in 1976-77. A major decline was in the large-scale sector. However, the small-scale industries showed a greater dynamism in investment and output as compared to the performance of large/medium-scale industries in the private sector. During Bhutto's six year's rule, small-scale industrial investment increased at a rate of 5 % per annum, which was a modest achievement, and reflected a new trend.<sup>42</sup>

Significant trends during Bhutto's rule were public

investment in the heavy industries, expansion of the agricultural sector, and a modest increase in small-scale industrial enterprise in the private sector. The critical question was whether economic growth and greater distributional equality could be achieved simultaneously.

While the Bhutto government was striving to achieve these twin objectives by developing a framework of "mixed economy" through policies of gradual reform, one scholar of the South Asian scene, Dr. Mahboob-ul-Haq, asserted that "the days of mixed economy are numbered." It generates neither "growth" nor "equality," but promotes "bureaucratic socialism." He further asserted:

The developing countries will have to become either more frankly capitalist or more genuinely socialist. The capitalist alternative is workable only in those situations where the society is willing to accept income inequality over a long period of time without expanding, or where extremely high growth rates (10 to 15 %) can be financed with a generous inflow of resources from western friends. Otherwise the only alternative is a genuinely socialist system, based on a different ideology and a different pattern of society.

Haq reduces the problem to an either/or situation, limiting the choices to a "frankly capitalist" or "genuinely socialist" system — which amounts to no choice. Haq apparently fails to comprehend the nature of historical, structural conditions in these societies. His prescription precludes gradualism as an effective policy instrument, given a relatively longer period of time. The key issue is not only creating "major change," but first creating an awareness about the need for change, i.e., about the iniquitous nature of the socio-economic structure. Here one can identify some of the effects of Bhutto's gradualist approach:

- (1) Nationalization of the banks ushered the rural sector into the market economy, thereby initiating a process of socio-economic change in the agrarian structure. It performed dual functions: landowning elites were encouraged to develop entrepreneurial skills by relying on agriculture technology and mechanization (i.e., through credits and loans), whereas the small, middle farmer felt relieved from the shackles of the landlord and moneylender, and could rely on banks for credits and loans. The banks have become an important link between the rural migrant to the Middle East and his family in the village.
- (2) With Bhutto's gradualist approach, returns from remittances from overseas workers played an important role in reducing poverty. While his welfare policies in the area of education, health, housing, population planning, etc., gave salience to the issue, input in these sectors was still meager in terms of GNP ratios. Nevertheless, for the first time a serious effort was made to recognize the problem and initiate some process to resolve it.
- (3) Bhutto's policies spread social consciousness among the rural and urban masses. While the "feudal" norms persisted, egalitarian norms were also emerging. Agrarian transition — if not transformation — has become an ongoing process in Pakistan's polity.
- (4) The nationalization of basic industries had made the public sector an integral component of Pakistan's economy. Evidently it promoted bureau-



cratic control. It has to be recognized, however, that a reformist leader needs a longer period of political stability to institutionalize his reformist policies, and in the short run he may be forced to fall back on the existing institutions—which may not be the best solution. Increased bureaucratic inefficiency on the other hand, can also serve to prompt incremental change.

- (5) The experience of Bhutto's reformist policies indicated that some "equity" can be achieved through gradulism, though in the short run "growth" may suffer. But it can be argued that if social development policies are sound in concept, mass-participation oriented, and well executed, then growth may follow social development, especially in the long run. The Chinese experience can be cited as an example.

In sum, given a relatively short period of six years, and despite the constraints of structural collapse and psychological loss, Bhutto succeeded in rebuilding the shattered state of Pakistan. He could not provide optimal solutions as a reformist leader, but his policies of incremental change did initiate processes of attitudinal change in Pakistan. It can be asserted that incremental change with corresponding institutional consolidation still remains perhaps the most effective viable policy option for the developing societies.

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## Patterns Of Civil-Military Relations In Pakistan: An Appraisal of Bhutto Period

In forty years of Pakistan's history the military has been in power for 23 years. The prospects of continued hegemonic role of the military persist. During 1971-77 under the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto an attempt was made to replace military's hegemony with a civilian led dominant party system. The interlude was short, controversial and despite some innovative features remained illusive.

Most of the theoretical literature that deals with the role of the military in developing countries is premised on the assumption that developing countries should accept the supremacy of civilian leadership and institutions over the military, as is done in the west. This assumption is reflected in a number of typologies that explain the role of the military in the politics of developing nations.<sup>1</sup>

In explaining the Pakistan case, I find these typologies of limited value. Using the Pakistan experience as an example, I propose that civil-military relations in developing countries be analyzed in terms of military hegemony vs. civilian dominance. It is not merely a question of delineating the spheres of influence between the two. It is basically a competition between the two types of system, each having its own adherents and opponents.



The adversarial nature of the civil-military relationship (in terms of seeking hegemony or dominance of one over the other) is of special significance in Pakistan, where the history of civil-military relations is a study in mistrust and intermittent conflict rooted in a certain incompatibility between the hegemonial power-holders (the military-bureaucratic elites) over the relatively noninstitutionalized political parties and political leaders. Mistrust and conflict are largely engendered and aggravated if and when a civilian regime comes to power and attempts to alter the basis of the military's hegemonic position.

During Bhutto's regime, civil-military relations underwent such a transition. Under such conditions, establishing civilian dominance and replacing the military's hegemony emerged as the primary goal of civilian leadership, while building institutions, such as political parties or interest groups, remained a low priority. Civilian supremacy without party building proved illusive. It is in this context that I will explore: What types of strategies were adopted by Bhutto to redefine the basis of the relationship with the military? What impact did these policies have on the military, and how did the military elites respond? To what degree, if any, was the civilian regime under Bhutto any different from the military regimes in Pakistan?

TABLE 1  
GNP GROSS REVENUE RECEIPT AND DEFENCE  
EXPENDITURES

(Rupees in millions)

Expenditure As % of Yr. Rev. Rcpts.	GNP	Total Rev. Rcpts.	Amount	As % GNP	Revenue Receipts
1968-69	37955	5774	2427	6.4	42.0
1969-70	43348	6665	2739	6.3	41.0
1970-71	54620	6021	3202	7.0	53.2
1971-72	49268	6065	3726	7.6	61.4
1972-73	61258	7533	4440	7.3	58.9
1973-74	81058	11048	4949	6.1	44.8
1974-75	105787	12980	6914	6.5	53.3
1976-77	141166	17787	8121	5.8	45.7

Source: Computed from *Pakistan Economy Survey*, 1978-79. (Islamabad: Finance Division).

Analyzing civil-military relations, Welch has pertinently observed that scholars of civil-military relations appear "more effective in listing causes of military coup d'etat than in prescribing steps for civilian control"<sup>2</sup>. I think the interesting question is not only why the civilian regimes fail, but also how they try to maintain themselves. Welch says:

Civilian control is more a set of *relationships* than an individual *event*. . . The nature and extent of civilian control reflect shifting balances between the strengths of civilian political institutions on one side, and the political strengths of military institutions on the other. Civilian control is a matter of degree. All armed forces

participate in politics in various fashions. They cannot be precluded from the political arena, given their organizational identity, autonomy, and functional specialization. Any military has an impact on its political system with its political roles being a question not of *whether*, but of *how much* and *what kind*.<sup>3</sup>

The critical issue in civilian control is one of "setting limits" on the political role of the military elites and the military as an institution. Military control of politics in developing countries has become the rule rather than an exception (of course there are exceptions like India, Mexico, Malaysia, among others). Pakistan under Bhutto was such an exception, but that interlude did not last long.

#### Pattern of Civilian Control: The Military Under Bhutto

Bhutto was the first Pakistani political leader who made a concerted effort to bring the military under civilian control. On one hand, his strategy was to impose checks on the political role of the military; on the other hand, domestic and external security considerations compelled him to increase defence expenditure. During his rule, (1972-77) defence spending stood around 6 % of the GNP or 47% of the annual budget (see Table 1). This strategy of restricting the political role of the military and appeasing its budgetary needs produced contradictory effects. Bhutto became so occupied with imposing civilian control over the military that he failed to pay adequate attention to civilian political institutions (particularly political parties).

Bhutto showed preference for subordinating the military to civilian control. Defeat had left the military humiliated and weakened, and its ability to maintain hegemony had also declined. Bhutto recognized this and moved quickly to take maximum advantage: within four months of taking



command, he purged 43 senior officers.<sup>4</sup>

The fact that Bhutto was able to make such a purge indicated that the generals were divided, demoralized and paralyzed by the effects of war. Purges in the air force and the navy were of minor significance because of their smaller size and secondary political role. It is estimated that in 1971 the total number of officers in the Pakistan army above the rank of brigadier was 120.<sup>5</sup> Retirement of 29 officers was a sizeable but not massive reduction. As a result of the 1971 crisis and war with India, a number of these officers were discredited by the army and the public. It effectively shook the upper ranks in the army, and Bhutto was careful not to pursue a general purge. Bhutto's goal was, Cohen has pertinently remarked:

... to create in Pakistan the kind of professional but docile military establishment that the Indians had by reducing the power and prestige of the army without reducing its fighting capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

The Pakistani experience revealed that the military withdrew from politics, not voluntarily, but under conditions of extreme distress or defeat. However, despite withdrawal, the Pakistani military remained a potent political force and a potential intervener.<sup>7</sup> This was so because in the post-military state, ethnic cleavages, ideological polarization and personal rivalries among the political leaders emerged with a new intensity.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the fear of India and further disintegration of the Pakistani state persisted. These conditions were hardly conducive for establishing civilian control over the military.

Prior to 1972 the military was the single largest employer with the largest single public expenditure. It employed 300,000 officers and men (approximately 280,000 were in

the army).<sup>9</sup> Between 1968 and 1972, the defence expenditure was 5.6% of the country's total GNP.<sup>10</sup>

Besides the financial-industrial groups, the military was the biggest loser in the 1971 civil war. Laporte correctly observed that, prior to the creation of Bangladesh, "the military, and in particular the army, was a highly prestigious, well organized, and according to U.S. military personnel, effective fighting force as well - certainly one of the better armed forces in Asia."<sup>11</sup> This image was radically altered after the 1971 war. Prior to the war the military had enjoyed the public's esteem. Military officers were painfully aware of their loss of reputation. For example, Major General Fazal Muqueem graphically described the change in public opinion

The public confidence in the defence services was badly shaken. The disenchantment of the people with the military establishment was universal. . . . The armed forces themselves were disillusioned and most bitter. Mixed feelings of depression and discharge were rampant amongst them.<sup>12</sup>

A cursory survey of Pakistan's Urdu newspapers reveals that the military's defeat struck the public with disbelief, shock and grief. However, it was the military generals and not the military as an institution that came under severe criticism.<sup>13</sup>

To analyze the civil-military relations, I will elaborate some of the policy choices through which Bhutto regime attempted to control the military in Pakistan.

1. Imposing constitutional constraints.
2. Social class, generational and regional background of the military elites.

3. Instituting changes in command structure.
4. Control through creation of parallel para-military institutions.

### **Constitutional Constraints**

Having purged the generals whom Bhutto perceived as potential or real rivals, he opted to establish civilian control through constitutional means. Bhutto's strategy was to confine the role of the military to defense and security matters. The 1973 Constitution clearly spelled out the role of the military in the political system. The constitution declared that under the direction of the federal government, the military was required to, "defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so."<sup>14</sup> These are the normal functions of the military, but by including such a clause Bhutto showed that he was determined to set limits on the political role of the military. Yet another clause was incorporated to ensure against a possible coup d'etat. The Supreme Court had earlier held that General Yahya Khan had usurped power; therefore in the new constitution a "high treason" clause was incorporated. It warned:

Any person who attempts to abrogate or conspires to abrogate and subvert the constitution by the use of force or show of force shall be regarded as an act of high treason.<sup>15</sup>

By purging the generals and by setting constitutional limits on the political role of the military, Bhutto succeeded in obtaining the support of the military high command. At the institutional level, however, the military remained skeptical about Bhutto's motives.<sup>16</sup>



While Bhutto attempted to control the military through constitutional devices, he demonstrated a lack of respect for the constitution by his political actions and behaviour. The opposition parties' confrontational attitude and Bhutto regime's authoritarian response resulted in increased domestic political violence, frequent use of section 144, and continuation of Emergency and other repressive measures. These conditions produced skepticism among the military elites about Bhutto's commitment to uphold the constitution.

It must be recognized that respect for the constitution and civilian supremacy is a matter of socialization and educational training of the military which demands a degree of consensus among the civilian and military elite groups to show mutual respect for each other's spheres of interest.<sup>17</sup> The military hegemonic system is based on coercion and respect for the law is minimal, both at the elite and popular levels. Therefore, in the post-military state, hegemonic tendencies not only persist, but political leadership also finds it difficult to promote acceptance of constitutional process. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition parties could resist adopting extra-constitutional methods to settle political differences because, under military hegemonic rule, their experience was limited to politics of confrontation and not compromise and consensus. The Pakistani case reveals that the civilian regime more than anything attempted to use the constitution primarily as a means to eliminate the hegemonic position of the military and establish civilian control.

#### **Social Class, Generational and Regional Background of the Military Elites**

In the "New" Pakistan, Punjab emerged as the most populous province (58 % of the total) followed by Sind (21.6 %) NWFP (16.7%) and Baluchistan (2.4 %).<sup>18</sup>

It must be pointed out that prior to 1971, the ethnic factor was least salient in the military; it was only after the emergence of Bangladesh that the ethnic factor became visible. Precise figures for each group's position in the officer corps are not available. According to one estimate, the ethnic composition of the Pakistani military officer corps is: Punjabis 70%, Pathans 15 %, Muhajirs 10 % Baluchis and Sindhis 5 %.<sup>19</sup> This estimate provides us with the broad composition of the Pakistan military officer corps, but does not provide insight into the complexity of inter-elite interactions. It may be noted that the ethnic issue has not emerged as a serious threat to the cohesion of the officer corps. During the post-1971 period, the regional groupings (i.e., not necessarily based on language) did acquire salience among the elite circles, and different factions jockeyed for power.

However, the upper echelons of the Pakistan army have shown a tremendous capacity to maintain cohesiveness and suppress dissent or insubordination. For example, just before Bhutto's installation, three Brigadiers, Iqbal Mehdi Shah, Agha Javed Iqbal, and B. A. were found to be involved in a plot to overthrow the Yahya regime. This was called the "Kharian conspiracy." The officers failed in their attempt and the brigadiers were court-martialled and released from the army.<sup>20</sup>

Although definite data are not available on the social class, education, year of recruitment, socialization experience, and regional background of the Pakistani military elite, in recent years efforts have been made to classify them for analytical purposes. Eqbal Amad has attempted to explain the ideological orientations of the military elites in class terms. He has divided two generations of Pakistani military officers into two "classes." The first was trained at Sandhurst and the Indian military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun, before world War-II and governed Pakistan until 1971.

According to Eqbal:

They regarded politicians contemptuously as fomentors of trouble. . . the people callously, as the object of administration and reservoir of labor. . . Although excessively greedy and callous, they were nevertheless moderate men in the sense that politically they were neither revivalists nor zealots. Belonging to an entrenched upper class. . . these retarded Tories had much stake in the old order; hence, an inclination to eschew fascist solution.<sup>21</sup>

The second generation was being succeeded, wrote Eqbal in 1974, by another class "of petit bourgeois origin and fascist outlook." According to Eqbal, since these officers were in school in the 1930's-1940's they were exposed to some degree to the politics of the nationalist movement and agitation. This influenced their political outlook. Eqbal described this class of officers:

Having been trained in the old tradition, they share most of the authoritarian values and elitist values of the old guard. However, being less acquainted with liberal British tradition, they are more prone to viewing the world in straight lines, in terms of order vs. discipline vs. permissiveness, strength vs. weakness.<sup>22</sup>

Class explanations, although meaningful, do not adequately explain the behaviour and outlook of officers as a whole. Generational differences do have an effect. Cohen, taking into account such factors as time of recruitment, social class, ethnic background and institutional training, has classified three generations of Pakistan army. He cautions his readers that his "generational classification" does not have "hard and fast distinction."<sup>23</sup> Cohen's generations are:

1. **British Generation:** These officers entered service



around 1918-1920, were trained at Sandhurst, served during World War II, and dominated Pakistan in the 1950's and early 1960's. Their major contribution was that they developed a strategic alliance with the United States that led to the "material and technical growth of the Pakistan military."<sup>24</sup>

2. **American Generation :** These officers entered service after 1932, were trained at Sandhurst and the IMA, and also served during World War II. With the initiation of U.S. military aid in 1953, a larger number of officers from this generation received training, either in the United States or from the Americans. This generation came to acquire an overblown estimate of their own and Pakistan's martial qualities, and some came to believe implicitly the myth that one Pakistani soldier was equal to five, ten or more Indians.<sup>25</sup> This generation was dominant in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
3. **Pakistani Generation :** These officers were recruited during World War II or immediately after through a programme of the short Commission and were called Emergency Commission Officers (ECO's). They were considered professionally inferior compared to Sandhurst or IMA graduates and came to dominate between 1972 and 1982.

This classification, although insightful and broad, has a number of limitations, for example, the three generations fall primarily into the category of the British generation. Second from the 1950's on, irrespective of any generation, U.S. military doctrines and equipment were dominant characteristics of the Pakistani military establishment. Third, I find Cohen's generational dimension useful, but his labeling of generations is superficial because an outstanding characteristic of the Pakistan military is that, in terms of organization,

strategic doctrines and military equipment and elite orientation, its officer corps is predominantly pro-West.

I will argue that, from 1950 to 1977, the Pakistani military elites underwent a cycle of generational-regional shifts. These shifts changed not only the political outlook of the officer corps, but also influenced their attitude towards the civilian political leadership and institutions. Although schooling and social class help us understand the composition and outlook of the officer corps, one does find gaps. In a number of cases, officers had a similar social class and institutional training background, yet their political orientations and professional attitudes were completely different. In addition to generation, regional and those factors previously mentioned, another important factor was the selection and political orientation of the commander-in-chief of the army. Generational changes coincided with regional shifts and contributed to the selection of the commander-in-chief. This, in turn, shaped the political-professional attitudes and orientations of each successive generation of officers.

Between 1950-72, Pathan Generals were the dominant military elites. With regard to recruitment, social class origins and schooling these generals had different backgrounds. Although belonging to different generation, as commander-in-chief Pakistan army, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (1950-1969), General A. M. Yahya Khan (1966-71) and General Gul Hassan (1971 December, March 1972) were influential in changing the course of politics in the country. General Gul Hassan's short tenure was transitory and led to regional-generational shift facilitating the ascendancy of Pothwar Generals. The Pothwar Generals although from the "martial race" came from relatively humble social origins, since Pothwar is the primary troop recruiting area these generals had strong support among the rank and file. A



number of them had been Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCO's). This commission was given to aspiring and ambitious native soldiers in the British Indian Army. These officers were traditional in outlook, inclined to respect chain of command and civilian supremacy. General Tikka Khan, who was Chief of Staff of the Pakistan army from 1972 to 1976, came from this background.

Another prominent officer with similar social origins, but different regional- generational background was General Mohammad Musa Khan (from Hazara tribe in Baluchistan). He had also risen from the ranks was commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army from 1958-1966. These were the only commander-in-chief's of the Pakistan army who did not initiate coup d'état's to become President.

In 1976 the generation of Pathan-Pothwar generals was visibly fading, and a new generation was gaining prominence. The officers of the World War II years were being replaced by officers commissioned in the post-war years. This third generation of officers came from the lower-middle class and some from "non-martial" backgrounds. During the war years, a crash program of granting "temporary commissions" was initiated by the British to produce officers with superior qualifications. They were called Emergency Commission Officers (ECO's) and were to be discharged from service after the war.<sup>26</sup> According to Cohen:

The ECO's received shorter training, many had non-military backgrounds. Their English was weaker and many were motivated by a desire for a government job rather than military service.<sup>27</sup>

Selection of General Zia-ul-Haq as a chief of staff of Pakistan army in 1976, coincided with a third generation-regional shift in the elite structure of Pakistan army. The



earlier generation of generals manifested modern-western political orientations. However, General Zia-ul-Haq did not take too long to reveal his fundamentalist political outlook. He was brisk in replacing the Quaid-i-Azam's motto of Pakistan army-Unity, Faith and discipline with Faith, Peity and Holy war (Jihad). As noted earlier the chief of Pakistan army has played a crucial role, not only in shaping the elite groupings but also in influencing the political orientations of the military elites. This suggests that in 1971, as Bhutto assumed power, Pakistan military elites were undergoing a generational-regional shift. The generals were faction-ridden, but maintained organizational unity. Bhutto was skillful in managing this shift. However in 1976, he failed to comprehend the generational-regional change that was in the offing.

### **Instituting Changes in Military Command Structure**

Bhutto was shrewd enough to recognize that the military elites were divided and struggling to adapt, and he was quick to take advantage of the situation. His objective was clear and simple: establish personal and civilian supremacy over the military. As noted earlier, having initiated the purges and constitutional controls, Bhutto set out to bring changes in the institutional structure of the military. He devised a two pronged strategy:

1. reform the command structure of the armed forces;
2. reduce reliance on the military for maintaining law and order by creating paramilitary forces.

As a first step, Bhutto opted to co-opt and promote the Pothwar Generals. In March 1972, recognizing that the Sandhurst officers and General Yahya's associates had lost credibility in the army and that patronizing the Pothwar

officers would who a sizeable constituency for him, Bhutto chose to appoint General Tikka Khan chief of staff of the Pakistan army (who was initially by passed although he was senior to General Gul Hassan). It may well have been that Bhutto found it difficult to persuade General Gul Hassan to go along with his (Bhutto's) proposed reform of the command structure of the armed forces. Bhutto abolished what he termed the "anachronistic and obsolete" post of the commander-in-chief: all the services' chiefs (the army, navy and air force) were given same rank and seniority.<sup>28</sup> Besides the strong support base of General Tikka Khan within the army, Bhutto was encouraged to promote the general as he was receptive to the civilian, supremacy of the armed forces. Simultaneously, Bhutto announced the retirement of six senior air force officers, and appointed Air Marshal Zafar Choudhary chief of the Pakistan air force.

His second step was to fix the tenure of the chief of staff for a term of four years (later reduced to three years). Third, Bhutto decided to shift the Naval headquarters from Karachi to Islamabad, ostensibly to promote coordination among the services, but also to have a close watch over the navy's top brass.<sup>29</sup> These changes were cosmetic, but the fact that Bhutto was able to enforce them indicated that the military elites were weak and reluctantly accepted civilian supremacy.

Having appointed a team of dependable chiefs of the services, Bhutto gradually moved to placate various elite groups in the military. For instance, General Fazal Muqueem an East Punjabi, was appointed Secretary, Ministry of Defence. At the same time, Bhutto began to supervise closely the promotions, posting and transfers of the officers above the rank of brigadier. He was known to ask political associates, as well as adversaries, about the political affiliations of various senior officers. He withheld approval of promotions of



officers related to his political opponents.<sup>30</sup> These decisions created a commotion among the senior officer corps, who perceived them as interference in the affairs of the military. This was resented by the military elites.<sup>31</sup> Nordlinger has hypothesized a co-relation between civilian interference in the affairs of the military and coup d'etat's.<sup>32</sup> He points out that in Egypt in 1952, King Farouk was overthrown by the army because he interfered in the internal affairs of the army. Similarly, in 1964, Brazilian President Goulart was overthrown by the military as he attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of the military. Nordlinger's argument can be generalized and has relevance to Pakistani case. In March 1973, a group of army officers led by retired Brigadier F.B. Ali and Colonel Alim Afridi, attempted a coup against the Bhutto regime. The leaders aimed at not only overthrowing Bhutto, but also unseating senior commanders who were collaborating with Bhutto.<sup>33</sup> The attempted coup failed because the conspiring officers had a very narrow base and their organization was weak. The ring leaders of the coup were tried according to the military law (with General Zia-ul-Haq, then Brigadier, as the Military Judge); the conspiring officers were given long term imprisonment. An interesting aspect of Pakistan's military is that only those coups have succeeded which were led by the chief-of-staff of Pakistan army (1958, 1969, and 1977). All those attempts made by the junior officers failed (1951, 1971, 1973).

In general, the army under the command of General Tikka Khan, remained supportive of the Bhutto regime. However, despite these changes of the command structure, Bhutto's control of the military was precarious.<sup>34</sup>

With supportive commanders Bhutto felt confident and encouraged to pursue civilian control of the military. In March 1976 the regime issued a White Paper on Higher Defence Organization.<sup>35</sup> The White Paper upheld the princi-



ple of civilian supremacy over the military and declared that Prime Minister was the chief executive of the state and that the ultimate responsibility of national defence would rest with him. The White Paper attributed the defeat of the military in 1971 to poor defence planning and emphasized the need for civilian supremacy. It stated:

The evolution of the national defence policy and its administration requires: (a) effective political control at the top, both to secure the proper integration of the various relevant elements and to provide competent political guidance to the nation's defence effort; and (b) a number of institutions and agencies at the base, to produce the necessary data and appreciations on which political decisions can be based, and to translate the overall policy when formulated into specific, mutually consistent plans for implementation by the armed services and other agencies concerned.<sup>36</sup>

The new scheme decentralized power into different offices and institutions. The chief of staff of the army was put in charge of planning and conducting ground operations. And the chiefs of the air and naval staffs were responsible for air and sea operations. The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was created. The Chairman was to be senior to the three chiefs. He was to plan and conduct joint operations of the three services. The Secretary General for Defence was placed in charge of administration, while the minister of state for defence was in charge of internal security and was to coordinate defence related matters with the JCSC and the armed forces headquarters.

The function of promotion and appointments was, however, not centralized under the Ministry of Defence, as is usual in most countries. The three service chiefs continued

to be responsible for this function in their respective services. Bhutto thought that giving this function to the Chairman of the JCSC would make him too powerful. And, he found the military too closely knit and closed for a civilian defence minister (the portfolio he himself had) to take on this task. However, the Defence Ministry had the right to veto a promotion. Bhutto used this veto power a few times and was met with resentment bordering on uproar. But the service chiefs remained a force in making appointments.<sup>37</sup>

Bhutto's obvious strategy was to insure that no individual or group within the armed forces acquire a dominant position. General Tikka Khan, the chief of army staff, was rewarded for his loyalty and was appointed minister of state for defence.<sup>38</sup> General Mohammad Sharif was appointed as the first chairman of JCSC. Both he and Khan were from Pothwar. In March 1976, General Zia-ul-Haq, a junior corps commander was promoted to chief of army staff, superseding four generals; two resigned in protest. His promotion further reinforced the perception among the military elites that Bhutto was setting aside the principle of seniority and professional competence, and was promoting political loyalists to the top positions.<sup>39</sup>

These changes had three effects. First, they sharpened the 'Punjabization' of the Pakistan army at the elite level and may have caused a commotion among the senior Pathan officers. Second, the perception among the military elites that Bhutto was interfering in the professional matters of the army produced a status deprivation syndrome. The military elites were already aware of their tarnished reputation. Bhutto's attempts to establish civilian supremacy undermine the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of the military. Third, it appeared that Bhutto failed to comprehend the organizational principles of the military, particularly at the top level, where relations among generals are of a political



rather than a disciplinary nature.

### **FSF : Its Functions and Bhutto's Motives**

Had Bhutto confined himself to merely tinkering with the command structure, the military elites might have tolerated his reformism. But, confronted with problems of labour unrest, civil strife and regionalism, Bhutto was on more than one occasion forced to call upon the army to restore law and order. To enhance personal power, reduce reliance on the military, and to diminish the military's monopoly of coercive power, Bhutto created paramilitary institution like the Federal Security Force (FSF). It was an important step in a country where the military's hegemony had never before been challenged, and it was to have important ramifications for the pattern of civil-military relations under Bhutto's regime.

The creation of a paramilitary force, more than anything, produced a status deprivation syndrome among the military elite. Nordlinger says:

The establishment of popular militia, calls in doubt the military's adequacy and reliability as guarantors of national security. . . The dilution of the responsibility and this assignment to professional inferiors, can only be interpreted as a stinging insult to the officer corps. It also represents a clear signal to the military : the armed forces are replaceable.<sup>40</sup>

Essentially, Nordlinger is saying that the military is provoked when its corporate interests are challenged while Welch reminds us that the military can also be provoked if the legitimacy of civilian political institutions is weak.<sup>41</sup> Drawing upon the Nordlinger-Welch framework, I will argue that the military in Pakistan perceived the FSF as a potential



rival institution - a threat to their autonomy and monopoly of coercive power. Furthermore, the opposition political parties also saw the FSF as a threat to their interests. They perceived it as an instrument of state repression and challenged its legitimacy. Thus, the FSF emerged as a crucial factor in influencing the pattern of civil-military relations under the Bhutto regime.

In creating the FSF, Bhutto was clearly motivated by power considerations. His strategy was to regulate the politics of street protest, reduce civilian dependence on the military, and if possible, create an autonomous paramilitary force. This was reflected in a confidential letter that Bhutto wrote to his chief security officer:

We are living in times of trouble and chaos. In these extraordinary conditions the law and order situation is often threatened. The people come out on the streets on the least pretext. They violently defy established authority. Many of them have now become experts in the art of guerrilla tactics. Bloody clashes lead to more bloody clashes and the situation deteriorates so much that *it becomes necessary to call upon the armed forces to intervene. Once the armed forces intervene they play the game according to their own rules. It is necessary for a civilian government to avoid seeking the assistance of the armed forces in dealing with its responsibilities* (emphasis added),

He went on to argue that, since the Pakistani police force is "terribly inadequate and badly equipped", it has problems of low morale and discipline. In view of these conditions, Bhutto asserted:

We must make provisions for a first class reserve force. This must be a really first class force, well educated,

well trained and well equipped. . . It should be mobile, smart and alert. It should have a good image and it should be really the final repository for serious agitations and serious breaches of law and order.<sup>42</sup>

Bhutto's diagnosis of the problem was correct. He was perceptive enough to see a correlation between political disorder and possible military intervention. Given the history of the military's hegemony in Pakistan's politics, Bhutto had a lingering fear of a military takeover. This was reinforced by the fact that Bhutto hailed from Sind, a province not adequately represented in the Pakistan military. He had a popular support base in the Punjab, but he was uncertain about support from the military elites. As noted in the last section, his co-option of the Pothwar-East-Punjabi generals may have been motivated by considerations of securing support of the dominant elite groups in the military. In this ethno-political milieu, Bhutto's strategy was not only to control the military but also to control and suppress the opposition forces, which developed overtones of regional confrontation in Baluchistan.

With these considerations, the FSF was assigned to assist the civil administration in maintaining law and order in situation of "unlawful demonstrations" or "serious breaches of law and order."<sup>43</sup> Even though the officer corps of the force was to be recruited from among the armed forces, civil armed force and the police, it did not satisfy the opposition parties or the military because, in reality, the FSF developed into an instrument of repression.

As noted in the beginning of this section, the military perceived the FSF as a potential rival. Loss of status loomed larger in their perception than any threat of inadequate budgetary support. Nordlinger's assertion that a large militia reduces the military's ability to insure adequate budgetary



support, thereby leading to a sharp decline in the size of the military, was not the case in Bhutto's Pakistan. The total expenditure on the police and civil armed forces for the fiscal year 1976-77 amounted to Rs. 521.8 million (of this the FSF's share was only Rs. 107.7 million) a figure significantly less than Rs. 8.1 billion defence budget for the same year.<sup>44</sup> The size of Pakistan's military in Bhutto reign rose from 392,000 to 428,000 (an increase of over 9%)<sup>45</sup>

In 1977, the FSF had 20,000 servicemen. It had acquired a sophisticated communications network, possessed modern light weapons, and was visible not only in crowd control but also in VIP protection. Most of these functions had previously been monopolized by the military. Despite a large defence budget, it was the special status of the FSF that irked the military officers corps. According to Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "there was a good deal of resentment against the special status it (FSF) enjoyed and the rapidity with which it had acquired this status."<sup>46</sup>

In July 1977 when the military overthrew the Bhutto regime, one of its first acts was to disband the FSF.

In addition to their visible losses, there were instances where the military elites perceived that their privileges and autonomy were in jeopardy. For example, in November 1975, the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill was adopted by the National Assembly.<sup>47</sup> This enabled the regime to second any officer for service into civil armed forces of Pakistan. The previous practice had allowed only those officers who volunteered to join the civil armed forces to be seconded. Now the regime could transfer the army officers to the civil armed services. In yet another reformist move in January 1977, Bhutto reduced the size of landholding to 100 acres of irrigated and 200 acres of non-irrigated land. This affected a large segment of the officer corps. A precise figure is



difficult to give. Under General Ayub Khan, a land grant scheme was introduced, according to this officers between the rank of Colonel and General could be granted 150-240 acres of land. Bhutto's reform meant that officers would have to surrender part of their land. This was sufficient to cause disaffection among the senior officer corps with Bhutto's regime. The military elites saw this as another status depriving move.<sup>48</sup> There is no evidence to suggest whether Bhutto had carefully examined how this measure might affect the military elites.

In the Pakistani case, my findings suggest that Nordlinger's argument is applicable to the extent that perceptions about military autonomy and rival paramilitary institutions influenced the military elites' attitude toward the civilian regime. His point about inadequacy of budgetary support for defence may be examined in a different light. That is, it may be the adequacy of defence budget and not necessarily inadequacy which encourages the military to intervene in politics.

How does one account for increase in defence expenditure and also defence related projects under Bhutto's rule?

### **Bhutto's Foreign Policy Goals and the Military**

As noted earlier, Bhutto's strategy was to reduce the probability of the military's intervention in politics, and not to reduce the defence budget. Bhutto had two goals in maintaining a sizeable defence establishment. First, he believed that for an independent and active foreign policy a militarily strong Pakistan was a must. Second, through adequate defence expenditures, he thought he could appease the military. In other words, Bhutto's attitude towards the military was influenced by both domestic and foreign policy considerations. In this section, I will analyze how Bhutto's

perception of Pakistan's security needs and foreign policy goals influenced the pattern of civil-military relations.

Bhutto had concrete views on the kind of role Pakistan should play in the comity of nations. He identified these in terms of security needs, geo-political location, relations with great powers, historical ties with the Muslim world, and advocacy and support for Third World causes.<sup>49</sup>

Bhutto envisioned an independent foreign policy for Pakistan. For the purposes of brevity of my argument, I will focus on those issues and relations where Bhutto demonstrated what he meant by independent foreign policy. First, in a series of highly publicized foreign policy decisions, Bhutto recognized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. At the same time, he developed close relations with China, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Romania and North Korea.<sup>50</sup> He was quick to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries. In addition, Pakistan's diplomatic corps were instructed to support a number of liberation movements in Africa. He was also outspoken in denouncing the military overthrow of Allende's government in Chile. Bhutto sought to play an influential role in the economic struggle of the Third World countries against the advanced industrial states.<sup>51</sup>

These foreign policy changes had an impact on the ideological consciousness of the people, gave popular legitimacy to the regime and reinforced Bhutto's radical-nationalist image. Thus Bhutto attempted to convey that, whereas the earlier military regimes in Pakistan had subordinated Pakistan's national interests to "imperialist interest", under the civilian regime, a change in the new direction was taking place.



Second, Bhutto carefully expanded and consolidated Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world. He was able to cultivate relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, and the Gulf States. In February 1974, Bhutto played an active role in organizing the Second Islamic Conference, in which 37 Muslim countries participated (Bhutto was chosen as its first president and retained the position until his execution in April 1979). This provided Bhutto with an opportunity to develop close personal relations with a number of leaders of the Muslim leaders.

Bhutto encouraged affinity among Muslim countries and was able to secure considerable monetary help from the rich oil producing countries and later for the defence needs of Pakistan. For example, with Libyan financial support, Bhutto established the Mirage fighter air craft rebuilding plant, the Karachi Steel Mill with Soviet help, and the Indus Highway, Lowari Pass Taunnel, and the Nuclear power development program to mention a few.<sup>5 2</sup> He also expanded the existing defence-related exchange programs, particularly with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Increased number of officers corps from these countries received training in Pakistan's military and air force academies. The number of military "missions" in the Middle Eastern countries increased.

Third, the most important influence has been the changing nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations under Bhutto. Apparently Bhutto re-evaluated the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations as he assumed power in 1971. He explained this re-evaluation in terms of changes in objective conditions and geo-political realities. His critics charged that this was another facet of Bhutto's opportunism.

Once in power, Bhutto found that changed geo-political realities demanded a continued alliance with the United States. Bhutto was forced to face this reality in view of



Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, China-U.S. rapprochement and the Pakistan military's need for the U.S. equipment. It is conceivable that the military itself was a potent factor in retaining an alliance with the United States. The Pakistani military had links with State department which had developed and endured during different military regimes in Pakistan, and Bhutto was not prepared to disturb this linkage. In 1976, Bhutto ran in trouble with the United States. The issue was the acquisition of a nuclear reprocessing plant. In 1974, India had exploded a nuclear device. This revived Pakistan's insecurity syndrome. In response, Bhutto first sought guarantees from Western nuclear powers. Unable to secure such guarantees, he decided to go for the nuclear option. Bhutto's primary considerations were not only the security threat from India; he hoped that Pakistan would be the first Muslim country to have a nuclear bomb. He thought it would give him greater leverage in pursuing an active policy in the Muslim world and mobilized the support of the Muslim countries towards this end. It was in 1976 that Bhutto signed an agreement with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant. The U.S. Government attempted to dissuade both France and Pakistan from making such a deal, but did not succeed. After the nuclear deal, relations between the Bhutto regime and the United States deteriorated. President Carter's administration was publicly hostile to the Bhutto regime's insistence on pursuing a nuclear option. In July 1977 when, after wide spread protest, the Bhutto regime was overthrown by the military, there were speculation and reports of the United States having encouraged the military takeover.<sup>53</sup>

### Conclusion

Bhutto's domestic and foreign policy had contradictory effects in influencing the pattern of civil-military relations. In Bhutto's last political statement, his principal argument was that his regime was overthrown by the generals, who were encouraged by the United States to restrain him from

pursuing a nuclear weapons development program.<sup>54</sup> Bhutto also alleged that the opposition-led protest movement against his regime was financed by an outside power (implying the United States). These allegations have been refuted by the military regime, which has not abandoned the nuclear program. However, Bhutto's supporters continue to believe the U.S. involvement was a major factor in Bhutto's downfall and his execution.<sup>55</sup> Bhutto's and his supporters' beliefs aside, Bhutto caused disaffection in the military. Domestically, the military elites felt status deprivation and threats to their autonomy; externally an activist foreign policy, identification with Third World, the Muslim connection and the nuclear option increased military's desire to intervene rather than accept civilian supremacy.

Bhutto's plan to establish civilian control over the military by appeasing Pakistan's defence needs did not lead to acceptance of civilian supremacy: his tactics to control the military by imposing constitutional constraints, change of the command structure, and creation of the FSF also caused commotion among the military elites.

In dealing with the military Bhutto's strategy was to avert the prospects of a military coup. In a post-military-hegemonic political system the civilian successors can have a lingering fear of a possible military intervention. Given the history of military's hegemony in Pakistan, Bhutto had a reason to be concerned about the prospects of a coup particularly after 1973 abortive attempt. I have discussed various policy choices that Bhutto employed to restrict the political role of the army. Bhutto found it difficult to develop consensus among other political parties in restricting the role of military in politics. The FSF and its uses became a major source of conflict between the PPP regime and opposition parties. The army also did not like the FSF. On the other hand Bhutto sought the subordination of military to civilian

control without sufficiently organising the PPP.

Bhutto's excessive zeal in isolating the military from politics proved to be his most serious error. His strategies and tactics conveyed the impression that, more than just civilian control of the military, he wanted to establish personal hegemony.



## NOTES

1. See for example, Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1966, pp. 5-8, Amos Perlmutter, "Civil-Military Relations in Socialist Authoritarian and Praetorian States: Prospects and Retrospects": in Roman Kolko-wiez and Andrzed Korbonski (eds), *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 310-312. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hill, 1977, pp. 10-18.
2. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1976), pp. 1-2.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
4. 29 Officers from the Army, 7 each from the Navy and Air Force See, Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 252.
5. Interviews.
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26. Interviews.
27. Stephen Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 144.

28. Bhutto, *President of Pakistan: Speeches and Statements - December 20, 1972, — March 31, 1972*, p. 110.
29. Lodi, pp. 650-651.
30. Interviews.
31. Interviews; also Lodi, p. 652.
32. Nordlinger, pp. 71-73.
33. The March 1973 abortive coup was called the Attock Conspiracy Case: for an academic assessment, see Lodi, pp. 649-651. For two intensely personal and opposing points of view, see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated...* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 103-104, and Retired Air Marshal Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics, 1958-82* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983), pp. 92-94.
34. Lodi, p. 649, Selig Harrison (1981), p. 155.
35. For full text of the *White Paper of Defence Organization*, See *Defence Journal*, Vol. H, Nos. 7-8 (July-August 1976), pp. 16-22.
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42. For complete text of Letter, See Annexure 26 of page A-68 in *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. III (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1979).
43. *Ibid.*



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46. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), P. 69.
47. The Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill was adopted by the Assembly on November 7, 1975. See *Debates*, November, 7, 1975, p. 397.
48. Tahir-Kheli (1982), pp. 69-70.
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51. Bhutto, *New Directions*, pp. 84-85.
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53. Tahir Kheli, pp. 54-55, also Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan and India Politics Personalities and Foreign Policy", *Asian Survey*, Vol. VIII, No. 7, July 1978, pp. 717-724.
54. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I Am Assassinated...*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979, pp. 143-159.
55. Sh. Rashid, Senior Vice Chairman of the PPP said in an interview "I believe that U.S. murdered Mr. Bhutto." For full text see *Herald*, Karachi, Vol. 18, No. 6, June 1987, pp. 136-141.

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